

**CHANGES OF POLICY ORIENTATION
AND THE DETERMINANTS:**

The Unification Policy of South Korea

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Introduction

i. Conventional wisdom and a recent change

If there is one factor that determines today's Korean society it is, more than anything else, the partition of the country. The impacts of this range widely from people's daily lives to foreign relations both in South and North Korea. Whether named re-unification or new unification, reunion is not only the greatest hope of the Korean people but also a contested academic debate.

The partition of the Korean peninsula has, for a long time, been ascribed to an international conflict between the superpowers by the Korean people themselves. Many analysts have also been trapped in environmental determinism, a fashionable theory following the end of World War II which partly resulted from what has elsewhere been called "super power phobia" in unification studies. Lack of information, particularly about the P'yongyang regime in the North, made studies on internal factors like a crossword

puzzle and accordingly dampened the impact of domestic concerns on inter-Korean relations. Accordingly, the question of domestic variables has often been hidden beneath discussions which ascribe to superpowers a single and general position in South-North Korean relations.

Recently some attempts have been made to restore a more proper balance between external forces and domestic politics. This interactive perspective¹ stresses that the researcher must be careful not to jump to any final conclusions on the determinants of Korean unification.² If domestic factors are as unimportant as environmental determinism suggests, interactionists hold that an enormous question mark should be placed against the actual possibility of unification. There is, from the environmental determinist view, little hope for Korea itself to find a way to escape the web woven by the international power balance. The now historical example of German unification also raises a comparable question: are there greater international barriers against Korean unification than there were for German unification?


In this paper I start with the assumption that future studies on Korean unification must pay more attention to domestic factors. While not ignoring the fact that the international current may have been influential on the unification problem, I argue that unification policies in reality have been framed largely by domestic variables. My focus is only South Korea. Two empirical examples are presented about ongoing changes taking place in both government and society. Firstly, a content analysis carried out on presidential new year's addresses from 1970 to 1991 to follow up changes in governmental policy orientation. The addresses, fundamental to governmental yearly policy, systematically mark the government's attitude. Secondly, the results of five nation-wide surveys carried out in 1977,

1987, 1988 and 1990 respectively are compared. These show underlying trends in public consciousness on unification issues in terms of ideology, the method of unification and the post-unification political system. My paper begins by outlining the different dimensions of unification policies in Korea.

ii. Setting the framework

An overview of the unification policies put forward by South and North Korea indicates that there are three dimensions in which the problem is discussed: co-operation, co-existence and conflict. These three are the simplified elements often employed to explain inter-governmental relationships. Any governmental stance can be marked on a general continuum running between the three.

In the case of the unification policies of South Korea, a different dimension has been emphasized at different times and in different places. This is because a specific dimension is highlighted by the government for differing reasons under given circumstances. It is nonetheless mainly from a humanitarian and nationalistic dimension that a cooperative posture is emphasised. On the other hand, the state-political dimension often leads to a conflict-oriented stance. Figure 1 summarises these correlations; arrows mark the directions of influence and dotted lines indicate relatively weak correlations.



Changes of Policy Orientation: the South Korean Government's Stances

As I pointed out earlier, content analyses of the Presidential New Year's Addresses between 1970 and 1991 estimates the South's stances. Content analysis is a method for making replicable and valid inferences from data in their context³ which helps to mark inferences by objectively and systematically identifying the characteristics of messages.⁴ Its development can be traced back to theological studies in the late 1600s when the church was worried about the spread of secularism in the press. During world war II, content analysts had successfully predicted several major military and political campaigns, including the date of deployment of German V-bombs. Here a basic content analysis is used to mark policy orientations towards the North. Each sentence in the addresses is quantified in terms of frequency, intensity, and favourable/unfavourable attributes (for convenience, variables are not calculated).⁵ Table I outlines my criteria for the analysis of addresses. A glance at this is sufficient to identify the distribution of scales between clusters for quantitative scoring. Basically, thirteen types of message can be elicited from the addresses. These can be further categorised into seven exclusive clusters, within each of which sentences have similarities.

