

# The Role of the Mongolian People's Republic in the Korean War

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## Introduction

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union's occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States' occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War.

Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.<sup>2</sup> However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released

publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea.

Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,<sup>3</sup> Dr. B. Ligden,<sup>4</sup> Dr. Sh. Sandag,<sup>5</sup> junior scholar J. Sukhee,<sup>6</sup> and A. A. Osipov<sup>7</sup> mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,<sup>8</sup> D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),<sup>9</sup> Ts. Batbayar,<sup>10</sup> J. Battur,<sup>11</sup> K. Demberel,<sup>12</sup> Balázs Szalontai,<sup>13</sup> Sergey Radchenko<sup>14</sup> and Li Narangoa.<sup>15</sup> There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 2007<sup>16</sup> and 2008.<sup>17</sup>

The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about *why, how and to what degree* Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR's membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People's Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.<sup>18</sup> In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR's external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty.

## Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: Intensive Proposals of the DPRK

Diplomatic relations between the Mongolian People's Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were established on 15 October 1948 following DPRK's Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong's (박헌영, 朴憲永) proposal on 8 October 1948 to establish diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries.<sup>19</sup> The Mongolian government supported the proposal and the two sides exchanged verbal notes to that effect.<sup>20</sup>

In a note of response from Kh. Choibalsan, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the MPR it is mentioned:

After the Soviet Union, the Government of the MPR decided to establish diplomatic and economic ties with the DPRK. The Government of the MPR congratulates the North Korean nation for its establishment of the DPRK and its Government, and received satisfactorily the DPRK's Government proposal to establish between our states diplomatic and economic ties. Herewith we express wishes for successful progress to friendly relations between MPR and DPRK aiming for prosperity of our countries respecting national liberation and for friendship and security of worldwide nations.<sup>21</sup>

At the request of the DPRK's Ambassador to Moscow Chu Yong-ha<sup>22</sup> (Ju Yong-ha) meetings were held with the MPR's Ambassador to Moscow N. Yadamjav and proposals were issued on 10 May 1950 stating that: "on the grounds of tight relations the DPRK is willing to exchange ambassadors with fraternal MPR"... and on 26 May 1950 intending "to establish embassies on both sides". Soon after these proposals it was announced that "Government of the MPR welcomes with pleasure the issue of establishing mutual Diplomatic Representatives on Embassy status."<sup>23</sup> This urgency on the DPRK's side might have been connected with the necessity to establish foreign diplomatic representatives in large numbers in Pyongyang prior to the outbreak of war.<sup>24</sup>

Ambassador J. Sambuu accompanied by Counsellor and First secretary Kh. Sanjmyatav, Second secretary L. Purev, left Ulaanbaatar on 1 August 1950, and passing through Manchuria arrived in Pyongyang on 8 August. The first Mongolian Ambassador to the DPRK J. Sambuu<sup>25</sup> presented his Letters of Credentials to the President of the Supreme People's Congress for the DPRK Kim Tu-bong on 11 August 1950.<sup>26</sup> J. Sambuu, was an experienced diplomat, who, in 1937–1946, in particular during the most difficult times of World War II was working as an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the MPR to the Soviet Union. This experience and the fact that he was responsible for urgently organizing assistance to the Soviet Red Army were the reasons for appointing him Ambassador to the DPRK. The Mongolian Embassy, similar to the Soviet Embassy, was opened in Moranbong or Moran Hill, and following the capture of Pyongyang was moved to Sinuiju on the border between DPRK and PRC. S. Ravdan, as Ambassador and Colonel General in Pyongyang in 1952–1955, was subjected to a U.S. airstrike and received a heavy injury in his ear.<sup>27</sup> Due to these airstrikes, over the course of the war, the Embassy of Mongolia to the DPRK was moved four times.

In Ulaanbaatar, the DPRK's first Ambassador Kim Yong-jin (Kim Yeong-chin) and other diplomats including the third secretary and two attachés were

welcomed by B. Ochirbat, Head of Protocol Department, MFA, and B. Durvuljin, Head of Eastern Department, MFA at the Mongolian and Soviet border.<sup>28</sup> On 23 April 1951 Ambassador Kim Yong-jin was received by N. Lkhamsuren, Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the meeting Yu. K. Prikhodov, Ambassador of the USSR to the MPR and Ji Yatai Ambassador of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the MPR were also present.<sup>29</sup>

The First Ambassador of the DPRK Kim Yong-jin presented his Letters of Credentials to Chairman of the State Lower Khural (Lower House or Parliament) of MPR G. Bumtsend on 24 April 1951.<sup>30</sup> Ambassador Kim Yong-jin was a member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, educated in the Soviet Union, possibly at the KUTV, or Communist University of the Toilers of the East. He was an attaché in the Embassy of the DPRK in Moscow, according to information available in the archives. The presentations of these credentials were held during the most difficult initial period of the Korean War.

At the time of the founding of the PRC in October 1949, the MPR had already established diplomatic relations with the DPRK but until 1950 both sides communicated only on the occasion of each other's national days by sending mutual celebratory notes. It could be said therefore that the Korean War activated the relations of two countries. The ambassadors of Bulgaria and Romania in Beijing were also in charge of Pyongyang and Hanoi, but the Embassies of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were located in Pyongyang.

## The MPR Firmly Stood on the Side of the DPRK During the Korean War: Decisions and Assistance

It was believed in the MPR that the DPRK was waging a patriotic war of self-defense and aiming to reunify the Korean peninsula. With the involvement of the United States and peacekeepers from the United Nations, according to North Korea, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries the war became a patriotic war against American Imperialism. At that time the Mongolian Government was of the same view.

In the final stages of World War II Mongolia took part in the liberation war against Japanese militarism as the Soviet Union's political and military ally. As the second socialist country that recognized the DPRK, Mongolia sided firmly with the latter and provided it with substantial material and moral support. It may be questioned whether Mongolia's reason for supporting the DPRK in this war was actually an independent decision or made under pressure or insistence from the Soviet Union, namely from J. V. Stalin. This paper will demonstrate that besides Soviet involvement, decisions for assistance from Mongolia were made

in framework of fraternal friendship and in accordance with Mongolia's internationalist sense responsibility and the interests of world communist system.

In the afternoon of 25 June 1950, Yu. K. Prikhodov,<sup>31</sup> the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to Mongolia, came to the Central Committee of the MPRP (Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party) and informed the Committee about sudden aggression on the DPRK from Rhee Syngman's puppet government in conjunction with American imperialism. Yu. K. Prikhodov was an influential politician who had formerly worked as staff at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and was also an advisor in the Central Committee of the MPRP.

In this urgent meeting participated Kh. Choibalsan (Marshal, Prime Minister), Yu. Tsedenbal (General Secretary of the MPRP), G. Bumtsend (Chairman of the Presidium for the State Lower Khural), B. Lamjav (Deputy Prime Minister), S. Luvsan (Deputy Prime and Trade Minister), N. Lkhamsuren (Minister of Foreign Affairs), B. Lkhamsuren (General Secretary to MFA) and Prikhodov Yu. K. (USSR Ambassador to the MPR).<sup>32</sup>

From Moscow, on the evening of 25 June 1950 Kh. Yadamjav,<sup>33</sup> Ambassador of the MPR to the Soviet Union, according to the statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Union had also given information about the joint aggression of American imperialism and Seoul's puppet regime on the fraternal DPRK.<sup>34</sup> Later in 1956–1959, Kh. Yadamjav was assigned as an ambassador to the DPRK.

