

Koreans across the Sea: Migration of Laborers to the Metropole, 1910–1937

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with Korean farmers who were transformed into laborers during the Korean colonial period and migrated to Japan to enhance their living conditions. The author's research adopts a regional scale to its investigation in which the emergence of Osaka as a global city attracted Koreans seeking economic betterment. The paper shows that, despite an initial claim to permit the free mobility of Koreans, the Japanese empire came to control this mobility depending on political, social, and economic circumstances of Japan and Korea. For Koreans, notwithstanding poverty being a primary trigger for the abandonment of their homes, the paper argues that their migration was facilitated by chain migration and they saw Japan as a resolution to their economic hardships in the process of capital accumulation by the empire.

Keywords: Chain migration, mobility, empire, metropole, labor, economic hardship, modernity, immigration regulation, commodification, capitalism, state-building

Introduction

Japanese and English language scholarship on the history of Korean migration during the colonial era often depict the remarkable size of the Korean population in Japan by stating that Koreans were, and continued to be in postwar Japan, the

largest foreign population. This phenomenon appeared for the first time in 1917 when Korean workers began to stream into Japan in conspicuously large numbers to aid the labor demand produced by the First World War. It was also then that they surpassed the total number of Chinese residents. Before this time, more than fifty percent of Japan's foreign population consisted of Chinese immigrants.¹ It would not be until 2007 that the population of Chinese residents recovered to become dominant at some 606,889, exceeding the number of Korean residents in Japan by 13,400.² These statistics do not include Koreans and their offspring who have been resident for several generations and have become naturalized. In other words, the population of Korean residents in Japan today mostly originates from the laboring class, which comprised the largest group of Koreans during the colonial period.

Before 1910, ordinances were introduced between 1874 and 1899 to regulate the immigration of foreign workers including Koreans. Imperial Ordinances 352 and 421 enacted in July 1899 by the Ministry of Home Affairs confined foreigners to general labor. The former ordinance was promulgated particularly to control the employment of unskilled Chinese laborers, as they were considered to be unhygienic, undisciplined, and opium addicts. Conflict between them and Japanese workers was also a common sight.³ As Korean laborers grew in number after the annexation of Korea, this image of Chinese laborers was soon projected onto Koreans. Not only was the presence of Korean laborers inconspicuous before this time, but there were a greater number of Koreans in education, diplomatic establishment, and politics, with students being the most noticeable.⁴ From August 29, 1910, Koreans were exempt from the law that restricted the entry of foreign laborers and permitted to travel between Korea and Japan through the Free Travel System (自由渡航制度 *jiyū tokō seido*).⁵ The imperial authorities welcomed Korean migrants and stated that it was their duty to protect and train Koreans.⁶ This was, however, soon counteracted by the rising tide of Korean laborers who migrated to Japan without securing employment in Japan. They did not initially travel to Japan of their own volition. However, as industries developed, they became the target of entrepreneurs for reasons that Korean laborers were acquiescent to low wages, longer working hours, and poor working environments. Additionally, a great number of Korean laborers steadily traveled to Japan through chain migration. This is known as migration through kinship connection where migrants typically relocate from the peripheries to urban centers. Their decision is consolidated by family members or acquaintances who have already settled in a new location. The group of migrants consequently reside in the same urban area.⁷ This concerned the imperial authorities whose intention in permitting free mobility was not the congregation and accumulation of what they considered people of low culture.⁸

From the perspective of Korean laborers, migration to Japan was an unavoidable consequence of the oppression of Japanese colonial rule. The majority of Koreans who crossed the straits to Japan were originally peasant-farmers who became laborers upon prematurely retiring from the agricultural industry in Korea. The cadastral land survey (土地調査事情 *tochi chōsa jijō*) conducted between 1910 and 1918 and the institution of the program to increase rice exports (産米増殖計画 *sammai zōshoku keikaku*) from 1920 were two prominent projects undertaken by the Japanese government to expand agriculture on the peninsula. However, Korean peasant-farmers argued that these projects led to the loss of their land and pushed them from their hometown to seek occupations elsewhere.⁹ For Koreans who decided to emigrate, Japan was neither the only destination nor the most popular destination. More prevalent destinations included China, Siberia, North America, Sakhalin, and the United Kingdom.¹⁰ In fact, Koreans continued to travel to Manchuria in greater numbers than they did to Japan up until the middle of the Second World War.¹¹

There were three key players in the migration of Korean laborers: the imperial authorities, capitalists, and Koreans themselves. Using Korean labor migration to Japan as one mechanism in the process of Japan's state-building, this paper showcases the interactions between the three key players in order to examine Korean labor migration from the standpoint of the Japanese empire and Koreans. The imperial authorities first claimed to form a deepening bond between Japanese and Korean people. However, as businesspeople and corporates accumulated capital and favored Korean labor, the authorities soon lamented that the free migration of Koreans to Japan allowed the presence of Korean laborers who generated social, economic, and political problems in Japan. Why did the imperial authorities then not prohibit the migration of Koreans in the laboring class altogether? For Korean laborers, if migration to Japan was an inevitable result of the colonial oppression, why did they choose Japan as a destination while a greater number of Koreans traveled elsewhere inside and outside of the peninsula? In order to answer these questions, this paper will cover 1910 to 1937, with the latter being the year that marked the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War and where immigration regulations morphed into ones that encouraged Korean migration more progressively.

In English language scholarship, Edward Wagner is the first to have explored the Korean minority in Japan from 1910 to 1950. Albeit revealing unprecedented research findings on social, economic, and political issues of Korean residents in Japan, it is not his interest to analyze the migration processes of Koreans where other scholars have examined push and pull factors that triggered the migration of Koreans to Japan. Michael Weiner is one of the first English language scholars

to have examined Korean migration to Japan from 1910 to the end of the Second World War. In addition to the main themes of his research centering around race and assimilation introduced by the Japanese empire as a colonial policy, he places emphasis on the pull factors of Koreans' migration to Japan and how Korean laborers were received by the host society and industry. While he provides an overview of the immigration systems implemented by the authorities, their effects on the mobility of Koreans between the straits and the circumstances in the two lands that elicited the authorities to issue such systems are unclear. Ken Kawashima also utilizes Korean laborers as a lens through which he scrutinizes the processes that ultimately trapped Koreans in a web of commodification of their labor power during capital accumulation. What separates his research from the earlier studies is that he not only views state power as a non-monolithic entity, but he also studies social and institutional practices that led to divisions among the Korean minority. Eliminating the assumption of racism and discrimination against Koreans, which is prominent in previous studies, certainly supports his argument involving class struggle of the proletariat. However, despite providing both push and pull factors of Koreans' migration to Japan, his research is not concerned with the immigration processes and policies that interfered with the decision of migration among Korean workers.

In Japanese language scholarship, one scholar who has had a thorough overview of the Korean community in Japan is Tonomura Masaru. Although the main focus of his research is not on Korean migration, his project to reconstruct the historiography of the Korean minority from a sociological approach enables him to make a statistical analysis of Korean mobility. Similar to Kawashima's research, Tonomura's research departs from the prevalent tendency of previous studies to conceptualize the Korean minority as a unified existence and to study them through colonial policies and resistance. This offers the re-examination of the Korean community with a bottom-up approach, allowing readers to comprehend the significance of the general public in the formation of the Korean minority. However, he takes a broad examination of the Korean community exploring every corner of the general public that it is not sufficient to understand the extent to which the regulation of Korean mobility interfered with the push and pull factors of their migration. In contrast, scholars such as Kim Ch'an-chŏng and Iwasa Kazuyuki take a narrow approach where they zoom into Osaka as the central place of their investigation. Primarily through interviews with first-generation *zainichi* Koreans, Kim's research provides an important insight into the economic circumstances Cheju residents were exposed to and their living conditions after settling in Osaka. The use of oral history undeniably offers a detailed look into the aspects of the lives of Korean laborers that textual sources alone cannot present. However,

unlike Iwasa's research which reveals the industrial development and the urbanization of Osaka as the main source of attraction for the greatest number of Korean migrants, Kim does not place the findings of his research in a broader context of the *zainichi* Korean historiography. Moreover, notwithstanding migration being a central issue in Iwasa's research, he is not concerned with the relation between the prosperity of Osaka and the immigration regulations proclaimed on Koreans.