Figure 1. Changes in the Government's Attitude




TABLE I

SCALE POINTS FOR ASSESSMENT

Co-operative Region	Scale Point	Description
	+3	* Acceptance of the other side's proposal
	+2	* Praising the other side
	+1	* Proposing unification policies
Neutral Region	0	* Stressing the importance of unification * Mere retrospect of the past * Statements on other countries
Conflicting Region	-1	* Stressing defensive capability * denial of the other side's proposal * Hypothetical assumption about other side's conflicting action
	-2	* Weak or indirect criticism
	-3	* Strong and direct criticism * warning * Stressing the danger of war

In order to quantify each sentence, I developed a 6-point scale divided into two regions: a *co-operative* region and a *conflicting* region. +3 is the value given to the most co-operative governmental posture, the most favourable stance towards the North.⁶ -3 indicates the most conflicting governmental stance, for example in sentences implying hostile antagonism. Point 0 on the scale signifies a neutral region, neither co-operative nor conflicting. Based on this, each sentence can be marked; the sum of the marks becomes a given year's score. (Policy Orientation = $\sum F \cdot I$; where "F" is frequency and "I" is intensity).

i. 1970 - 1979 (regime of Park Chung Hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi])

The first feature noted in this period is that the Seoul government's policy remained at the bottom of the conflict region. The three consecutive years from 1975 to 1977 recorded the highest points in the conflict region, indicating the time of greatest hostility. This was due to the violent murder of Park's wife on 15 August 1974. Park himself narrowly escaped assassination and suspected that his would-be assassin was an agent of P'yŏngyang. A further serious blow was the discovery of a series of tunnels dug by North Korean troops under the Demilitarised Zone in November 1974 and February 1975. The two incidents became the prelude for self-injuring rivalry between Seoul and P'yŏngyang in a prolonged cold war, even after the orchestrators of them had entered into an international detente.

Second, the government's attitudes before and after the historic year of 1972 deserve special mention. 1972 is often seen as a milestone in the South-North talks about unification since the historic Joint Communiqué was agreed on 4 July 1972. More specifically, on 12 August 1971 the southern Red Cross proposed a meeting with the northern Red Cross to discuss the problem of families divided since the post-war partition of Korea. Their proposal was immediately accepted and, after preliminary meetings, a total of seven full-sessions of talks were held between 30 August 1972 and 13 July 1973.⁷ The Joint Communiqué came after a series of secret negotiations about exchange visits between Seoul and P'yŏngyang.

Surprisingly, however, the Park government's attitude remained highly negative on the eve of this historic Communiqué. Conflict points decreased by 20 points in 1973, but co-operative points remained constant. Again, the increase of co-operative points in 1974 was not accompanied by a decrease of conflict points. Rather there was a sharp increase of conflict points, suggesting that although the Joint Communiqué reflected the strong aspirations of the people, it was pronounced in a hostile climate. The Park government seems to have been unwilling to seek the further steps towards unification suggested by the Communiqué.

South-North dialogue proceeded no further. Even the Joint Communiqué was interpreted differently by both sides. For one thing, democratic procedure was taken by Seoul as an excuse for denying any sweeping policy proposal from P'yŏngyang and autonomy was thought of by P'yŏngyang as an agreement to drive out the American ground troops stationed in the South. Facing P'yŏngyang's argument for the removal of American troops, Park took a step backwards and announced a new policy: he opened up the possibility of contact with communist countries in his 23 June 1973 "Declaration on the Diplomacy of Peaceful Unification". Park stated that both Seoul and P'yŏngyang should be admitted to the United Nations, while Seoul would open its doors to communist states and non-aligned groups⁸. This idea developed to a cross contact concept later, but at this stage the first priority was given to non-aggression in inter-Korean relations. Seoul vehemently opposed any P'yŏngyang contacts with the United States or Japan. P'yŏngyang for its part criticized the cross contact concept as perpetuating the partition of the Korean peninsula.