During the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPRP, and mainly at the behest of Marshal Kh. Choibalsan, decisions on foreign policy were made. Information sources were based solely upon secret information received through the Politburo of the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and via the Embassy of the USSR to Ulaanbaatar.

Stalin, using his authority, misled the leaders of other socialist countries about the real causes of the Korean War. Before the war Mongolians had just a general understanding that the Koreans had been under Japan's colonization, at the end of the WWII had been divided in two parts and it had been the DPRK's choice to follow the socialist path. At the time Mongolia and other socialist countries had a very general understanding about the origins and goals of the Korean War. Coupled with this Mongolian leaders believed that steadfast support for DPRK would be most significant for ensuring solidarity and closeness in the world socialist system.

Not long after the Korean War started, the MPR's Prime Minister Kh. Choibalsan<sup>35</sup> sent on 12 July 1950 a message to the leader of North Korea Kim Il Sung in which he underlined that "The Mongolian people are closely following the heroic struggle of the freedom loving Korean people against the armed aggression of the traitorous clique of Rhee Syng-man and American imperialism

so as to fully liberate its country. The Mongolian people strongly believe that the day of full liberation of the democratic DPRK is near and wishes it further success and speedy victory.”<sup>36</sup> Contrary to one potential reading of this message, Mongolian archival documents confirm that in the meetings of the Politburo of Central Committee of the MPRP and Special Commission between 1950–1953 there was no consideration, plans or decisions about sending troops into North Korea.

During the 1950–53 Korean War and the post-war reconstruction years the Central Committee of the MPRP and the Council of Ministers of the MPR considered officially on a number of occasions the issue of providing assistance to the North Korean people and took decisions to provide the Korean People’s army with horses, livestock, warm clothes, food as well as aid and assistance in the post-war reconstruction. ‘A Special Commission of a movement to assist the North Korean people’ was established and headed by deputy Prime Minister by B. Lamjav.<sup>37</sup> B. Lamjav had formerly led the 4th and 5th convoy of assistance of the MPR to the Soviet Red Army in March and November 1943 during the heat of WWII. Badamyn Lkhamsuren,<sup>38</sup> General Secretary to Ministry of Foreign Affairs was appointed as Secretary of that Commission. His experience formerly as an advisor in Department of international affairs of the Central Committee of the MPRP would perhaps become important. During that time in the Central Committee of the MPRP were there two Lkhamsuren. Namtaishir Lkhamsuren, served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs (1946–1951), Deputy of Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1951–1954), member of Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPRP (1954–1957), Secretary for Ideology in Central Committee and member of the Lower House.

Here the paper emphasises that the MPR did not make decisions on assistance to North Korea at the very outset of the Korean War. Instead when United States led military forces liberated Seoul in 25 September 1950, overrode the 38th parallel on 8 October, and captured Pyongyang on 19 October 1950 (The United States started to bomb, with napalm bombs,<sup>39</sup> unceasingly from B-29’s North Korea’s villages and ordinary people), Ulaanbaatar took no initial action. On 25 October when the PRC’s liberation army of “volunteers” named the Peng Dehuai intervened in the Korean War, and the situation became dangerous, the Politburo of Central Committee of the MPRP met, and made the resolution on 1 December of 1950 “The Assistance in the heroic struggle of Korean Nation against American imperialism.”

In this period 43,923 horses, 9,094 cows, 79,965 sheep and goats (30 percent male and 70 percent female), 17,462 warm clothes, including traditional fur sheepskin coats, 10,000 pairs of felt boots, 20,030 pairs of cotton pants and shirt,

4,500 over-coats, 50,000 pieces of sheepskin, 1,000 pairs of leather boots and other items were sent as material assistance. As for foodstuffs, 2,248.7 tons of meat, 30 tons of butter, 65 tons of meat fat, 99,1 tons of various kinds of sausages, 97,3 tons of pastry, 1,209.7 tons of wheat, 160,8 tons of rice, 200 tons of flour, 26,5 thousand liters of spirits (alcoholic beverages) were sent.<sup>40</sup>

The Special Commission informed Ambassador J. Sambuu that the first convoy of assistance formed of 14 train carriages was being dispatched from Ulaanbaatar station on 26 December 1950. The items were then transferred at the first Manchurian railway station (Manzhouli满洲里站) to be sent on to Mukden (current Shenyang railway station沈阳站). Ulaanbaatar instructed the diplomats of the Mongolian Embassy in the PRC to receive the items and to officially convey them to the DPRK side.

Ambassador J. Sambuu on 9 February 1951 sent a verbal note to the DPRK's Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong in which he informed that in response to North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's request of purchasing 7,000 geldings (horses) for the army's use, the Mongolian side was preparing to provide the said number of horses as assistance to North Korea. He also informed him that the Mongolian Special commission had chosen 7,000 horses in Choibalsan aimak (East province) and that by the end of February 1951 it would be delivering them on foot to the Manchurian rail station and transferring them to the Korean side. In his verbal response note of 21 February 1951 Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong underlined that Kim Il Sung and the DPRK Government were deeply grateful for the Mongolian Government's decision to transfer to the Korean side the 7,000 horses and that by the end of February or beginning of March the Korean side would receive the horses from Manzhouli railway station. On 6 March 1951 Comrade Kh. Choibalsan sent a personal letter to Kim Il Sung reassuring him that the 7,000 horses had been selected and would be transferred to the Korean side in the time period agreed.<sup>41</sup> The official ceremony transferring the first batch of assistance of the Mongolian people was held on 5 March 1951 in Pyongyang at a meeting with the Korean public. There Ambassador J. Sambuu made a statement and presented the 2,700,000 tugrik's (Mongolian currency) worth of assistance raised by the Mongolian people to the Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party and the Chairman of the DPRK's Commission in charge of receiving the assistance.<sup>42</sup>

According to the Special Commission's report of the 31 March 1951 regarding the work done to present horses to the Korean people's army, the Commission prepared 7,370 mares, of which 7,165 were chosen. Also 213 horses were added, so the total number reached 7,378 which were then officially transferred to the Korean side. This number included 1090 from Ministry of Defense, 1,200 horses

from the Ministry of Interior, 3,165 from people's collectives, 1,465 from various other organizations and other from peoples. The delegation led by deputy Prime Minister B. Lamjav met with the Korean delegation led by Hong Myeong-hui, deputy Prime Minister of DPRK at the Manchurian rail station and officially transferred the horses to the Korean side and signed a protocol thereon. On 25 March 1951 Kim Il Sung sent a letter of gratitude to Marshal Kh. Choibalsan in which the former acknowledged receipt of the horses in time. He underlined that the horses were in perfect condition and that the horses would soon be used at the war front. The content of the letter of gratitude and receipt of the horses sent by Kim Il Sung was communicated specifically to the members of the Presidium for the State Lower Khural as well as members of the Central Committee of the MPRP.<sup>43</sup>