This paper therefore will build on the previous studies to study the migration of Korean laborers by employing top-down and bottom-up approaches. The former allows scholars to study the Japanese empire through the state and policies while scholars using the latter examine it through the birth of Korean nationalism and resistance. Jun Uchida, who has conducted extensive research on Japanese settlers on the Korean peninsula, asserts that an area oscillating between these approaches has recently seized the attention of scholars where colonial Korea is not only defined by colonial policies and resistance but also by modernity.¹² This area becomes significant as my research endeavors to answer the two questions posed above. This study aims to demonstrate that the discussion of Korean migration to Japan expands beyond a one-dimensional analysis encompassing Japanese colonial oppression. The first half of this paper will discuss how the structural changes in economy that were caused by specific events between 1910 and 1937 prompted Korean laborers to abandon their homes for Japan. For the scope of this paper, I will explore the motives of Korean emigration to Japan by targeting Osaka regionally. The second half of this paper will examine the reaction of the Japanese empire to Korean migration by exploring the immigration policies promulgated by the imperial authorities to regulate Korean mobility according to economic, social, and political conditions of Korea and Japan.

Influx of Korean Laborers

At the beginning of the Free Travel System, Korean laborers were encouraged to migrate voluntarily, but only an insignificant number of Koreans traveled to Japan of their own volition. Notwithstanding the small influx of Korean laborers into Japan at this time, ferries between Pusan of South Kyōngsang Province and Shimonoseki of Yamaguchi Prefecture began operation in September 1905 by a private shipping line.¹³ The 壱岐丸 Iki-maru was the first ferry to specialize in transporting passengers with approximately eight hours of travel time. Besides this route, ferries between Cheju Island and Osaka, Yōsu and Shimonoseki, and Pusan and Hakata of Fukuoka Prefecture eventually began transporting passengers.¹⁴ Passengers who boarded the ferries were not only Koreans. Japanese entrepreneurs, encouraged by the state, began to recruit Korean laborers into Japanese industries

Table 1 Korean population in a few areas within the Japanese empire.

Year	Japan	Korea	Manchuria (excluding Kwantung Leased Territory)	Kwantung Leased Territory	Mainland China
1910	2,600	13,128,780	158,433	20	0
1911	5,728				
1912	7,796				
1913	10,394				
1914	12,961				
1915	15,106				
1916	17,972	16,309,179	328,207	67	244
1917	22,218				
1918	34,082				
1919	37,732				
1920	40,755				
1921	62,404				
1922	90,741	17,208,139	534,967	635	1,247
1923	136,557	17,446,913	527,416	611	1,100
1924	172,130				
1925	214,657				
1926	247,358	18,615,033	552,217	976	2,367
1927	308,685				
1928	358,121				

such as textiles, chemicals, and coal mining from 1911. In July of the same year, the Seoul Relief Society Employment Exchange Agency (京城救護會職業紹介所 *Keijō Kyūgokai Shokugyō Shōkaijo*) was set up to recruit Koreans more efficiently.

As shown in Table 1, the recruitments did not impel many Koreans to leave the peninsula at the beginning.¹⁵ One of the first push factors following annexation was the land survey (土地調査事情 *tochi chōsa jijō*) conducted by the Government-General of Korea between 1910 and 1918.¹⁶ The primary objective was to confirm ownership in order to conduct surveys to assess the quality and value of each parcel of land for taxation. This project was undertaken by the implementation

Year	Japan	Korea	Manchuria (excluding Kwantung Leased Territory)	Kwantung Leased Territory	Mainland China
1929	398,920				
1930	419,009				
1931	427,275	19,710,168	629,235	1,747	2,580
1932	433,692	20,037,273	654,023	2,002	3,582
1933	500,637	20,205,591	671,535	2,259	4,954
1934	559,080	20,513,804	758,885	2,708	6,214
1935	615,867	21,248,864	826,570	3,251	7,197
1936	657,497	21,373,572	895,000	4,025	11,353
1937	693,138	21,682,855	932,000	3,917	16,420
1938	796,927	21,950,616	1,056,308	4,496	21,816
1939	980,700	22,098,310	1,162,127	4,828	44,759
1940	1,241,315	22,954,563	1,450,384	5,710	77,667
1941	1,484,025	23,913,063	1,490,000	6,405	86,793
1942	1,778,480	24,105,906	1,562,000	7,279	86,153
1943	1,946,047	24,389,719	1,634,000	7,414	86,654
1944	2,139,143				
1945	2,206,541				

Source: Tonomura Masaru (外村大), *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai no Rekishigakuteki Kenkyū-Keisei, Kōzō, Henyō* (在日朝鮮人社会の歴史学的研究-形成・構造・変容) (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 2004), 42, 60–61.

of a modern registration system, 토지대장 *t'oji taejang* (*j*: 土地台帳 *tochi daichō*), which remained the primary register throughout the colonial period, and it is still used in South Korea today.¹⁷

Postcolonial discourses surrounding the land survey are controversial, as many scholars assert that it allowed the imperial government to institute private ownership rights for the first time in Korea. Moreover, they maintain that it was a strategy to fraudulently claim Korea's arable land and to expropriate landownership from illiterate and uneducated Korean peasants. Although the purpose of this paper is not to weight the degrees of immiseration Korean peasants experienced prior to

and after annexation, historians such as Gi-Wook Shin and Edwin Gragert argue that the nature of the survey was not to radically bring changes to Korean economy and society, and that it did not usurp landownership from Korean peasants. On the one hand, statistics show that a considerable number of Korean peasants undeniably lost their land title as a result of the survey, and this situation worsened as the program to increase rice production (産米増殖計画 *sammai zōshoku keikaku*) was instituted in 1920 to increase rice exports to Japan.¹⁸ A study by Lee Gwangchae shows that the semi-tenancy rate declined from 39.4 percent in 1918 to 37.4 percent in 1920, which continued to drop and reached 23.3 percent by 1940. On the contrary, the tenancy rate was 37.8 percent in 1918, but it rose to 39.8 percent in 1920 and spiked upwards to 53.1 percent by 1940.¹⁹ Once Korean peasants were reduced to tenants, not only did they contribute anywhere between forty and sixty percent of crop shares, but they were also burdened with high rents and land taxes.²⁰ On the other hand, Shin contends that the alleged intentions of the survey claimed by scholars are not only unsupported by many case studies, but they were prevalent prior to annexation. For instance, the early Chosŏn dynasty employed private ownership as the land tenure system.²¹ Landholdings were unequally distributed, and land tenure was characterized by high tenancy in the late Chosŏn dynasty, where the security of tenancy tenure was never promising.²² Tenant-landlord relations were explained by two types of rent payment systems: variable or fixed. The former was dominantly employed in the Chosŏn dynasty where tenants and landlords divided crops equally. The downside of this system, at least for tenants, was that absentee landlords requested fixed rent, which was fewer than half the crops in value but supplemented by high land taxes.²³ Much of tenant-landlord relations and the land tenure system continued unaltered under the Japanese agricultural policy, at least until the Great Depression.²⁴ Gragert also asserts that Korean land not only predominantly remained in the hands of Koreans during the colonial period, but most land transfers from Korean to Japanese owners were enabled by joint efforts between Yi dynasty elites and Japanese businessmen and corporations.²⁵ Shin and Gragert both charge that there are many parallels to be drawn between Korean landownership of the Chosŏn dynasty and that of the colonial period, and they encourage reassessment of the Japanese agricultural policy. The extent to which the Japanese agricultural programs intended to exploit its colony is still open to debate.