Lastly, it is interesting that there was a steep decrease of conflict points in proportion to domestic affairs

difficulties⁹. A notable move was made towards unification though this was the most difficult domestic time for Park's government, since it followed the passing of the *Yushin* (Vitalising Reforms) Constitution on 17 October 1972. Perhaps the endemic popular fear of the communist North became less effective in calming domestic discontent, while at the same time, public sympathy for Park's tragic loss of his wife petered out.

The Park government found itself facing growing discontent in 1978. On 12 December, legislative elections were held resulting in the massive defeat of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP). The ruling DRP won only 32% of the vote as against the 34% gained by the die-hard opposition New Democratic Party (NDP). Opposition forces became more diverse, ranging from the NDP to student radicals and religious organisations. The immediate inference is that Park's government tried to play a co-operation card to cool domestic discontent. This is supported by the fact that co-operative points did not increase at all in 1979 despite the sharp diminishing of conflict points. The conflict-oriented drive, used until then to extend the duration of Park's presidency, became of little use. Facing demands for constitutional revision and the president's resignation, the unification stance was changed. But no sooner did success seem to be within reach than the government fell with Park's murder in October 1979.

ii. 1981 - 1987 (regime of Chun Doo Hwan [Chŏn Tuhwan])

Figure 2 indicates that Chun's government made more attempts to step up the South-North dialogue than had his predecessor. In a sense, this co-operative drive was an inevitable consequence of the fact that the general public became so enlightened that the government could no longer use a conflict-oriented card. Conflict-oriented drives were no longer attractive to the people. Chun's debt to the people who elected him, founded on the 1980 Kwangju incident, also accelerated changes in unification policy.

Seoul's co-operative posture was dealt a decisive blow by the Rangoon bombing incident on 9 October 1983. As Figure 2 shows, conflict points suddenly increased by 33, from 17 to 50, in 1984. Chun warned P'yŏngyang, speaking on nation-wide television on 20 October: "The Rangoon incident is an act of terror against the head of this state, and it is to be treated as a declaration of war". He went on to continue, later in January 1984:¹⁰ "I am warning that I will retaliate unreservedly if North Korea continues its violent provocation which threatens our existence".

However, the government quickly started to turn back to a co-operative stance from mid-1984. Figure 2 illustrates that 3 points were added to the co-operative region with a 48 point decrease in the conflict region despite the incident. In addition, mid-1984 saw the agreement to hold meetings to discuss economic co-operation, parliamentary exchanges and sporting links. In September, following disastrous flooding in Seoul, the North offered aid in the form of rice, cement and medicine. This was accepted by the South. The South sent electronic home appliances to the North. Economic talks followed on 15 November 1984.

Chun's government sought to revive co-operative relations with P'yŏngyang although there were no notable demands for such action from society at large. In doing so, the politics behind Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympics cannot be over-emphasised. Politics rendered Chun's government malleable not only to the vanguard of the popular movement for constitutional reform,¹¹ but also to improving South-North relations. Seoul's fear of losing the Games prevented the government from deploying forceful policies against the North. It served Chun to restrain from the use of force against the Summer 1987 mass protests for constitutional reform and to argue for peaceful coexistence, if not co-operation, with the North. Meanwhile, after Seoul was chosen to host the Games, from 30 July 1985 North Korea repeatedly argued that it should be the co-host. As a result, in October 1985 and January 1986, the North and South Korean Olympic committees held two rounds of (inconclusive) talks. The Seoul government was extremely careful to soothe P'yŏngyang, especially until the Games were held in 1988.