## Visits of Mongolian Government Delegation to the DPRK and Kim Il Sung's First Visit to the MPR

In the fall of 1951 the Mongolian delegation headed by Ch. Surenjav,<sup>44</sup> Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP, B. Lkhamsuren, Secretary-General to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of the Commission to organize the movement to assist the Korean people, and J. Jamyan (who later became lieutenant general)<sup>45</sup> visited the DPRK for the first time on the occasion of the 3rd anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries and handed to the Korean side the third batch of assistance materials.<sup>46</sup> The Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Government and the people of Korea warmly greeted the delegation and appraised the assistance of the Mongolian people highly. The delegation visited the Korean troops fighting at the war's front lines and were acquainted with the actual situation on the front. There were many information and photo stands under the heading "Assistance provided by the Mongolian People's Republic." The Mongolian people also sent thousands of letters and telegraphs to those fighting at the war front. Since it was impossible to translate all letters, many were sent directly in the Mongolian language. Sentences reading "American Imperialism—hands off Korea" and "The Korean people shall prevail" were taken from the letters, reprinted by thousands and pasted on present boxes as well as on the cars and train carriages to be sent to Korea.<sup>47</sup>

B. Lkhamsuren, J. Jamyan have remarked in their memoirs that North Korean soldiers talked about the Mongolian horses, known as "Mongolian volunteers," and they were used in roadless places or where roads were bad or almost non-existent, or places with marshes, rivers, hills and mountains where

artillery and other military equipment had to be transported. That is why the stands carried photos of individual horses and each was given "hero horse" titles.<sup>48</sup>

Members of the Mongolian Special commission went to aimak (provinces) to pick horses, sheep and other livestock, herd them over the Mongolian border to the station in Manchuria and would then board them on trains to be sent to Korea. In order to acclimatize them to the Korean weather conditions and breed them there, mares with foal as well as cows for breeding were also sent.

The US Central Intelligence Agency took an interest in all types of socialist aid to North Korea, including from Mongolia. However, these reports were often inaccurate. One newly released CIA information report describes the potential of Mongolian horses in Korea in the following way:

Mongolian horses would be inefficient and unsuitable in North Korea because they would have difficulty adapting themselves. These horses, used to grazing on the vast tracts of Outer Mongolia, would find it hard to acquire a taste for the husks of millet and rice they would get in Korea. A number of them would probably die of malnutrition before they became used to the new feed. After the salty water found in most of Mongolia, the horses would find the Korean water unpalatable and would be adversely affected. The climate would make them sick. They are used to the cold of Mongolia but not the heat and humidity of Korea. Furthermore, horses raised on the prairie or gently rolling land such as that found in most of Mongolia, generally have weak hoofs. Many of them would fall lame in mountainous terrain with its rocks and pebbles.<sup>49</sup>

The text also comments using information from an opposing opinion that the horses sent as gift for the Korean people proved to be a great use in the mountainous front. The horses were useful enough to the North Koreans, however, to merit discussion in the subsequent years at important moments in bilateral relations. Both in the speeches at the friendship gathering organized in Ulaanbaatar during the official visit of North Korean Leader Kim Il Sung in July 1956,<sup>50</sup> and at the friendship meeting organized in Pyongyang during the official meeting of Premier Minister Yu. Tsendenbal of the MPR between October and November in 1956 to the DPRK, Kim expressed gratitude to the Mongolian Government, its people's assistance, and his especially high appreciation of the energy of Mongolian horses.<sup>51</sup>

Journalist Ryu Gyoung-chang in his article entitled "The Great Assistance of Mongolian People"<sup>52</sup> published in 11 July 1952 in *Rodong Sinmun*, and in the letter from 26 June 1952 from the postal address 256 of North Korean National Army sent from soldier Hyun Chang-yun with title "To Mongolian People" both indicated a certain fascination with the Mongolian horses.<sup>53</sup>

Mongolian horses were also praised by the US Marine Corps. One Mongolian mare had made its way to Seoul and was ultimately sold to a Lieutenant Eric Pedersen in October 1952. According to an extensive recounting of this horse's heroism written for an American audience, the horse, which its new owner named 'Reckless' was put to use on the front lines of the Korean War, carrying "more than 150 rounds of 75 mm recoilless ammunition ... from the dump to firing positions on Hill 120, and once served as a shield for four Marines working their way up the slope." Having been impressed into an anti-tank company of the US Marines, 'Reckless' reportedly made 51 solo trips to resupply front line units in a single day of fighting at the Battle of Outpost Vegas (near Panmunjom).<sup>54</sup>

Horses were an important part of Mongolian aid to North Korea during the war, but gifts and decorations also played a role in binding the two countries together. On 20 December 1952 Foreign Minister N. Lkhamsuren<sup>55</sup> received the DPRK's Ambassador Kim Yeong-jin and asked the approval of the Korean side to send at New Year the next convoy of assistance as well as to confer to the outstanding leaders of the Korean Workers' Party, the DPRK and the army the highest orders and medals of the MPR and to that end to send a delegation headed by Ch. Surenjav. The Foreign Minister underlined that Prime Minister Yu. Tsedenbal<sup>56</sup> was sending to Kim Il Sung a fully furnished Mongolian *ger* (nomadic dwelling) as his personal gift.<sup>57</sup> Therefore, between 30 December 1952 and 19 January 1953 the Mongolian Government delegation headed by Ch. Surenjav, MPR's deputy Prime Minister visited the DPRK for the second time to transmit a New Year's train-load of assistance to the Korean side and to confer Mongolian decorations (orders and medals) to the leadership of the Korean Workers' Party, the DPRK and the Korean army.

The leader of the DPRK Kim Il Sung twice personally met with the Mongolian delegation headed by Ch. Surenjav. Though Kim Il Sung discussed bilateral relations, he also talked frankly about the internal situation in the DPRK, the war, the situations within the Korean Workers' Party and the army, which underlined the political importance of the visit.

During the meeting Ch. Surenjav conveyed the greetings of Prime Minister Yu. Tsedenbal and his personal letter addressed to Kim Il Sung. He also mentioned that as a symbol of friendship between the two countries Yu. Tsedenbal had sent Kim Il Sung a fully furnished Mongolian *ger* and a knife and chop stick set for personal use. North Koreans fighting at the front and toiling behind the front, as well as North Korean leaders, were decorated with Mongolian awards. These included 700 tons of meat, 1,000 tons of wheat, 12.5 tons of spirits (alcoholic beverages), 50 tons of various sausages, 30 tons of meat fat, 45,000 pieces of sheepskin, 10,000 pairs of cotton pants and shirt, 10,000

pairs of children's clothes, 10 Mongolian *gers*, 1,390 tons of veterinary medicine and equipment.<sup>58</sup>

Ch. Surenjav also informed of the decision of the Mongolian side to reward with high decorations of the MPR, the leaders of the Korean Workers' Party and the DPRK government, as well as those fighting at the front and those workers toiling behind the front. Ch. Surenjav read out the decision to confer upon Kim Il Sung the Order of Sukhbaatar and presented to him the order.<sup>59</sup> In response, Kim Il Sung highly appraised the gift of the Mongolian people, especially the horses sent to the war front and the food highly needed for the soldiers. He highly appraised the role of the Mongolian horses and said that they could be called Mongolian "volunteers." In response to Ch. Surenjav's request to visit the front, Kim Il Sung said that the entire country was a war front and that the delegation could go and visit the 4th division and the Nampo military unit.<sup>60</sup>

Kim Il Sung also emphasized: "The basis of our people's spiritual strength is the support of the democratic camp (i.e. of the socialist countries). The democratic countries headed by the USSR are providing much assistance. The volunteers of Great China, the most populous country in the world, are fighting side by side with us. ... Now the Korean Workers' Party has over 1 million membership ... Our main objective is to further strengthen the people's army, people's government and the united front". Kim Il Sung mentioned also to the Mongolian delegation about situation in the South, including the Rhee Syngman puppet government's massacres of South Korean communists.