Migration Channel

The colonial agricultural programs most severely affected the following six southern provinces where the commercialization of land was most vigorous: North and South Chŏlla, North and South Kyŏngsang, and North and South

Ch'ungch'öng.²⁶ A great many Korean peasants from these provinces first migrated to urban areas in a hope to find employment outside of the agricultural sector. A first-generation *zainichi* Korean, Lee Sök-hyön, who traveled to urban areas on the peninsula at the age of fifteen before settling in Manchuria and ultimately in Japan, noted that people whom he encountered at a night school told him and other children countless stories about the urban cities, and the stories made him envious.²⁷ Although he earned just enough money to call his income 小遣い *kozukai* (pin money), he nevertheless found a job at a nightclub. However, urban centers themselves were already experiencing scarcity in employment opportunities, and a vast number of Korean farmers set their minds to emigrate to Japan.²⁸

A pull factor for destitute Korean farmers that coincided with the period of the cadastral land survey was Japan's participation in the First World War and a subsequent increase in labor demands.²⁹ Persuaded by company recruiters to work in Japanese industries, Koreans conspicuously appeared in Japan in the later years of the First World War as 'cheap, temporary, and non-unionized industrial workers' who were distributed to small and medium-sized factories.³⁰ Ken Kawashima adds that the recruitments of Korean laborers had the support of the Government-General to employ them as a means to hinder wage levels from rising and Japanese trade unionism from strengthening.³¹ This way, capitalists could maximize profits while maintaining production costs low. During the war boom, Korean laborers were primarily recruited into coal mines and cotton factories. The majority of them were men, though women were also present and most noticeable in cotton factories. Another industry in which Koreans were hired, albeit on a smaller scale, was public works.³² Indeed, the Korean population swelled drastically in 1917 and 1918 compared to previous years. In 1918 in particular, the number of Korean immigrants skyrocketed from 1917 by 11,864.³³

Contrary to this first influx of Koreans who chiefly embarked on their journey to Japan through recruitment, Korean emigrants began to enter Japan in a greater number through kinship connection from as early as 1919.³⁴ Figures for 1917 exhibit 37.3 percent of Koreans who emigrated to Japan through recruitment. However, only 10.8 percent of them emigrated through recruitment in 1919, and this drastically decreased to 5.7 percent by 1920 and continued to decline in the subsequent years.³⁵ The sudden drop in the number of Koreans who used recruiters as a channel of emigration can be attributed to two reasons: the end of the land survey and postwar recession. Once the survey was completed in 1918, a considerable number of Korean farmers, who were either landowners or tenants, lost title to their land and hoped to secure employment in Japan. This overlapped with a period of economic recession that gripped Japan in the aftermath of the First World War, which implied that there was not as much necessity as before for direct

recruitments of Korean laborers on the peninsula. The lack of labor shortages, which manifested itself after the end of the war, was accompanied by the 1920 economic crisis.³⁶ An immediate consequence was substantial dismissals of laborers who were predominantly Korean factory workers whose contracts were temporary. Korean labor subsequently became disposable in nature.³⁷ Meanwhile, Koreans continued to cross to Japan through kinship connection. A survey conducted in 1927 revealed that 36.9 percent of Korean emigrants to Japan were called upon by their relatives. This was followed by 20.5 percent of emigrants who were invited by friends. 14.6 percent answered that they sought acquaintances in Japan. In contrast, only 2.5 percent of travelers applied for emigration without relying on someone in Japan.³⁸

The gradual rise in the use of chain migration by Korean migrants also implies that they increasingly resided in Japan in family units. The number of women never surpassed that of men throughout the colonial period. However, the gender ratio exhibited steady changes. In the early stage of Korean migration, the Korean community mainly consisted of unmarried men whose age range was primarily between their mid-teens and early 30s. They traveled to Japan as sojourn (出稼ぎ *dekasegi*) laborers.³⁹ As elaborated below, the Free Travel System became restricted in April 1919. From then, dependents accompanied the head of the household by means of 妻子呼寄 *saishi yobiyose* (invitation of wife and children), which allowed the traveler to immigrate with his family. In the 1920s, Korean women only comprised 11.6 percent of the total Korean population with almost 6 percent of them occupying the age range between mid-teens and late-20s.⁴⁰ In 1927, 88.2 percent of men and 64.6 percent of women entering or departing Japan traveled alone without one's parent or spouse.⁴¹ This suggests that the majority of male and female travelers were unmarried or crossed to Japan as sojourn travelers no matter their purpose of immigration. In the 1930s, while men of the same age range still dominated the Korean community, their percentage dropped to just below 50 and instead, infants (age 0–4) occupied 12 percent (2.5 percent in the 1920s). The female percentage also rose to 29 percent and the greatest number of women were still in the age range between mid-teens and late-20s.⁴² In Osaka, infants comprised as high as 20 percent of the Korean population in 1932. It is evident from the population shift that the demographics of the Korean community altered from unmarried *dekasegi* male labors to immigrants in family units. The Osaka survey also supports this analysis by showing that the presence of married Korean women continuously became more conspicuous from the Meiji era to 1932.⁴³ What is more, increasingly more Koreans were residing in Japan with their family permanently.⁴⁴

In 1937, which marked the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the rebirth of labor demands, the imperial authorities even modified the existing immigration system to facilitate the migration of dependents to Japan.⁴⁵ The intention of the

government was to stabilize the Korean community, and this parallels the trend in contemporary Western European countries where they encourage family reunions but transform migrant laborers into a commodity.⁴⁶ As elaborated below, Korean migration soon came to be problematized by the authorities for matters including unemployment, disputes with the locals, and illegal entries.⁴⁷ While the encouragement of family reunions seems counterintuitive, having the presence of family most likely enhanced the wellbeing of Korean men and reduced the frequency of illegal entries. On the other hand, it also suggests the migration of Koreans who followed their family members without comprehensive knowledge of the economic conditions in Japan. For instance, in the Osaka survey mentioned above, almost 90 percent of married women were unemployed. Although it appears that men were the primary breadwinners within most Korean households, there are many first-generation *zainichi* women who stated that they had to work alongside their husband because his income alone was not sufficient to support the family.

Koreans, like any other migrant laborers, were pushed away from their homeland and pulled towards the metropole in the process of capital accumulation. On the one hand, it seems at a glance that family reunions were a benevolent act of the government to stabilize the community. On the other hand, it also allowed the government to justify the commodification and mobilization of laborers. Korean peasants migrated in the hope to enhance their lives, and their families accordingly followed suit. Encouraged by the state or not, the quantitative increase of Korean migrants in family groups also implies that family members accompanied the head of the household not to aid capitalist penetration into new areas of the empire but to establish a stable family not spatially separated by the straits.