To conclude, Chun started to reject four decades of unwavering policy against international communism. In doing so, the extension of the diplomatic horizon was a major policy aim. However, diplomatic expansion was not paralleled in South-North relations. Chun's unilateral posture was not matched by the North and, by and large, remained rooted in cold war consciousness. His diplomatic policies were framed to check the possible southern policy from the North, a policy directed particularly towards influencing the United States and Japan.

iii. 1988 to the present (regime of Roh Tae Woo [No T'ae-u])

Figure 2 indicates that President Roh's government has maintained the most co-operative stance since his inauguration in 1988. As can be seen, the conflict points recorded are at the lowest end of the scale and, at the same time, the co-operative points are, throughout the whole period, higher than before. Historic two-day talks between the prime ministers of the two Koreas took place on 6 September 1990. A second round of talks between the premiers, Kang Young Hoon [Kang Yŏnghun] and Yon Hyong Muk [Yon Hyongmŏk] followed in P'yŏngyang on 16-17 October 1990.

In a sense, the talks can be seen as one consequence of mounting pressure on Roh since 1988 to address the question of unification. The vanguard process of liberalisation in 1988 and 1989 meant the old-style security card became almost incapable of use. Government policy was demystified, and policy-makers were forced to change from crisis politics to interest politics. Roh himself understood this trend and from his inauguration onwards asserted that he would seek a co-ordinating role between differentiated southern and northern interests rather than act as an agent for change.

Roh's approach developed into a new style of policy, new both in content and in context. Strictly speaking, altered environmental contexts in domestic politics apparently contributed to the creation of a new unification policy coupled to a new attitude in foreign affairs. The specific policy which was formulated has been termed the Northern Policy¹² and is often linked to the late 1960s Kiesinger¹³ and Brandt¹⁴ *Östpolitik* in West Germany. Park Chul Un [Pak Chŏrun], formerly State Minister for

Political Affairs, was at the core of planning and executing Seoul's new policy.

The northern policy resulted in some notable successes, particularly in respect to Seoul's relations with former Eastern bloc states. Diplomatic relations were opened with Hungary in February 1989, and soon afterwards with Poland and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania followed in 1990. Seoul's efforts to improve such relations reached a peak with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on 30 September 1990. When President Roh met Gorbachev in San Francisco on 4 June 1990 they agreed to normalise diplomatic relations after 86 years of rare contact.

From the domestic viewpoint, Roh's northern policy seems to be a product of the consideration of three factors. First of all, sweetened relations with former adversaries were judged to offer new foreign markets for Korean manufactures. Korean products, after all, now face a renewed protectionism in American and European markets. The threat of sanctions over Korean protectionism also loomed large, and South Korea faced particular difficulties when put on the United States' list of unfair trading nations.¹⁵ Former eastern bloc states looked to Korea for help to stem economic stagnation, and particularly to overcome problems associated with supply difficulties for consumer goods.

Warning bells had begun to sound in 1988. Then, Korea's labour force, arguably the hardest working in the world, took to the streets as the social consensus on economic development broke down. Korea's labour-intensive industries were forced to turn their attention overseas, where the applied industrial technologies of South Korea were welcomed. Table II gives a typical illustration of

the economic relations between Seoul and one former adversary.

TABLE II

TRADE BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND THE USSR IN 1989

(unit: \$1,000)

Exports		Imports	
1. Machinery	55,545	Pig Iron	75,024
2. Textile	53,396	Agri. and Food	70,245
3. Shipbuilding	40,317	Coal	54,611
4. Electronics	24,584	Nickel Ingot	33,183
5. Soap	9,511	Raw Cotton	17,416
6. Toothpaste	3,661	Timber & Pulp	15,490

Source: *Korea Newsreview*, 16 June 1990: 13.