At the end of his statement Kim Il Sung highly appraised the assistance of the Mongolian people saying that the Mongolian people is providing great assistance to the Korean people that are suffering from aggression and incursions and he quoted a Korean saying that "widows feel the pains of other widows." When he was told that a Mongolian *ger* (traditional home) was ready to be mounted in the garden of the premises of the Central Committee and presented to the Korean side, he said that due to his tight work schedule he would not be able to personally receive the *ger* and madam Pak Chong-ae, Secretary of the Central Committee, the WPK would receive the *ger* on his behalf.<sup>61</sup>

Threefold assistance was extended by the Mongolian delegation to the DPRK Government representative. The total amount of the assistance was, by the costs of that time, 23,365,000 Mongolian tugriks.<sup>62</sup> According to exchange rate of that time this was approximately US\$ 1,298,000. From 1950–1960 1 ruble was equal to 4,5 tugriks. In 1952 the volume of foreign trade between MPR and Soviet Union was 105,0 million rubles.<sup>63</sup> In 1950–1960 1 U.S. dollar was equal to 4 rubles.<sup>64</sup> In 1950 MRP's Gross Social Product was 1,327 billion tugriks, national income was 879,3 million tugriks.<sup>65</sup>

Besides the above, in 1952–59 Mongolia received and cared for 197 orphans (115 boys and 82 girls) and eight teachers in Ulaanbaatar. Thirty students studied and graduated at the National University of Mongolia and its institutes and returned back home. When living and studying for 8 years in Mongolia, these children lived in Sharga Mori't dacha (mountain) in summer and in winter in Zaisan hill, just outside of Ulaanbaatar. In total Mongolia spent 8,544,400 tugriks for that purpose.<sup>66</sup>

The Korean side, valuing highly the assistance provided by the Mongolian people presented the DPRK decorations to tens of Mongolian citizens that were very actively working to organize the assistance. In his message sent to the Government of Mongolia on 10 January 1953, in his capacity as Premier of Cabinet Ministers of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung wrote: "The Mongolian people have been and still are providing selfless assistance from the very first day of the war of the Korean people against American aggressors, for its independence and sovereignty, as well as to defend peace and joyous life of the people of the world. The material assistance and enormous moral support that the brotherly Mongolian people is providing to us is the manifestation of its love and solidarity with the Korean people."<sup>67</sup> In January 1953 the Mongolian side also evaluated highly the consistent struggle of 288 selected citizens of the DPRK for the independence of the Korean people and decorated them with orders and medals.<sup>68</sup>

In summary these visits and activities would certainly suggest that during this period, based on proletarian socialist internationalist principles a kind of new relations in the form of fraternal relationship were emerging and being practiced among Soviet lead socialist countries.

At the end of visits to Eastern Europe from 16 to 19 July 1957 the delegation headed by Kim Il Sung, Premier of Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK, paid the first official visit to the MPR. In the delegation group were Pak Chong-ae, Vice-Chairwoman of the Central Committee, Workers' Party of Korea, Nam Il, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ri Chung-ok, Chairman of the Planning Commission, and Hong Dong-cheol, second Ambassador of the DPRK to the MPR. During the visit views were exchanged on bilateral cooperation and the international situation, including the Korean peninsula, an eight paragraph protocol on cooperation in the cultural field between the MPR and the DPRK was signed and a Joint Statement on the Negotiations made, where "herewith notice with appreciation that the fraternal friendship and cooperation between Mongolian and Korean nations strengthened through the joint struggle for our countries freedom and independence are broadening and fastening year after year ... both sides noticed that two Governments stand firm on their decisions for

steadfast pursuing of peaceful and friendly cooperation policy on the basis of Five principles for peaceful co-existence praised by Bandung Conference and confirmed that the necessary precondition for Korea's Unification are the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and holding talks represented by delegations from North and South Korea ... Governments of the MPR and the PRC believe that the PRC could gain the proper role in United Nations in most near future. The governments of two states accuse the activities of Chiang Kai-shek's cruel group for hindering the MPR's membership in United Nations as sovereign state aiming for peace. As a sign of people's willingness the MPR Government has decided to raise an assistance in 1956–57 with a high number of livestock and the best agricultural products for supporting animal husbandry and promoting people's livelihood. The DPRK's Government delegation appreciated the material assistance given during the Korean people's patriotic War and during war reconstruction, and agreed to make bilateral trade between two countries beginning 1957.”<sup>69</sup>

## Mongolian Participation and Observation of the Panmunjom Armistice Agreement

As the USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 19 March 1953 (document#112) reveals, ending the war in Korea was also a high priority for the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow; in the midst of the great anxiety and confusion following Stalin's death, the new leadership drafted and approved this major foreign policy decision in only two weeks. The evidence thus suggests that Stalin's desire to continue the war in Korea was a major factor in the prolongation of the war; immediately after his death the three communist allies (USSR, DPRK and PRC) took decisive steps to reach an armistice agreement.<sup>70</sup>

The timing of the Council of Ministers' resolution also suggests that it was Stalin's death rather than threats from the United States to use nuclear weapons that finally brought a breakthrough in the armistice negotiations. The Eisenhower Administration later asserted that it finally broke the stalemate at Panmunjom by virtue of its “unmistakable warning” to Beijing that it would use nuclear weapons against China if an armistice were not-reached—a claim that had great influence on American strategic thinking after 1953. However, Eisenhower's threats to use nuclear weapons were made in May 1953, two months after the Soviet government resolved to bring the war to an end. The Russian documents thus provide important new evidence for the debate over “nuclear diplomacy.”

For the MPR as a member of world communist system, participation in the armistice agreement, besides its significance to socialist ideology was itself the matter of success and reputation.

From 22 July to 4 August 1953 for the first time Mongolian observers, Ts. Namsrai,<sup>71</sup> correspondent of “*Unen*” (The Truth) daily newspaper and T. Purevjal,<sup>72</sup> First Secretary of the MPR’s Embassy in Beijing participated in the historic international ceremony of signing of the ceasefire agreement in Panmunjom by the representatives of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung and Nam Il, the PRC, Peng Dehuai and the US/UN representatives. As arranged by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Division Mongolian observers along with press representatives from the USSR, Poland, Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the GDR having transited in Beijing, Mukden, Andong and Pyongyang arrived Kaesong city on the morning of 27th of July. The Mongolian delegation participated as observers in all the events of the ceremony.

On 30 July the press observers travelled from Kaesong to Pyongyang. The next day they went to the City Hall where they were briefed on the plans for the reconstruction of the city. That evening they attended a ceremonial meeting and a concert. On 1 August they were shown the general condition of the city, the main street to be reconstructed and some other planned construction works. The Mongolian delegation then returned to Beijing on 4 August via Andong and Mukden (Shenyang).<sup>73</sup>

In his message sent to the Premier of Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK on 28 July 1953, the Prime Minister of the MPR Yu. Tsendenbal underlined that “The Mongolian people and the Government of the MPR that have always supported the Korean people’s struggle for its independence, were sincerely happy and underlined with deep satisfaction that the war was over in Korea and that the victory was on the side of the heroic Korean people, the great volunteers of the Chinese people and the peace and democratic forces.”<sup>74</sup>

The April 1954 Geneva Conference on Korean issues did not reach a common consensus, therefore the armistice agreement dated on 27 July 1953 serves still as the fundamental document determining the legal status of South and North relations extending into the twenty-first century.