Chain Migration

What further galvanized numerous destitute Korean peasants to leave their homeland from the late 1920s was the worldwide depression. The depression first hit the agricultural industry in Japan in 1925 when the price of rice declined drastically. In the last month of 1934, Japanese rice regained the predepression value.⁴⁸ On the Korean peninsula where the colonial agricultural policy was to render Korea a primary source of rice for Japan, the impact of the depression was even more substantial. Starting in 1929, Korean agriculture witnessed a severe drop in the value of rice and other agricultural products, spurred by painfully reduced exports to Japan. In Korea, too, it was not until 1934 that the price of rice returned to the level it was before 1929. Pressured by the economic crisis, many Korean owners underwent mortgage foreclosures or left with no choice but to sell their land at a low value in the 1930s. Landownership transfers were conducted

on a large scale, and it was then that Japanese businessmen and corporates seized land at an unprecedented level. A sharp rise in tenancy rates at this time was most evident in the vicinity of urban areas and ports, mercilessly affecting the southern provinces of the peninsula.⁴⁹ In 1910, Koreans who were engaged in agriculture, forestry or livestock farming occupied 84.1 percent of the total industries and occupations on the peninsula. This percent dropped by mere 0.73 percent by 1917 when the land survey had already been compiled. When these data were collected in 1926, just a few years before the impact of the worldwide depression became noticeable in the Korean agricultural industry, it continually displayed a slight decrease of 83.1 percent. However, in 1935, around the time this industry finally recuperated, the percentage had indeed decreased to 78.1 percent.⁵⁰ Table 2 indicates that in 1932, as many as 56 percent of Koreans took the decision to leave their hometown for Japan due to the depression in agriculture.

The uninterrupted stream of Koreans crossing to Japan typically through chain migration or recruitment suggests that they were receiving a considerable amount of information about living in Japan through relatives, friends, and recruiters. This parallels Lee Sök-hyŏn's story in which he moved to urban centers after listening to various tales of people who had traveled there. However, it also signifies that there was incomplete information circulating to the masses that lacked knowledge

Table 2 Reasons or purposes for which Koreans departed for Japan.

Reason/purpose for emigrating to Japan	Number of responses	Percentage of responses (%)
Depression in agriculture	6,587	55.66
Hardship of life	2,037	17.21
Moneymaking	1,745	14.74
Seeking employment	241	2.04
Depression in commerce	228	1.93
Recession	162	1.37
Labor	148	1.25
Wishing to improve life	140	1.18
Education	115	0.97
Business management	88	0.74
Total of all responses	11,835	100.00

Source: Ōsakafu Gakumubu Shakaika (大阪府学務部社会課), *Zaihan Chōsenjin no Seikatsu Jōtai* (在阪朝鮮人の生活状態), Osaka, 1932, 25–26.

Note: This table only lists the top ten answers.

of the conditions in Japan. As stated below, it was a common occurrence for Koreans to be approached by both Korean and Japanese brokers who persuaded them to work in Japan by presenting an array of statements illustrating Japan as the metropole of success and modernity. Just as soon as Koreans began to be recruited, they lamented that the contents of the employment contracts deviated from the actual working conditions. The complaints included conditions that were more arduous than what their Japanese counterparts were subjected to and the employment of underage persons and married women without a guardian consent. This occurred so frequently that the Government-General of Korea promulgated a regulation in as early as 1913 to control Korean recruitments.⁵¹ In its rectified regulation issued in 1918, it prohibited hyperbolic and false words to be used in the recruitment process.⁵²

The imperial authorities also articulated that Koreans entrusted Japan with a prospect of 一攫千金 *ikkaku senkin* (making a fortune at a stroke) and held 憧れ *akogare* (yearning) in going to Japan. Concerning Koreans who crossed to Japan by the Shimonoseki–Pusan ferry, the Fukuoka Regional Employment Exchange Office stated in 1929 as follows:

Osaka, Kyoto, and Hyogo have been absorbing a large number of laborers. As for the regions within the Fukuoka Regional Employment Exchange Office, Koreans are engaged in mining as miners or in general labor as navvies. Given its proximity compared to Osaka, Nagoya, and Tokyo, trips to Fukuoka are facilitated due to reduced travel costs and others. As for the regions within the Tokyo Regional Employment Exchange Office, for Tokyo is the imperial capital, they only envision Tokyo as the center of civilization and plan on sightseeing instead of seeking employment. It can be imagined that their fierce *akogare* is enhanced for Tokyo than it is for the other regions. If they lose employment or end up in poverty, it can be said that they selfishly misunderstand that they would not face a hardship if they return to such regions as Nagoya and Osaka. As for the regions within the Nagoya Regional Employment Exchange Office, various kinds of factories have rapidly developed over the last few years in and outside of Nagoya city, and it seems that the demand for Korean labor force has considerably expanded.⁵³

In spite of probable prejudice in this statement, it is likely that Koreans' decisions for emigration were facilitated by the spatial gap. A survey by the South Kyōngsang police department also concurs with this statement. Among 89 Koreans who were found to be repatriating to the peninsula due to poverty and hardship they experienced in Japan, 37 percent answered that they were unable to find employment while they traveled to Japan by seeking acquaintances, being invited by relatives, 漫然渡航 *manzen tokō* (rambling passage), or holding onto the hope they would find a job in Japan. The other reasons for returning home were sickness and

injury (39.3 percent), employment dismissals (19.1 percent), and a lack of language proficiency (4.5 percent).⁵⁴

Moreover, wages are one example that would seize people's attention. Although Koreans received smaller wages than their Japanese counterparts in Japan and Korea, their wages in Japan were nonetheless higher than they were in Korea. Employment introduction through kinship connection became most prevalent after the First World War labor demand diminished, and a study conducted in Osaka in 1934 revealed that nearly 52 percent of Korean migrants found their employment through introduction. Many of them also sought employment on their own (36 percent). This was followed by 14 percent of Koreans who made a living by self-employment. As demonstrated earlier, an insignificant number of Koreans found their job through employment exchange offices (8.6 percent).⁵⁵ Based on interviews with first-generation *zainichi* Koreans, Kim Ch'an-chōng explains that Koreans chiefly found a job through introduction by siblings, relatives, or parents. Labor bosses (親方 *oyakata*), whom Koreans met in worker dorms, were also in an intermediary position to introduce them.⁵⁶ The following anecdote by a first-generation *zainichi* Korean, Kim Han-pong, also confirms this:

When I came [to Japan] in about the second year of Showa (1927), there were neither many jobs nor places to work. It was difficult to get into the rubber industry, but I was able to through my relative's introduction. If one was not introduced, he/she hardly found a place to work.⁵⁷

The fact that a great many Koreans received employment through introduction implies that the information they were collecting from fellow Koreans also included the higher wages in Japan, and this wage difference functioned as an incentive for Koreans emigrants. For such industries as fishing, car manufacturing, and construction, they received at least one additional yen per day in Japan. Even for occupations with the minimum wage difference, the wages in Japan were at least 0.5 yen higher than those in Korea. While one of the salient issues raised by the imperial authorities was the high rate of unemployment, whether stemming from a dismissal from a job or an inability to find one, the daily wages for Koreans in Japan were on average 0.87 yen more than those in Korea (Table 3). This means that every month, Koreans were paid additional 26.1 yen on average in Japan. This survey also investigated monthly living expenses of Korean laborers in Korea and Japan, which further signifies the value of the wage difference. In Korea, Koreans spent on average 15 yen monthly on living. Because their average monthly wage was 37.5 yen, this left them with 22.5 yen. Their average monthly living expenses, after their settlement in Japan, were 19.5 yen.⁵⁸ They earned 63.6 yen monthly on average in Japan. Koreans residing in Japan were therefore left with 44.1 yen every month after deducting living expenses. This indicates that Korean laborers saved

Table 3 Comparison between daily wage rates of Korean laborers in Korea and Japan.