Secondly, the new policy was designed to induce changes in North Korea through international pressure. When Roh met Gorbachev in San Francisco, Roh asked for help to persuade North Korea to leave its self-imposed isolation. Initially, however, Seoul was worried by the rival policy of the North.¹⁶ The posture of policy makers did not move far from the zero option, in which one side's gain was seen as the other side's loss. But, as time went on, Seoul gained in confidence, for instance, allowing pictures of Kim Il Sung to be displayed on university campuses. The government feared the consequences if P'yŏngyang was excluded from the international community by the new policy and by the reverse domino effect of changes in the eastern bloc. So, Seoul's orientation became slowly more favourable towards the North. It repeatedly stressed that the policy aimed not to isolate North Korea from its old allies, but to pave the road for mutual prosperity. Roh told

Gorbachev: "We don't want North Korea to remain isolated, and we hope relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea will develop further".¹⁷

Last, but not least, the domestic drive to use diplomatic success as political capital in internal politics was a third reason for the new policy. Here, the race for the domestication of international affairs can be seen as a by-product of the political limits faced by Roh and his rivals, the two Kims, under the so-called *yōso yadae*¹⁸ phenomenon. In 1989, both public feeling of political inefficacy and diminishing popularity of political leaders led to the race between Roh and his rivals for invitations to visit former eastern bloc states, with the greatest efforts being exerted to gain invitations from the Soviet Union and China. Kim Young Sam [Kim Yōngsam] visited Moscow first. His visit occupied the mass media for several days, leading to the likelihood that he could rebuild his popularity both ideologically and as a potential foreign policy manager. However, the conservative alliance of 22 January 1990, in which Kim joined Roh, fuelled conflicts between Kim and Park Chul Un, both of whom had ambitions to become president, particularly after Kim's second Moscow visit in March 1990. Facing the gradual spread of democratic ideas, which limited available political resources, parliamentarians increased their options through foreign relations. The foreign card proved effective in cooling the people's discontent, albeit for a brief period.

In respect to this last point, some critics are worried that Roh is following a costly policy which has no guarantee of future profits, at least in economic terms. For one thing, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Poland on 1 November 1989 accompanied official agreement on bilateral economic cooperation. Under this, Korea's state-run Exim bank is to provide Korean companies setting up plants in

Poland with \$400 million in loans over a five year period, with another \$50 million given as a loan to Warsaw. Again, in the case of Russian contacts, Seoul agreed to give a \$3 billion aid package. This is certainly large-scale support. Earlier, it is claimed some businessmen went to Eastern bloc states for investment purposes without any pre-calculation, merely believing that the government would cover any losses for political reasons.

Public Opinion as a Policy Environment

So far, the main emphasis of my paper has been on the part played by the government in the domestic arena. Of course it is undeniable that the Seoul government's multifarious initiation has been the most powerful factor in explaining public policy. For example, during the period of rapid economic development, the government was the agent of change, the guardian of political stability, the major investor and a dominating force influencing private business investment decisions.

Recent developments indicate some emerging areas of politics working from the bottom up. In these, policy can be interpreted as government responses to public opinion. Society is becoming more diversified and more complicated, and this imposes crucial limits on the entrepreneurial role which the government is able to take. Differentiated social interests can no longer be satisfied by policy measures worked out on the basis of a monolithic pragmatism. Differing voices have to be heard, and this demands that the government should act as a co-ordinator, minimising its intervention. The people's antipathy towards authoritarian rule also undermines their compliance with the planning and implementation of policy.¹⁹ The people do not believe

that the government is a neutral guardian of public interests. They do not regard public bureaucrats as superior in terms of competence and motivation to private elites.

Unification policy, unavoidably, is subject to the same changing perspectives. More than ever before, it is now influenced by public opinion. This has been particularly so since 1988, when its unification policies were fiercely challenged.²⁰ Then, those who believed that the partition of Korea was the fundamental source of socio-political problems began to focus their attention on unification.

To demonstrate my assertion, I will compare five nationwide opinion surveys. These span 14 years from 1977 to 1990 and cover the general public, university students and opinion leaders in their respondents. The questions asked ranged the gamut of all unification issues.