## The Central Intelligence Agency Unevaluated Information Reports Regarding Mongolia During the Korean War

In January 2017 the American CIA released to the public 11 million archival documents in its CREST online database. In this electronic records search tool can be found numerous documents about MPR, in information reports regarding

Mongolia during the Korean War can also be found. Prior to this, in March 2004, Mongolian historians, together with the U.S. historians,<sup>75</sup> have organized an international seminar in Ulaanbaatar entitled "Mongolia and the Cold War", to which a number of materials connected with information and analysis of the CIA in 1950s were brought, among them a few pieces connected to the Korean War and Mongolia's involvement in it.

In the new online database are found numerous CIA information reports regarding MPR's troops, its assistances including horses and analyses on strength of Mongolian military forces.<sup>76</sup> Today more than half a century later we have an opportunity to understand what rumors and realities, truths and untruths stand behind the big picture of the Korean war at different moments in time. For example one truth is that according to archival sources and from the memoirs of Mongolian officials troops of the Mongolian People's Republic did not take part in the Korean War.

In the CIA reports some are marked as unevaluated information, and in some reports comments give opposing explanations, and also others include sources of information, which conflict with each other and overall give no real information of Mongolian participation in the Korean War.

The Information report dated 19 July 1951 states "Between 7 and 10 June 1951 one Outer Mongolian cavalry division passed through Harbin on its way to North Korea. The division contained over 12,000 men with tanks, mechanized equipment and over 2000 horses."<sup>77</sup>

The Information report from 21 September 1952 mentioned that as in late January 1952, the strength and nationality of foreign troops aiding North Korea as following: 47 Chinese Communist divisions, 5 Mongolian divisions, 1 Czechoslovakian medical battalion and 3000 Soviet advisers.<sup>78</sup>

Thus in the CIA's information piece of 13 February 1953<sup>79</sup> there was an analysis based on its own sources entitled "*Proposed plan for the use of Mongolian troops in Korea*". The analysis read that in order to end the Korean War on terms favorable North Korean terms, Kim Il Sung thought that Mongolian troops needed to be brought into the Korean theater. It underlined that such a plan had long been discussed by China and the MPR and by China and the USSR. The analysis continued that preparations for bringing Mongolian troops into Korea had almost been completed by the time Ho Kai's group<sup>80</sup> visited the MPR and Moscow in December 1952, although the final decision was to be taken based on the results China-MPR negotiations.<sup>81</sup>

According to the above material, if the USSR would have agreed to the use of Mongolian troops in the Korean War, it would have served as the basis for the USSR's active intervention in the Korean War. The MPR would have supplied

five or six divisions, where below the report the source comments that ... five divisions would represent 85 percent of the MPR's fighting power and the source believes it unlikely that Mongol troops will be sent to Korea, although a token force of about 10,000 might be sent for propaganda purposes. The USSR itself would have sent at least three mechanized divisions from its member republics of the Central Asia. The North Korean government did not believe the USSR would approve such a plan unless there was an all-out United Nations offensive. However, the North Korean government planned to request the USSR send an advance party of Mongolian troops and a staff to the North Korean-Chinese Communist operations headquarters.<sup>82</sup>

The Information report from 13 February 1953 analyses the strength of the Mongolian People's Republic Army and possibilities for sending its troops to the Korean Front: "In September and October 1952 articles appearing in the Hong Kong and Japanese press reported that the MPR had agreed to send five divisions to the Korean front. Estimates of the total strength of the MPR army varied from 120,000 to 200,000. These figures are high in proportion to the total population of one million.<sup>83</sup> The population of the MPR in 1950 according to Mongolian statistical data was 758.0 thousand."<sup>84</sup>

As noted in the CIA's information piece of 13 June 1951, military forces of the PRC's Inner Mongolian cavalry and Outer Mongolian armed forces were present on the Korean peninsula. The Mongols from both groups get on well together, but much less well with members of non-Mongolian military forces. On the other hand the Mongolian military strictly followed the advice of their Soviet instructors. It pointed out that between 5,000 to 10,000 Mongolian troops were based on the Korean peninsula.<sup>85</sup> According to French intelligence documents copied from Chinese archives in Shanghai, those referenced by A. Stolypine,<sup>86</sup> advisors of the Mongolian people's army were working in the North Korean army, and though the Mongolians had drawn up a plan to push forward to Busan, since the entry into the war of Chinese volunteers they returned to Mongolia.<sup>87</sup> The source used by A. Stolypine is the same as the unevaluated information of the CIA.

The talks on the Korean War armistice started in July 1951, lasted for 2 years and ended with the signing of the armistice agreement in July 1953 in Panmunjom. It is possible that Kim Il Sung made various proposals to Chinese and Soviet sides as how to quickly end the Korean War on favorable conditions for the North Korean side. One of such proposal could have been to use a specific number of Mongolian and Soviet Central Asian troops that would serve as pressure on the United States to quickly end the war. It is believed that to that end a delegation headed by Ho Kai visited Ulaanbaatar and Moscow in

December 1952. It is no doubt that the final decision would have been taken by Moscow. Since Moscow at that time was closely following the events not only in Asia but also in Europe, it is possible that it did not support that proposal since it did not want to aggravate further the Korean War in case it led to a wider world war.<sup>88</sup>

According to Mongolian archival documents Mongolia did not send troops in the Korean War, but also did not send troops to the USSR during the World War II. The majority of information from the CIA regarding Mongolia during the Korean War is not entirely reliable. The CIA's information could well have derived from propaganda information broadcast by Pyongyang radio, deliberately delivered intelligence disinformation, and also disinformation from Taipei. Some CIA commentary made on their own reports about Mongolian military information also confirm the inappropriateness of information they collected. In the documents of Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs no evidence has been found attesting to the participation of the MPR horse cavalry. Instead according to Li Narangoa, only Inner Mongolian horse cavalry joined the Chinese military division.<sup>89</sup>

## The Positions of the United States and China's Republic Regarding the Role of Mongolia in the Korean War and Membership of Mongolia at the UN

Since Communist China's entry into Korean War Chiang Kai-shek had fully supported the United States led United Nations military actions. Thus its representative in the UN Security Council, not only continuously provoked disputes, raising the issue at Council and saying that even troops of Outer Mongolia, that had been forcefully detached from Chinese territory, have been sent to North Korea, deliberately falsifying the facts and events. At that time the United States was witnessing strong anti-communist campaigns, including McCarthy's suggesting that China had been lost to the communists.

On bilateral basis it is evident that due to the Baitag Bogd clashes<sup>90</sup> in 1946–49 the MPR and the Republic of China were not able to exchange ambassadors. In October 1949 MPR cancelled its diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Kuomintang of China or Taiwan) and established diplomatic relations with the PRC. In 24 February 1953 the Chinese Nationalist government (ROC) abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed on 14 August in 1945 with the Soviet Union. That treaty had a provision that the government of the Republic of China recognized the MPR. Thus deputy Permanent Representative

of the Republic of China to the United Nations Tsiang Jiang Tinfu (蔣廷黻) has pointed out that Outer Mongolia was an artificial state created by the USSR so that it could dominate China and Korea, and that Outer Mongolia's troops were involved in the Korean War.<sup>91</sup>

At the beginning of 1960s, when Mongolia was working to join the United Nations and establish diplomatic relations with the United States, Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China tried to vigorously influence U.S. policy, asserting the following to the administration in Washington DC. That since the United States had informed the government of the Republic of China of its negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia, the government of the Republic of China believed that it needed to explain its consistent position regarding Outer Mongolia. Second Outer Mongolia was a puppet state that did not qualify to be an independent sovereign State. The independence of Outer Mongolia was just a creation of the Yalta secret agreement. Thirdly, the Pei-ta-shan incident (known in Mongolia as Baitag Bogd border incident), was but Outer Mongolian troops' aggressive incursions into Xinjiang on the instructions from the Soviets. Fourth when the Korean War started Mongolia was an aggressor that sent its troops, assisted communist Korea and was hostile to the United Nations. Fifth All these demonstrated that Outer Mongolia was not only not an independent state, but in fact was an instrument of Soviet foreign aggression. And finally the Republic of China sincerely wished that the US government would realize the dangerous nature of the issue and would be mindful of the consequences of such a policy.