Occupation/industry	Wage (yen)		
	Korea	Japan	Difference relative to wage rates in Korea
Agriculture	0.92	1.64	+0.72
Fisherman	1.70	2.83	+1.13
Car manufacturing	1.97	3.51	+1.54
Construction	1.30	2.30	+1.00
Craftsman	1.10	1.80	+0.70
Miner	1.30	2.20	+0.90
Seaman	1.00	1.50	+0.50
General labor	0.70	1.20	+0.50
Average	1.25	2.12	+0.87

Source: Ōsakashi Shakaibu Chōsaka Hensan (大阪市社会部調査課編纂), *Chōsenjin Rōdōsha Mondai* (朝鮮人労働者問題), Osaka, 1924, 65–67.

Note: The data is based on the wages of male workers.

a sum of 21.6 additional yen by living in Japan. Koreans' accounts are divided, and while many were able to save some money during their residence in Japan, others were not. However, the spatial gap was most likely a contributing factor in the decision-making of Koreans to depart for Japan.

Alternative Destinations

For Koreans who embarked on their journey to a foreign country, Japan was not the most popular destination. They departed to settle in Manchuria from as early as the 1880s when Korean peasants migrated to fill the labor shortage of privately owned land or to access uncultivated land.⁵⁹ Hyun Ok Park explains that even before the establishment of Manchukuo, Korean peasants had been used as a lever by the Japanese empire to pacify Chinese resistance and to penetrate Manchuria in its hope to ultimately reach mainland China and the rest of Asia.⁶⁰ Korean peasants steadily migrated to Manchuria to escape poverty, much the same way they did to Japan, in a greater number until 1942 (Table 1). The sudden shift is explained by the government's labor mobilization scheme (計画渡航制度 *keikaku tokō seido*), promulgated in 1939, to gather Korean laborers for Japan's war effort.

The stable growth of the Korean population in Manchuria for thirty-two years during the period of annexation is contrary to the understanding that Korean

migration to Japan was due to economic hardships caused by Japanese colonial rule. In other words, if the colonial oppression prompted Koreans, the majority of whom derived from the agricultural industry, to inevitably leave home for an unfamiliar country like Japan, Koreans would have departed for Japan in a greater number than they did for Manchuria. “I was poor in my hometown, so I went to Japan” is a frequent phrase utilized in accounts of first-generation *zainichi* Koreans who continue to reside in Japan today. However, this is followed by “it was hard to make ends meet in Japan.” Countless scholarship discusses ethnic discrimination Koreans faced in their everyday lives in Japan, and a wage gap between Koreans and indigenous laborers has been one central topic. There is no doubt that they were marginalized and many migrants traveled to Japan through Korean and Japanese brokers only to discover discrepancies in the actual working conditions. However, they would not have departed for Japan in masses if there were no incentives or emigration to Japan did not yield the slightest improvement from their lives back in Korea. Korean residents in Tokyo were asked in 1929 if life was more difficult in Japan. The participants were classified according to their marital status and occupation. For married Koreans in 46 occupations including free labor, 74.5 percent answered that life was easier in Japan whereas 13.8 percent responded that it was more difficult in Japan. 9.3 percent also stated that it did not differ, and 2.5 percent of the responses were classified as “unknown.” Among unmarried Koreans in 72 occupations including free labor, 62.4 percent responded that life was easier in Japan while 13.8 percent stated that it was more difficult in Japan. The rest of the answers included “[life was] the same” (7.3 percent) and “unknown” (1.6 percent). For the participants who claimed that life was less difficult in Japan, the reasons included higher wages and a greater number of employment opportunities. On the contrary, food, the higher cost of living, and coldheartedness of the Japanese were the reasons for articulating that life was more difficult in Japan.⁶¹

The prevalent tendency of Koreans immigrating to Japan and Manchuria can also be traced back to geographic proximity. According to a study in 1923, 83.3 percent of Koreans who chose Japan as their destination had North Kyōngsang, South Kyōngsang, and South Chōlla as their birthplace. In contrast, among Koreans who emigrated to northern destinations including Manchuria, 75.5 percent came from South Hamgyōng, North Hamgyōng, and South P’yōng’an.⁶² This shows that Koreans whose birthplace was located in the southern provinces of the peninsula had a higher tendency to cross the straits to Japan whereas those from the northern provinces were more likely to migrate to the north which was geographically closer to them. For emigrants to Japan, ferries that connected the ports situated in the south of the peninsula with those in Japan further facilitated their decision to travel to Japan.

Korean laborers, the majority of whom were originally peasant-farmers, undoubtedly underwent financial hardship in the aftermath of the land survey and the program to increase rice production, accelerated by the depression years. The idea of immigration to Japan surfaced during this time in their hope to escape agricultural immiseration. Whereas the majority of Korean emigrants chose a destination other than Japan, the decision of those who selected Japan, until 1942, was affected by multiple factors such as the colonial agricultural interventions that most severely affected the southern areas of the peninsula, the high unemployment rate in urban centers of the peninsula, images of Japan that elicited emigration to Japan, and geographic proximity.

Osaka, the Metropole for Korean Laborers

For Koreans who arrived in Japan hoping for economic betterment, the majority headed for Osaka. The first ferry, which transported passengers between Pusan and Shimonoseki, began operation in 1905. In contrast, the route between Cheju Island and Osaka commenced in 1923. Needless to say, the ferry between Cheju Island and Osaka gained popularity and was quickly dominated by Cheju residents, as the fare was a third of that between Pusan and Shimonoseki. Cheju residents eventually comprised the largest Korean community in Osaka.⁶³ The high stream of Cheju residents to Osaka is evident from the statistics that indicate as high as sixty percent of Korean residents in Osaka came from Cheju in 1924.⁶⁴

It was neither only Cheju residents who favorably chose Osaka nor did they simply settle in Osaka as a destination determined by the ferry. The most progressive mobility of Koreans towards Japan proper was witnessed in the 1920s and the 1940s.⁶⁵ The latter was marked by the Labor Mobilization Scheme the Japanese government promulgated to mobilize Koreans to various areas of the Japanese imperial territories to assist the war effort from 1939. In contrast, the former was a result of labor demands generated by the First World War. Products such as cotton cloth, machinery, metal, and ceramics, along with the shipbuilding industry exhibited demands in the Asian market from 1916 as alternatives to European products. The industrial development in Osaka during the 1920s played a significant role in aiding these demands and was crucial for the rise of the Japanese economy. Notwithstanding Cheju residents dominating the Korean population in Osaka with the operation of ferries between Cheju and Osaka since 1923, Koreans from various areas of the peninsula left Pusan for Osaka upon landing in Shimonoseki. The route between Pusan and Shimonoseki was indeed the most prominent until 1923, and while Yamaguchi Prefecture, where the city of Shimonoseki was situated, was the second most frequent destination for Koreans

who landed in Shimonoseki, Koreans primarily resumed their journey to Osaka as the final destination.⁶⁶

In this wave of Korean migration in the 1920s, Osaka was seen as the most favorable destination by Korean laborers. Indeed, it became a metropolis in 1925 after merging forty-four neighboring cities and villages. It was then that Osaka came to be called the “Manchester of the Orient” (東洋のマンチェスター *tōyō no manchestā*) by the Japanese.⁶⁷ The active participation of Osaka in Japan’s economy applied to the trading world as well. In 1925, the most essential trading partners for Japan were as follows: for exports, they were North and South America and Asia, with China being the top, and for imports, they were Asia, such as China and India, North and South America, and Europe such as Britain. For exports to Asia, 48.3 percent were shipped through Osaka. What is more, 61.8 percent of exports to China were via Osaka. Among exported products that left the port of Osaka, 70 percent was dominated by cotton threads and cloths in 1925. This naturally raised the number of factories in Osaka and Osaka became the base for the cotton spinning industry.⁶⁸ Table 4 shows the top five prefectures with the highest production output in Japan, and Osaka ranked first in all three categories with the highest number of factories and employees and the greatest amount of production. Factories in Osaka thus created job opportunities for Korean laborers. By 1925, Osaka was the most attractive destination in Japan for Koreans in the laboring class.⁶⁹

Table 4 Factories in the top five prefectures in 1925 according to the production quantity.