TABLE III

THE DESIRABILITY OF UNIFICATION (1988)

(unit: %)

Answer scale:	1	2	3	4	5
Public	63.5	20.8	7.4	6.5	1.5
Opinion Leaders	81.9	14.9	1.6	1.4	0.4

Explanations:

- 1 "should be done"
- 2 "will be better"
- 3 "trouble making"
- 4 "unnecessary"
- 5 "it is not my business"

Source: Pyung Gil Chay [Ch'oe Pyōnggil], *A Survey on Socio-Political Consciousness* (Seoul: the Department of Public Administration, Yonsei University, 1988).

The first feature of Table III is the desirability of Korean unification. Respondents were asked how much they thought unification desirable. Answering on a simple five point scale, respondents almost uniformly placed emphasis on the importance of unification. 84.3% of the general public and 96.5% of opinion leaders believe unification desirable. The proportion considering unification "not necessary" roughly equals those responding "not my business".

To explore the background of popular support for unification, another question was given. 49% thought unification desirable for "national prosperity and development" and 25% chose for "recovering national identity". 18.4% believed unification desirable simply for the accomplishment of a united nation. As the cross-tabulation (0.0002 chi²) of this attitude against respondent age shows, the younger the respondent the more emphasis given to politico-historical aspects over than humanitarian/geographical concerns (the reverse also holds).

Experience of life before 1945 in undivided Korea seem to lead the older generation to stress the reunion and of up to 10 million people within now separated families. This generation accounts for nearly 20% of today's population and tends to be relatively conservative in political terms. This stems not only from vivid memories of wartime life, but also from the fact that many of them (between 700,000 and 1 million) fled from the North as refugees. Although by voting with their feet²¹ they contributed to the political legitimacy of the South, they added a more conservative colour to the political spectrum.

TABLE IV**OBJECTIVES OF UNIFICATION AMONG OPINION LEADERS (1988)**

(units: numbers, %)

Answer:	1	2	3	4	5	6
Ages: 10-19	0	7	8	1	3	19
	0	36.8	42.1	5.3	15.8	0.8
20-29	7	209	308	19	93	637
	1.1	32.8	48.4	3.0	14.8	28.2
30-39	10	168	356	37	115	686
	1.5	24.5	51.9	5.4	16.8	30.4
40-49	5	93	289	41	73	501
	1	18.6	57.7	8.2	14.6	22.2
50-59	9	77	127	35	112	360
	2.5	21.4	35.3	9.7	31.1	16.0
60-69	3	10	16	3	20	52
	5.8	19.2	30.8	5.8	38.5	2.3
Total	34	564	1104	136	416	2255
	1.5	25.0	49.0	6.0	18.4	100.0

Explanations:

1. Meeting of separated families
2. Recovering national identity
3. National prosperity and development
4. Liberation from the fear of war
5. Accomplishment of a unified nation

On the other hand, the post-war generation has much more practical and realistic values in respect of unification, and does not take the divided country as a given necessity. They focus on the political and economic burden caused by division and tend to be less concerned about national

security. In South Korea today, fully 50% of the adult population are aged between 20 and 35.

A much greater surprise is the notions of what a post-unification political system should be. Table V summarises the sweeping changes deemed desirable. The different wording between 4 and 5 in the answers is due to the fact that questionnaires were designed to allow respondents to locate themselves in relation to major currents of the time.²²

TABLE V**THE POST-UNIFICATION POLITICAL SYSTEM**

(unit: %)

Answers:	1	2	3	4	5
Years: Surveyed:					
1982 Public	76.3	0.5	12.5	8.6	
1986 University	47.8	2.68	38.28	8.59	
1987 Public	46.0	0.9	14.5		37.2
1988 Public	43.4	0.7	19.8		35.5
1990 Public	25.8	0.3	28.9		45.0

Explanations:

1. Capitalism
2. Communism
3. Mixed system
4. Any system except communism
5. New Ideological system

The majority of respondents in 1990, 45%, would prefer a new ideological and political system. There has been a constant and rapid increase in the respondents who give this answer since 1987. On the contrary, those in favour of the capitalist system have decreased considerably from 76.3% in 1982 to 25.8%. Answer 1 is in inverse relation to

answer 5. This seems to indicate that those who alienate themselves from capitalism have gained a new political outlook over the decade. Considering that there is little change in the unpopularity of communism, it follows that many people have been disappointed by South Korean domestic politics.