It was also an interesting diplomatic occasion amongst the various controversies between the major powers during the Cold War that the membership issue of both MPR and South Korea at the UN arose at the same moment, and were both declined at the same moment. In the 1955 Fall session of General Assembly of United Nations Security Council, where the Council discussed the Canada's proposal on membership for 18 countries including MPR and Japan in the UN driven by and according to the principle of universalism. That time the Republic of China, permanent member of Security Council, had proposed to admit 11 states out of 18 and also add South Korea and South Vietnam. Thus the Soviet Union not recognizing South Korea and South Vietnam, opposed the proposal of the Republic of China of two states for membership using its veto and vice versa Republic of China also used its veto on Mongolia and Japan.<sup>92</sup>

Between 1946 and 1961, the MPR submitted membership requests four times and was discussed thirteen times at the UN. The second request, signed by Prime Minister Marshal Kh. Choibalsan, was sent on 25 October 1948 and was discussed on the following dates: 16 June 1949, 19 December 1951, 1 February 1952,

5 September 1952, November 1954 and in the autumn of 1955. The third request, signed by Yu. Tsendenbal, Prime Minister, was sent to Dag Carl Hammarskjold, the UN Secretary General. It reached the recipient on 14 September 1956 and was discussed at the UN on 12 December 1956. The last request of 1 September 1957, signed by the Mongolian Foreign Minister S. Avarzed, was discussed at the UN on 9 September 1957. Mongolia's membership requests were continuously postponed mainly because of the Chinese Kuomintang, the USA and the USSR ideological oppositions.<sup>93</sup>

Mongolian scholar Dr. R. Bold making use of the U.S. archival materials has written how the United States and the Chiang Kai Shek's Republic of China coordinated their activities regarding Mongolia's membership in the United Nations. He wrote:

Vetoing Mongolia's United Nations membership would be seen as going against those that would be supportive of Mongolia's membership and that the Republic of China's interests at the United Nations would be severely affected". According to the researcher, there was an agreement that the U.S. would not vote in favor of Mongolia's membership, and the Republic of China would make a statement in support of this. President J. Kennedy would provide reassurance by diplomatic channels to Chiang Kai-shek that the U.S. would veto Communist China's UN membership in return for which the Republic of China would not veto Mongolia's membership.<sup>94</sup>

On 27 October 1961 at the XVI session of the United Nations General Assembly at its 1043-rd meeting 23 states co-sponsored a resolution to admit the MPR as its member and a decision to that effect was taken without a vote. Thus Mongolia's many years of efforts to acquire UN membership ended successfully and it became the United Nation's 101st member.

## Conclusion

The goal of this article has been to give a comprehensive picture of why, how and how far MPR participated in the Korean War, to emphasize the consequences which impacted on the MPR itself, to make some clarifications as to the veracity of newly opened CIA archival documents regarding Mongolia and to make some contributions to research of Korean War history.

The leader of Mongolia, Kh. Choibalsan, his closest comrades and Mongolian people stood firmly on the side of the DPRK and gave a moral and humanitarian aid as much as possible, but did not send any troops to the Korean War. In the speech of Kim Il Sung in Ulaanbaatar in July 1956, in the speech of Yu. Tsendenbal in Pyongyang in October/November 1956, and also in all Mongolian archival

documents related to assistance to North Korea, we find no evidence of troops having been sent from the MPR into the Korean War. Given the fact that the MPR did not send troops even in hardest times of World War II to its own closest ally, the Soviet Red Army, perhaps this should not be surprising. But according to Yalta agreement, the MPR had declared war on 10 August 1945 against militarist Japan, and over 21,000 soldiers of the Mongolian People's Army participated in fighting for the liberation of Inner Mongolia, in Northeast China from 10 August to 21 August.<sup>95</sup> During World War II, the Mongolian government and people had presented around a half million horses to the Soviet Red Army, and sold them 30,000 horses.<sup>96</sup> Therefore the Soviets might have advised on equine matters to Mongolians and Kim Il Sung. Ultimately the MPR was not a military ally with North Korea, operating instead in the framework of the world communist system during Cold War providing firstly, fraternal friendship relations, and secondly, humanitarian aid to North Korea during the war.

The newly released U.S. CIA information reports, already to some extent known before, were produced from sources based derived through military and diplomatic channels, but they also seem to consist of information from Taiwan and propaganda information from North Korea. North Korea spread disinformation deliberately on radio and through intelligence channels such as receiving enormous material and troops assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and the CIA documents seem to bear this out.

As for what these perceptions did for Mongolia's international standing, this is a more complicated matter. Representatives of the Republic of China delayed and obstructed the issue of membership of Mongolia in the UN, saying from the UN stage that "Soviet satellite the MPR has assisted materially and sent troops to aggressor communist North Korea, which fights against US-led UN unified military force. Therefore the territory named as the MPR which was taken away with Stalin's help from China, is not honored to enter into the UN as a member." Though the postponing of membership of the MPR in the UN was of course connected with the Korean War, it is certain that the factors like the Cold War arising from relations between the Soviet and US, the cancellation of diplomatic ties with Republic of China, then a permanent member of Security Council of UN, in 16 October 1949 and the establishment of diplomatic ties with communist mainland China also affected it.<sup>97</sup>

The Korean War is estimated to have become the origin of controversies between the Soviet Union and the PRC, and Mongolian documents also shed light here. Overall, communist China's involvement in the Korean War rescued North Korea's communist regime, but it did not fully break down the US-led UN forces. This political map of Korea remained unchanged at the end of the Korean

War, which led to a further stage of the Cold War in Asia. Until the beginning of 1970s the PRC could not be recognized by the U.S. and Western powers nor enter the UN as a member. On the other hand, however the Korean War turned out to profit for the Republic of China. Before this war the USA has decidedly refused to participate in a clash between the ROC and mainland China in any form, and terminated its assistance to the ROC. But in the post war period the USA concerned to keep its influence in the region started to encourage the ROC leaders in all forms. In this matter the USA sent its troops, and rescued Chiang Kai-shek's China from obvious defeat.<sup>98</sup> Mongolia's role in these larger conflicts was not central, but the individual diplomats and the information gleaned from Chinese and North Korean interactions with Mongolian counterparts during the Korean War and the Cold War remains useful today.