Prefectures	Number of factories	Ratio of factories (%)	Number of employees	Ratio of employees (%)	Amount of production (thousand yen)	Ratio of production (%)
Osaka	6,364	13.1	258,177	14.0	1,158,039	16.7
Tokyo	5,145	10.6	179,083	9.7	784,334	11.3
Hyogo	2,819	5.8	159,065	8.6	710,092	10.3
Aichi	5,065	10.4	166,631	9.0	569,321	8.2
Nagano	1,294	2.7	114,398	6.2	292,468	4.2
Total of all prefectures	48,514	100.0	1,841,311	100.0	6,924,911	100.0

Source: Iwasa Kazuyuki (岩佐和幸), “Sekai toshi Ōsaka no Rekishiteki keisei- Senkanki ni Okeru Chōsenjin imin no Ryūnyū katei wo Chūshin ni (世界都市大阪の歴史的形-戦間期における朝鮮人移民の流入過程を中心に),” *Keizairongyō Bessatsu* (経済論叢別冊), no. 16 (October 1998): 95.

Note: The rest of the prefectures that made the top ten are as follows: Fukuoka, Kanagawa, Kyoto, Shizuoka, and Mie.

The industrial development of Osaka is not to suggest that Korean laborers, along with their Japanese counterparts, were presented a plethora of job opportunities during the chronic recession. The disposable and temporary nature of Korean labor manifested in the 1920s and 1930s. With the end of the First World War and postwar recession, Koreans were dismissed from factories and coal mines in masses.⁷⁰ While many repatriated to the peninsula, the outgoing number of Koreans never exceeded the incoming number. During the periods of recession and depression, what absorbed a surplus of unemployed laborers and migrants was the public works industry that developed after the First World War. Spurred by urban planning projects and the advancement of modern hygiene, the Ministry of Home Affairs founded the city planning section in 1918 and in the following year, the Urban Planning Law was enacted.⁷¹ While Koreans continued to be commodified as unskilled and cheap day laborers who were vulnerable to the insecurity of employment, they became a necessity in the public works and construction industries to contribute to these progressive projects in interwar Japan.⁷² With the uninterrupted influx of Koreans into Japan, they began to appear as free laborers, day laborers, or navvies primarily in public works. This meant that they were impelled to seek a job on a daily basis, mainly as unskilled and manual laborers, where the availability of jobs was contingent and precarious.⁷³

The only prefectures where the existence of Korean day laborers was not as conspicuous were Osaka and Kyoto. These prefectures exhibited 40 percent and 30 percent, respectively, of Korean day laborers while approximately 75 percent were day laborers in Tokyo.⁷⁴ In Osaka with the outstanding number of factories, the glass industry absorbed the highest number of Korean laborers where one out of four workers was Korean.⁷⁵ What is more, 98 percent of glass factories in Osaka relied on Korean labor force. The majority of Korean female laborers, too, remained in the cotton spinning industry in Osaka during the chronic recession.⁷⁶

The visible tendency of Korean laborers to be confined in the domain of unskilled labor created an ethnic division of labor where Korean wages were maintained at a lower rate than Japanese wages.⁷⁷ Among the ten occupations or types of industry shown in Table 5, Japanese laborers received anywhere between 0.3 and 1.1 yen more than their Korean counterparts. The authorities stated that because Korean laborers who traveled to Japan were originally farmers, they lacked training or knowledge in mechanized industry. They were thus regarded to be useless for skilled labor and assumed that their only asset was their physical strength. Yet, the authorities attributed such factors as a lack of ability, energy, and physical strength as well as illiteracy to the wage gap.⁷⁸ The Osaka Regional Employment Exchange Agency conducted a study in 1923 with a thousand Korean residents in

Table 5 Daily wage rates of Korean and Japanese laborers in Japan proper.

Occupation/ industry	Koreans			Japanese		
	Highest	Average	Lowest	Highest	Average	Lowest
Agriculture	1.70	1.60	1.20	2.20	2.00	2.00
Washerman	1.90	1.80	1.00	2.70	2.00	1.00
Dye-making	1.90	1.20	0.80	2.80	2.10	0.90
Knitting	1.90	1.30	1.00	3.00	2.20	1.50
Textiles	2.00	1.20	0.90	2.80	1.70	1.00
Glass-making	3.00	1.20	0.90	3.50	1.60	1.10
Stevedore	2.50	2.00	1.70	3.00	2.50	2.00
Navy	1.70	1.70	1.00	2.00	1.90	1.80
Construction	2.50	2.00	1.70	2.80	2.50	2.00
Miner	2.30	2.10	1.60	3.00	2.50	1.80

Source: Ōsakashi Shakaibu Chōsaka Hensan (大阪市社会部調査課編纂). *Chōsenjin Rōdōsha Mondai* (朝鮮人労働者問題), Osaka, 1924, 78.

Note: The original data made a distinction between the wage rates of men and women. These data only display those of men.

Osaka and demonstrated that 776 laborers were previously engaged in agriculture in Korea, and merely 10 laborers had experience in factory labor.⁷⁹ Additionally, the greatest number (366 Koreans) resided in Osaka for less than one year before returning to the homeland. This was followed by 311 Koreans having resided in Osaka for fewer than six months. Among one thousand participants, 391 laborers understood Japanese while 550 of them did not, and 59 participants were perfectly literate.⁸⁰ These data suggest that most Korean laborers indeed lacked skills and experiences necessary to perform skilled labor. However, while a great many did not reside in Japan for over a year, almost half the laborers in the study understood Japanese. Their skills and language proficiency also most likely improved with time. This means that they were subjected to the wage gap unexplainable by the factors mentioned by the authorities. One, if not the most, salient cause of the wage gap was a high turnover rate. The majority of Korean laborers were employed as unskilled workers during the First World War, but this status became even more crucial to capitalists during the interwar period where Koreans were most needed in public works and construction sites. As discussed above, the status of Korean laborers as unskilled laborers insinuated that their employment was not secured beyond one day. This in turn meant that they were more prone to injuries and sickness at work. Because of their status, they were not given enough training or enough time

to be equipped with the skills necessary to perform their tasks.⁸¹ The survey by the South Kyōngsang police department mentioned above also had sickness and injury at work as the primary reason for returning to Korea.⁸² While one cannot contend that the temporary nature of their labor status was the sole reason for injuries and sickness, unskilled laborers executed more dangerous and arduous tasks than skilled laborers. Most importantly, their labor status ensured that their wages would not exceed those of their Japanese counterparts.

Koreans were not entirely unaware of this situation in Japan. When Koreans, who traveled to Osaka, were asked in 1932 what occupation or industry they would like to engage in upon arriving in Japan, 78.6 percent answered “labor” (Table 6). While most Koreans were initially peasants, the top desired occupations were outside of the agricultural sector. Their response to this survey was most likely dependent on the mode of finding employment and labor demands. As specified above, Koreans were already acquainted with the working conditions in Japan through anecdotes, and most Koreans found a job, typically in labor, by being introduced. It is probable

Table 6 Desired occupation or industry for Koreans to engage in Japan.

Desired occupation/industry	Number of responses	Ratio of responses (%)
Labor	9,303	78.6
Commerce	408	3.45
Craftsman	149	1.26
Second-class drug seller	49	0.41
Student	40	0.34
Smith	40	0.34
Car driver	25	0.21
Lodging business	23	0.19
Sewing	23	0.19
Shoemaking	18	0.15
Undecided	70	0.59
None	1,381	11.67
Total of all desired occupations	11,835	100.00

Source: Ōsakafu Gakumubu Shakaika (大阪府学務部社会課), *Zaihan Chōsenjin no Seikatsu Jōtai* (在阪朝鮮人の生活状態), Osaka, 1932, 46.