TABLE VI

CORRELATION OF POST-UNIFICATION SYSTEM WITH AGE (1990—public respondents)

(units: numbers/%)

Answers:	1	2	3	4	Row total
Age:					
20-29	57	0	136	209	402
	14.2	0	33.8	52	37.4
30-39	74	1	66	129	270
	27.4	0.3	24.4	47.8	25.1
40-49	65	0	56	84	205
	31.7	0	27.3	41	19.1
50-59	51	2	39	51	143
	35.7	1.4	27.3	35.7	13.3
60-69	30	0	14	11	55
	54.5	0	25.5	20	5.1
Total no.	277	3	311	484	1075
Total %	25.8	0.3	28.9	45	100.0

Explanations:

- 1 South Korean style capitalism
- 2 North Korean style communism
- 3 mixed system
- 4 new system

Source: Pyung Gil Chay, unpublished survey data (1990)

Cross-tabulation (0.002 χ^2) of this with age reveals an explicit pattern of dissimilarities between age groups. Estrangement from the existing capitalist system is most

notable amongst those in their 20s and 30s: 85.8% and 72.2% respectively favour a mixed or new system. They are prepared to accept either, and this system can be thought of as somewhere between the current southern and northern styles. There is almost unanimous opposition against communism, despite the fact that the younger the respondent the more a new system is preferred. This opposition seems to have been strengthened with the fall of the eastern bloc in 1989.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the changing trends of Korean unification policies and explored domestic factors which have framed the changes. Two empirical examples were presented, annual presidential addresses which mark government attitudes, and five nationwide surveys which show underlying trends in public consciousness.

It is not surprising that the unification issue has been an oasis in the political desert for politicians in both the South and North. The issue itself was often interpreted as an issue of security issue when the southern government drove domestic policies hard and railed against international detente. Political stability and national security was then the concern. More recently, though, the unification issue in the South has been used very much to enforce a co-operation posture. The change was mainly due to the discrediting of the old conflict-oriented stance through vigorous democratisation in the South. 1989 saw the most sweeping change from conflict to co-operation. As a result, the game in which one nominal policy proposal by one side is answered by a counter-proposal from the other,

have become more realistic. This has led to a decrease in the self-injuring rivalry between South and North.

The domestication of policy marked one feature of recent times. Fierce competition between political leaders, witnessed in competing unification policy initiatives, is a paradoxical indication of this. The South Korean people also more and more ascribe the partition of the peninsula to domestic factors rather than international interference. The surveys consequently show a 10.1% decrease in respondents who consider international factors a constraint upon unification between 1987 and 1990. However, the Koreanization of unification has fuelled conflicts between political leaders, suggesting that there is a danger that unification policy, or related foreign policies, can have too great a cost to be justified in terms of domestic ends. The public, nonetheless, shows undiminished support for unification. This has functioned as a source of political discontent wherever there is a gap between popular aspirations and government policies.

Comparison of opinion surveys over the last decade indicates that the reasons for public support for unification are changing. Where in the past unification was considered desirable mostly for humanitarian reasons, now it is thought necessary for national prosperity. This marks changing generations. The young generation, particularly those aged between 20 and 30, is not only more practical and realistic but also plays a leading role in making unification policy more democratic. They deny the old security card argument presented by the government and discard the mysticism which has usually surrounded unification policies. As a consequence, recent unification policy can be taken as the government's response to public opinion.