After the opportunity for UN membership was given to Mongolia it could not be fully used, as during the Cold War the United Nations rostrum became an arena of sharp ideological struggle of the two opposing social systems in which Mongolia was involuntarily involved. Specifically, based on the decision of the MPRP's XVI Congress held in June 1961 to the effect that the Mongolian people consistently sided with and would continue to support the just struggle of the brotherly Korean people to rid South Korea without delay of American troops and to unite its motherland by peaceful and democratic means, on 7 December 1961 the MPR's delegation at the XVI session of the General Assembly has introduced, reflecting the DPRK's national interests, a draft resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. This was Mongolia's first draft resolution after it's the United Nations membership. However, since at that time the United States introduced another draft resolution on the same subject which stated that any such action would not be effective when the Korean issue is considered in the absence of Korean representatives, the Mongolian draft was not approved.<sup>99</sup>





Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong with Kim Il Sung. Autumn of 1948



J. Sambuu, first Ambassador of the MPR to the DPRK. Spring of 1950, Ulaanbaatar



Mongolian delegation J. Jamyan with diplomatic uniform, 1953



Kim Yeong-jin, First Ambassador of the DPRK to the MPR and G. Bumtsend, Chairman of the Presidium of State Lower Khural (Lower House or Parliament) of the MPR. April, 1951, Ulaanbaatar, MPR



Mongolian delegations with Kim Il Sung, North Korea, Autumn of 1951



General Major S. Ravdan, Second Ambassador of the MPR to the DPRK on front side of Honorable Guard. Pyongyang, 1952



Mongolian delegations in Manchurian railway station, Manzhouli 满洲里站 Northeast China, 1952



Map of Mongolia's assistance's convoys from Eastern province, Mongolia to the Manchurian train station Manzhouli 满洲里站 to be sent on to Mukden (current Shenyang railway station 沈阳站), Northeast China, Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3



Mongolian delegations in North Korea, 1952



Staff Sergeant Reckless and her primary trainer, Platoon Gunnery Sergeant Joseph Latham, March 1953, The Battle for Outpost Vegas



Kim Il Sung and Yu. Tsendenbal, July 17, 1956, at Zaisan Hill, front side of Ulaanbaatar, MPR



Kim Il Sung, Premier of Cabinet Ministers of the DPRK and J. Sambuu, Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme People's Congress of the MPR. Pyongyang, May 1961



Left: USSR Ambassador Prikhodov Yu. K. Right: Ji Yatai 吉雅泰 (1901-1968) First Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the MPR (1950-53)



Ambassador of the USSR Yu. K. Prikhodov presented his Letters of Credence to the Chairman of the Presidium of the State Lower Khural (Lower House or Parliament) of the MPR. Left from G. Bumtsend, Marshal Kh. Choibalsan, Yu. Prikhodov, Foreign Minister N. Lkhamsuren

## Notes

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27. Ravdan S. (1907–1972) Colonel General, ambassador. He studied in Leningrad Oriental Institute, Moscow Military Academy. 1943–1950: Deputy and Head of Political Department of the Mongolian People's Army. 1950–1952: Minister-Counsellor at the Mongolian Embassy in Moscow, 1952–1955: MPR's Ambassador to the DPRK, 1956–1959 MPR's Ambassador to the Czechoslovakia, non-resident ambassador to Bulgaria, Albania and Romania. 1960–1970: Deputy Minister of Defense. 1943: Brigadier General, 1944: Major General, 1967: Lieutenant General, 1971: Colonel General.

28. The names of North Korean diplomats are written in archives only in Mongolian spelling.
29. Ji Yatai (吉雅泰1901–68) was a Chinese diplomat. He was the First Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the MPR (July 1950–July 53). Educated in KUTV, Moscow, USSR.
30. Kim Yeong-jin presented his LC, 24 April 1951, Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 9.
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37. Lamjav B. (1920–1995?) Politician. Educated in Party Institute under the MPRP in Ulaanbaatar and Communist Party Institute under the CPSU in Moscow. 1942–1962: Deputy Prime Minister; 1963–1986: Head of Cadres Department (at the present: Dept. of Human Resources or Staff Dept.) of the Central Committee of the MPRP, 1986–1990: Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee of the MPRP, 1986–1990: Alternate and full member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPRP.
38. Lkhamsuren B. (1923–2016) 1942–1947: Diploma Degree in Physics from National University of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar; 1954–1958: He received his Ph.D. Diploma from Diplomatic Academy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, USSR; 1972–1975: He received his Sc.D. Diploma from Institute of the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; 1959: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, academician, member of Academy of Sciences of the MPR; 1947–1950: Counselor to the CC MPRP, 1950–1952: Secretary General to Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 1952–1954: Adviser to Prime Minister of the MPR; 1958–1959: Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; 1962–1972: Alternate Member of Politburo, Central Committee, MPRP; Secretary of International Affairs at Central Committee of the MPRP; 1975–1981, 1984–1988: Representative of the MPRP at the International Journalistic Department in "Problems of Peace and Socialism" in Prague, Czechoslovakia; 1981–1984: Alternate Member of Politburo, Central Committee, MPRP, Director of Institute of Social Sciences under the Central Committee, MPRP; 1988–1990: Adviser to Secretary General, Central Committee of the MPRP; 1990–2000: Counselor to Institute for International Studies, Academy of Sciences, Mongolia.

39. The U.S. dropped a total of 635,000 tons of bombs, including 32,557 tons of napalm, on Korea, more than during the whole Pacific campaign of WWII.
40. Documents of the Special Commission for Assurances to Korean People. Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 221, 4–10.
41. *Ibid.*
42. J. Sambuu's report. Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 7.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Surenjav Ch. (1914–91) Since 1940 Rector of Institute of Party under the CC, MPRP; Head of Department of the Central Committee, MPRP, First Deputy Prime Minister of MPR, Member of Politburo of the CC, MPRP, Second Secretary of the CC, MPRP, Chairman of the Supreme People's Congress.
45. Jamyan J. (1916–2007) 1948–53: Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, 1953–56: Head of Eastern Department, MFA; 1957–59: Deputy Minister of Justice.
46. Lkhamsuren B. XVI Sixty Years (Memoirs). Ulaanbaatar, 2003, 9 (in Mongolian).
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49. Unsuitability of Mongolian Horses for use in North Korea. 22 My 1953; 2008/11/20 CIA-RDP80-00810A001200670006-9.
50. "Rodong Sinmun". 1950.07.20, "The Truth" newspaper. "60 Years of Relations Between Mongolia and the DPRK". The Collected Documents. Edited by Amb. J. Lombo. Pyongyang, 2007 (in Korean and Mongolian), 32–33.
51. "Rodong Sinmun". 1950.11.03, "The Truth" newspaper. 1950.11.04. "60 Years of Relations Between Mongolia and the DPRK". The Collected Documents. Edited by Amb. J. Lombo. Pyongyang, 2007 (in Korean and Mongolian), 39–40.
52. "60 Years of Relations Between Mongolia and the DPRK". The Collected Documents. Edited by Amb. J. Lombo. Pyongyang: 2007 (in Korean and Mongolian), 195–196.
53. *Ibid.* 197–198.
54. Andrew Geer, *Reckless, Pride of the Marines* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co, 1955), 9. Andrew Geer was also a Hollywood screenwriter who in 1951 had commercial success in eulogizing the US B-29 bombing of Japan via writing the story for the film "The Wild Blue Yonder."
55. Lkhamsuren N. (1917–92) Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 1946–51: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1950–54: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1954–56: Secretary of the Central Committee, MPRP.
56. Tsedenbal Yu. (1916–91) Politician, the Marshal of the MRP, 1940–84: Secretary General of the Central Committee, MPRP; 1974–84: Chairman for the Presidium of the Supreme People's Congress of the MPR; 1946–52: Deputy Prime Minister; 1952–74: Prime Minister; 1940–84: Member of Politburo Central Committee, MPRP; In 1984 has lost all power as of result of Kremlin conspiracy and died in Moscow in 1991.
57. Ch. Surenjav's report. Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 26.
58. *Ibid.*
59. D. Sukhbaatar—the founder of Mongolia's national democratic revolution of 1921.
60. Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 26, 98–106.
61. Ch. Surenjav's report. Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 26, 106–123.