Note: These are top ten desired occupations aside from “undecided.”

that destitute Korean peasants desired the quickest solution to impoverishment, and their answers were thus pragmatic rather than idealistic.

The remarkable industrial development in Osaka functioned as a powerful pull factor for Korean farmers who were seeking an opportunity to enhance their living situation. What is more, it was the beginning of a cascading problem to control the entry of nascent Korean laborers who became stranded in Japan. In spite of the remarkable increase in the number of factories in Osaka, Korean migrants continued to work predominantly as unskilled day laborers who were regarded by capitalists as the source of cheap and disposable labor.⁸³

This interplay between the empire, employers, and Korean laborers was the main factor which led Japan to begin regulating the mobility of Koreans. Discourse on Korean migration within the state, however, was shaped by a range of opinions on both ends of the spectrum. The government institutions were not a monolithic existence. One side argued in support of Korean migration and the other, not. For instance, the Osaka City Social Affairs Survey Division claimed that unlike “immigrants with color in white people’s nations,” Koreans did not differ from the Japanese in that they were all 臣民 *shinmin* (imperial subjects). It stated that they were entitled to reside and work anywhere they desired and moreover, there was no difference between the migration of Koreans and country folks of low life and culture mobilizing to the metropole to seek employment. Limitations on migration, the department argued, had to be deliberated cautiously and it was essential to protect their benefits during the term of employment in Japan.⁸⁴ The Ministry of Home Affairs, on the other hand, was often assertive about regulating Korean migration given its concern with *manzen tokō* (rambling passage), radical political activities, and therefore threats to national security. As discussed below, talks between the Government-General of Korea and the Ministry of Home Affairs were not always in harmony, and the former often argued in favor of Koreans in regard to immigration regulations and articulated that there should soon come a day where they were free to once again cross the straits between Korea and Japan without having to comply with restrictions.⁸⁵

Immigration Regulations

The first event that galvanized the Japanese government to modify the Free Travel System was not due to an economic or social situation involving Korean laborers. The March First Independence Movement took place on 1 March 1919, and in its aftermath, the Government-General enacted the Travel Certificate System (旅行証明書制度 *ryokō shōmeisho seido*) in April of the same year to restrict the mobility of Koreans by issuing travel certificates. As opposed to most of the subsequent

systems promulgated in the 1920s and onwards to regulate the entry of Koreans according to economic and social circumstances, this system was implemented to cope with the security threat posed by the independence movement. It monitored the mobility of ordinary Koreans both within and outside the peninsula. Those willing to travel outside the peninsula were required to receive a travel certificate either from their local police station or police substation by stating the purpose of travel and the destination, and present it to the coastal police officers at the final point of departure in Korea. Koreans with an intention to travel within the peninsula, on the other hand, had the choice of either obtaining the same certificate or a permit from the Imperial Diplomatic Establishments Abroad. They were asked to submit it to the first arrival point in Korea. This system was abolished three years later, in December 1922, against the wish of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Government-General of Korea was mindful of 内鮮融和 *naisen yūwa* (harmony between Japanese and Koreans) and contended that Koreans were to be permitted to freely travel once again just as Japanese travelers were.⁸⁶

While the Government-General nevertheless ordered to detain or fine anyone who did not abide by the regulation, the system exhibited some degree of flexibility.⁸⁷ When examining the incoming number of Koreans between 1918 and 1922, data indicate that in 1919 (20,968 incoming Koreans), the year in which the Travel Certificate System was implemented, the incoming number of Koreans exceeded that of the previous year by almost 7,000 (14,012 incoming Koreans in 1918). The same applied to 1920 when the incoming number exponentially swelled. From 1921 to the end of 1922, the greatest number of Koreans among the entire duration of the system flowed into Japan (38,118 in 1921 and 70,462 in 1922).⁸⁸ What is more, if a traveler did not possess a certificate or a travel ticket, he was able to state the purpose of travel and the travel destination to the police station or substation at the final departure point or the first arrival point in Korea. The Government-General further asserted that if a police officer determined that such a regulation was not necessary, he would be allowed to pardon the traveler from such requirements.

Once the Travel Certificate System was abandoned in December 1922, Koreans once again increasingly streamed into Japan. The influx of Koreans overlapped temporally with the ongoing postwar economic recession, which effected a decline in labor demands and rendered many, both Japanese and Korean workers, jobless in Japan in the 1920s. However, Koreans continued to enter the labor market and travel to Japan through chain migration, even without the help of recruiters. The multitude of circumstances yielded a surplus of Korean laborers. Furthermore, xenophobia began to form among some Japanese who lost their occupation due to the economic depression and attributed the lack of labor demands to Koreans dominating the job market. By this time, conflict between Japanese and Korean

laborers was a common sight.⁸⁹ This gravely troubled the authorities, but their anxiety also originated from Koreans who were not simply entering Japan for moneymaking. There was a growing number of students and laborers who supported socialism and anarchism, and not only were they entering Japan, but they were also forming political organizations and activities.⁹⁰ A dialectical resolution by the Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau and the Government-General was to monitor the migration of Koreans, and they issued a statement to regional governors in May 1923 to regulate free migration and group recruitments.⁹¹ The severity of this claim is once again questionable as they permitted individual evaluations for a small group of Korean laborers or for those who were believed to be politically harmless.⁹²

Great Kantō Earthquake

Within a year after the abolition of the Travel Certificate System, a catastrophic event struck Japan: The Great Kantō Earthquake of September 1923. An estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people died as a result of the tremors or fires that engulfed the cities. In the state where media was terminated, rumors circulated. Koreans were believed to have committed misconduct where they set fires with bombs and threw poison in well water. Further rumors subsumed riots and assaults by Koreans. These rumors caused groups of vigilantes to form and led to a gruesome massacre, which putatively killed approximately 6,000 Koreans solely in Tokyo and Kanagawa within a few days immediately following the earthquake.⁹³ The news about the horror of the massacre during the confusion of the earthquake also reached the ears of people in Korea within a week after the disaster. First and foremost, the delivery of the news was an inconvenience for Japanese settlers who were consolidating the reforms of cultural rule, albeit slowly. What is more, they feared that agitated Koreans would initiate anti-Japanese activities and consequently organized flocks of vigilantes.⁹⁴

In the Japanese Archipelago on the other hand, the earthquake prompted the Ministry of Home Affairs to regulate Korean migration immediately. There was no mention of the massacre, however. It claimed that Koreans' immigration to Japan proper must be absolutely banned to 'protect' Korean laborers against the emotional turbulence they underwent from the impact of the earthquake, and that the ban was to be lifted once peace and order had been restored.⁹⁵ Interestingly, a greater number of Koreans entered Japan this year than 1922. Furthermore, the outgoing number of Koreans was remarkable. Whereas 46,326 Koreans repatriated to the peninsula in 1922, as many as 89,745 Koreans left for the peninsula, permanently or temporarily, in 1923.⁹⁶ This reflects the devastation

of the earthquake and the fear of the masses as a considerable number of Koreans left Japan in the year of the earthquake. Despite the notable number of returnees in 1923, data published by the Tokyo Regional Employment Exchange Office indicate that the remaining Koreans were eager to seek labor in the aftermath of the earthquake. Between September and December of 1923 alone, 1,800 Koreans sought employment in the areas damaged by the earthquake, and 1,169 of them were successful in securing employment.⁹⁷ Although data from the previous and following years are not available, only 283 Koreans sought labor in areas untouched by the earthquake.⁹⁸ The number of repatriates and laborers seeking employment not only demonstrates the fear of Koreans but also their desperation in finding a new job in post-earthquake Tokyo and the other affected regions.