Finally, public opinion has recently tended to polarise, and many people are dissatisfied with the southern political practices. Although more and more focus on the domestic factors, this shift of interest is not matched by positive developments in the domestic arena. Table V thus illustrates that many Koreans now feel alienated by capitalism and want to promote a new ideology. Special attention ought to be paid to these dissatisfactions to prevent them developing into centrifugal political force. Thus, one of the most urgent things to do is to construct an economic welfare floor below which no one sinks in industrialised Korean society.

APPENDIX: Sources for presidential new year's addresses

Sōul shinmun, 9 January 1970, 11 January 1971, 11 January 1972, 12 January 1973, 15 January 1976, 12 January 1977, 18 January 1978, 19 January 1979, 13 January 1981, 23 January 1982, 18 January 1984, 17 January 1986, 18 January 1989.
Korea Times, 19 January 1974.
Korea Herald, 15 January 1975, 19 January 1983, 10 January 1985.
Chosōn ilbo, 11 January 1988, 11 January 1990.
Kyōnghyang shinmun, 12 January 1987.

NOTES

1. Michael G. Fry and Arthur N. Gilbert (1982), "A Historian and Linkage Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 26/3.
2. The influences of various factors in foreign policy making were well illustrated by G.T. Allison's *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) for the United States and in Britain by W. Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977).

3. Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (London: Sage, 1980).
4. O.R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969).
5. V.O. Key Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1964).
6. Azar developed a 15-point scale and weighted values by asking 18 experts on international relations. For the list of COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank), see Edward E. Azar, *Codebook and User's Package for the COPDAB* (Chapel Hill: Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, 1978).
7. D.S. Lewis (ed.), *Korea: Enduring Division?* (London: St. James Press, 1988).
8. *The Korea Herald*, 15 January 1975.
9. *Far Eastern Economic Review* 5 October 1979 and 26 October 1979.
10. *The Seoul Shinmun*, 18 January 1984.
11. Lewis, *ibid*: 99.
12. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 August 1990.
13. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Ludwig Erhard's successor, was inextricably connected with the rise and fall of the Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU/CSU. He was said to be the ideal chancellor candidate since he had the fewest outright opponents in either party when the Erhard government collapsed. Donald P. Kommers, "Chancellor, Cabinet and President", in C.C. Schweitzer *et al* (eds), *Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Leamington: Berg Publishers, 1984): 50 - 79; Martin McCauley, *The German Democratic Republic since 1945* (London: Macmillan, 1983).
14. Willy Brandt was brought to the national scene by the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966. As foreign minister he started to normalise the relationships with Eastern Europe.
15. South Korea, whose trade structure most closely resembles that of Japan in terms of export composition and destination, also

- suffered most from the depreciation of the yen (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 5 July 1990).
16. The series of developments in 1989 so elated the Seoul Government that Roh told his ruling group on 6 July 1990 that he expected to see north and south Korea re-united within 5 years (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 19 July 1990).
 17. *Korea Newsreview*, 9 June 1990: 4.
 18. *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, 26 April 1988.
 19. For a discussion of policy compliance, see Oran R. Young, *Compliance and Public Authority* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979).
 20. Young Whan Kihl, *Politics and Policies in Divided Korea* (London: Westview Press, 1984).
 21. This concept is based on Tiebout's explanation of the movement of population in search of preferred political systems. Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure", reprinted in M. Edel and J. Rothenberg (eds), *Readings in Urban Economics* (New York: Macmillan, 1972): 513 - 23. See also L.J. Sharpe and K. Newton, *Does Politics Matter?* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
 22. Otherwise the number of respondents who gave no reply increases. See H. Schuman and S. Presser, "The Assessment of 'No Opinion' in Attitude Surveys", in K. Schuessler (ed.), *Sociological Methodology* (San Francisco: Josey Bass, 1979).