62. An Account report of Special Commission. Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 221.
63. Foreign Trade of the USSR. Statistics 1918–1966. Moscow, 1967, 66, Yondon D, Namsrai Ya and Soli Z. Role of External Economic Relations in the MPR's Development. UB, 1980, 75.
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67. Kim Il Sung's telegram to Mongolian Government. 10 January 1953. Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 221.
68. Report of Special Commission. Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 221, p. 125.
69. “Joint Statement on the Negotiations between Government of the MPR and Government of the DPRK”-60 Years of Relations Between Mongolia and the DPRK, Collected Documents. Pyongyang. 2007 (in Korean and Mongolian), “Unen” (The Truth) Daily Newspaper of the Central Committee, MPRP. 1956.07.20, “Rodong Sinmun” July 20, 1956 (in Korean).
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71. Namsrai Ts. (1918–90) At that time, he served as a Vice-Director of Institute for History of Party under the Central Committee of the MPRP. 1962–63: Secretary General to MFA; 1964–84: General Chief of “Unen” daily newspaper under the Central Committee, MPRP; 1984–85: Ambassador of the MRP to the German Democratic Republic (GDR).
72. Purevjal T. (1923–91?) 1951–52: Assistant to Secretary General of MFA; 1952–53: Secretary General and Head of Law Department of MFA; 1953–54: First Secretary at the Embassy of the MPR to the People's Republic of China, Beijing; 1955–56: Head of the Eastern Department of MFA; 1957–63: Head of International Organization's Department, Head of European Department of MFA; 1963–65: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the MRP to the Republic of Guinea, Conakry, Central Africa; 1965–66: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of MRP to the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Algiers.
73. Ts. Namsrai, T. Purevjal's report, Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. Mongolia. Fond. 3 File 46.
74. Yu. Tsedenbal's telegram to Kim Il Sung, 28 July 1953. Documents of Mongolia's Foreign Relations (1921–1961) Volume I, Ulaanbaatar, 1964, 120 (in Mongolian).
75. Jim Hershberg. Associate prof. of History & Int'l Affairs, George Washington University, Yvette Chin. George Washington University, Malcolm Byrne. Director of Research, National Security Archives, Christian Ostermann. Director, Cold War International History Project.
76. CIA Information reports dated 13 June 1951, 19 July 1951, 19 December 1951, 8 September 1952, 21 September 1952, 8 October 1952, 6 December 1952, 21 December 1952, 2 reports from 13 February 1953, 17 February 1953, 22 Mai 1953, 23 October 1953 and 1 report with unknown date: “Outer Mongolian Participation in the Sino-Soviet Conference in Moscow and the Peace Conference in Peiping.”

77. "Movement of Chinese Communist Troops into Korea and Evacuation of Soviet, Polish, and Czech Troops from Korea," December 19, 1951, CIA-RDP82-00457R009700370008-1.
78. "Foreign Aid to North Korea" 21 September 1952. CIA-RDP82-00457R013900230007-0.
79. "Korea: Proposed Plan for the Use of Mongol Troops in Korea", 13 February 1953, CIA-RDP80-00810A000200460013-5.
80. Ho Kai (허가이許哥而, Russian name is Alexei Ivanovich Hegai 1908–53). Born in Khabarovsk. He became member of All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1930. Became Secretary of the Far East All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol) in 1932. In 1934 enrolled the All-Russian Agricultural University named Ya. M. Sverdlov. In 1937 was exiled to the Central Asia in connected with the "people's enemy" affair. In 1939 his All-Russian Communist Party membership was revived. In 1941–45 he was working at Tashkent party branch. In the fall of 1945 he participated in liberating the northern part of the Korean peninsula by the Red Army and entering Pyongyang. He played an important role in reconstructing the Korean Communist party. Since August 1946 became full member of the Politburo of the Korean Workers' Party, First deputy of the Central Committee and headed the Central Auditing Commission of the party. After 1949 he became First secretary of the party's Central Committee (Kim Il Sung was at that time Chairman of the Korean Workers' Party). Though it is believed that on 2 July 1953 he shot himself, however since he was the most dangerous rival of Kim Il Sung there is a version that he might have been eliminated on the orders of Kim Il Sung.
81. Mongolia and the Cold War. International Workshop, March 2004, Ulaanbaatar, Documents from the American Archives, CIA Documents, Part 2, Intelligence Report, "Korea: Proposed Plan for the Use of Mongol Troops in Korea", 13 February 1953 CIA-RDP80-00810A000200460013-5: Batbayar Ts. "Some Issues of Mongolia and the North Korean Relations During the Korean War" Research Paper. Joint Academic Conference: "38th Parallel of Korean Peninsula Will Become Peace Zone". April 11, 2015 School of Int'l Relations and Public Administration, National University of Mongolia and Mongolian-Japan Journalist Association (in Mongolian).
82. "Korea: Proposed Plan for the Use of Mongol Troops in Korea", 13 February 1953, CIA-RDP80-00810A000200460013-5.
83. Ibid.
84. <http://www.1212.mn/>, Mongolian statistical Information Service.
85. "Mongolian Troops in Manchuria and Korea", 13 June 1951, CIA-RDP82-00457R007900630001-9.
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87. Stolypine, Arcady, *La Mongolie entre Moscou et Peking*. Paris., 1971 (translated and published in 2000 in Mongolian), 81–85.
88. "Korea: Proposed Plan for the Use of Mongol Troops in Korea", 13 February 1953, CIA-RDP80-00810A000200460013-5.
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90. Battle of Baitag Bogd Mountain or The Beitashan Incident 北塔山事件; *Pei-ta-shan shih-chien*;) was between June 1947 and July 1949 a border conflict between Republic of China, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union, such Xinjiang and Mongolia Western province Khovd aimak. The MPR became involved in a border dispute with the Republic of China, as a Chinese Muslim Hui cavalry regiment was sent by the nationalist Chinese government to attack Mongol and Soviet positions.
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92. UN and Mongolia. Documents from the UN and Government archives. Ulaanbaatar, 2008: D. Ulambayar. "Establishment of Mongolia's Diplomatic Ties with the Republic of Korea and the Position of the DPRK"—Mongolian Journal of Korean Studies. No. 1, 2016, Embassy of the ROK, Institute of International Affairs, Academy of Sciences, Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, 82–112 (in Mongolian).
93. UN and Mongolia. Documents from the UN and Government archives. UB, 2008: Ulambayar D. "The Mongolian People's Republic's Attempt to Join the United Nations and the Position adopted by the United Kingdom". *Trans-Continental Neighbours: A History of Mongolia-UK Relations*. Volumes II. Mongolia and Inner Asia Studies Unit, Cambridge. 2014, 47.
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96. *The History of Mongolian Military (1911–1990s)*. Institute of Military History Studies. Ministry of Defense. Ulaanbaatar, 1996, 367 (in Mongolian).
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98. The Mutual defense treaty between the U.S. and the ROC was signed by John F. Dulles, Secretary of State and George K. C. Yeh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, ROC on 2 December 1954 in Washington, DC and came into force on 3 March 1955. On June 18, 1960, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and Republic of China's President Chiang Kai-shek met in Taipei, the only time in history that a sitting U.S. President visited the ROC.
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