As the chaos of the earthquake receded, the cities became lively with reconstruction projects from 1923 to 1927.⁹⁹ The restriction on Korean migration was accordingly abolished in May 1924. Needless to say, large groups of Korean laborers once again migrated to Japan whether they intended to aid the reconstruction projects or not.¹⁰⁰ The same month in which the restriction was lifted, 朝鮮日報 *Chōsen Nippō* reported that hotels in Pusan were overcrowded with hundreds to thousands of impoverished Koreans who wandered around with the intention of traveling to Japan even though they had no monetary means to make this possible or even to return to their hometown.¹⁰¹ Regardless of whether the statement is legitimate or not, it became publicly known that unemployment prevailed among Koreans willing to travel to Japan. As we shall see below, a means by which the imperial authorities used to control the mobility of Korean laborers they regarded to be *manzen* (rambling) travelers was to prevent the migration of those who could be a financial burden to Japan.

Prevention of *Manzen* Travelers

Regulation of Korean immigration, particularly directed towards laborers, began to get into full swing from 1925. A uniform immigration regulation took effect from October and onwards that applied throughout the peninsula for Korean emigrants in the laboring class. At this time, the need of capitalists, which was to collect cheap and disposable labor, was in conflict with the purport of the imperial authorities to only permit immigrants who would not become destitute. This exacerbated the existing issue of surplus Korean labor and the unemployment issue most vividly in the latter half of the 1920s.¹⁰² The Osaka City Social Affairs Survey Division asserted in 1924 that the labor market had begun to shift into a realm where laborers who were tolerant of low standards of living, lower wages, longer working hours, and more strenuous work would survive and be welcomed

by capitalists. The agony of Koreans, however, did not cease by traveling to Japan as many were nonetheless troubled by unemployment and poverty.¹⁰³ The Government-General stated that *manzen* (rambling) Korean laborers traveled to Japan through kinship connection after their conversations with repatriates or Korean residents in Japan about the bright financial possibilities Japan could offer. Because Japan presently held no capacity to accommodate such Koreans, it claimed that “prevention by compassionate persuasion” (懇諭阻止 *konyu soshi*) was to be introduced to protect Koreans from falling into financial difficulties.¹⁰⁴

Its method of protecting Koreans was to regulate their migration to Japan by introducing a set of categories for them to fulfill before departing the peninsula. In October 1925, it issued the Travel Prevention System (渡航阻止制度 *tokō soshi seido*) in South Kyōngsang Province towards individual immigration. The following criteria were finally imposed to prohibit the emigration of Korean laborers at the Port of Pusan:

1. Who responded to a recruitment that had no permit.
2. Who did not yet have secure employment in Japan.
3. Who did not comprehend the Japanese language.
4. Who did not possess ten yen remaining after deducting travel expenses.
5. Who were morphine addicts.¹⁰⁵

This system indeed thwarted travelers the authorities deemed to be *manzen* travelers. Provided that the system was introduced in the end of 1925, the total percentage of the travelers who were denied emigration in 1926 is higher than that of 1925, as it exhibited 19 percent of the total applicants (Table 7). However, it appears that this regulation, too, was not under strict enforcement in practice. In 1927, for instance, 37.1 percent of Korean laborers, who were permitted entry, did not have a secure job. 88.0 percent had less than ten yen in their pocket. Additionally, 38.8 percent of the permitted travelers did not possess any level of Japanese proficiency.¹⁰⁶

The Travel Prevention System exhibited other flaws. This regulation of so-called “prevention by compassionate persuasion” (*konyu soshi*) was only practiced in Pusan where travelers were refunded the fare of the ferry and made to return to their hometown. This was not sufficient to halt the incoming stream of Koreans into Pusan from their hometowns and they continued to gather there awaiting emigration.¹⁰⁷ The new regulation also only aggravated occurrences of illegal entry (密航 *mikkō*) which surfaced immediately following the installation of the Travel Certificate System in 1919. It began with a fabrication of travel certificates, and every time changes were made to the immigration system, novel methods of illegal entry emerged to bypass the official procedure of emigration and entry into Japan.¹⁰⁸ A wide range of attempts at illegal entries can be divided into two

Table 7 Koreans who were allowed emigration vis-à-vis Koreans who were denied emigration to Japan proper from 1925 to 1937.

Year	Denied emigration to Japan	Permitted emigration to Japan	Total percentage of travelers who were denied emigration to Japan (%)
1925	3,774	131,273	2.77
1926	21,407	91,092	19.03
1927	58,296	138,016	29.70
1928	47,297	166,286	22.14
1929	9,405	153,570	5.77
1930	2,566	95,491	2.62
1931	3,995	102,164	3.76
1932	2,980	113,615	2.56
1933	3,396	153,299	2.17
1934	4,317	159,176	2.64
1935	3,227	108,639	2.88
1936	1,610	113,714	1.40
1937	1,491	121,882	1.21

Source: Chōsen Sōtokufu (朝鮮総督府), *Saikin ni Okeru Chōsen Chian Jōkyō* (最近に於ける朝鮮治安状況) (Tokyo: Gennando Shoten, 1933), 190; Chōsen Sōtokufu (朝鮮総督府), *Saikin ni Okeru Chōsen Chian Jōkyō* (最近に於ける朝鮮治安状況) (Tokyo: Gennando Shoten, 1938), 318; Tonomura Masaru (外村大), *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai no Rekishigakuteki Kenkyū-Keisei, Kōzō, Henyō* (在日朝鮮人社会の歴史学的研究-形成・構造・変容) (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 2004), 46.

Note: The numbers were collected at the Port of Pusan until 1930. From 1931, they were based on censuses conducted at the port of Pusan, Yōsu (South Chōlla Province), Mokp'o (South Chōlla Province), and Ch'ōngjin (North Hamgyōng Province).

categories where travelers did not undergo official entry and where they entered legally but forged required documents. Within each category, methods of entry can further be divided into cases where individuals: boarded unauthorized ships or ships that acquired permission to sail by unofficial approval; boarded authorized ships including small fishing vessels; and boarded authorized ships as a crew member but never returned to the ships for the inbound trip. In situations where travelers forged documents, they employed one of the following ways: fabrication of permit; use of permit issued to someone else; and disguise as someone else.¹⁰⁹ A study by the South Kyōngsang police department, which was undertaken over a period of one month in September 1927, showed that among 1,534 Koreans they interviewed, only 3.2 percent of them were *mikkō* migrants. In spite of the effort of the police department to collect such data, the categorization used in its analysis

was rather narrow. That is, it determined that 96.8 percent were legal migrants based on its knowledge that they either boarded the Shimonoseki–Pusan ferry or any authorized company ship.¹¹⁰ As specified above, although numbers are unaccountable, many entered Japan by authorized transport while they presented fabricated permits or permits that did not belong to them.

Koreans who were denied emigration in Pusan were often approached by both Japanese and Korean brokers in various areas of the city where they offered illegal aid in a number of ways to smuggle them into Japan. For every traveler, brokers collected anywhere between five and twelve yen depending on the type of assistance they provided.¹¹¹ When arrested, however, travelers were charged about fifty yen whereas brokers were charged eighty to two-hundred yen.¹¹² Considering how minimal the wages of Korean laborers were, this was a significant amount of money to invest. While this suggests their carelessness, it also exposes their desperation for survival and the hope they had for economic betterment in Japan.

In order to cease the ongoing issue of illegal entries and the congregation of Korean travelers in Pusan, the Government-General determined that travelers needed to be supervised in their hometowns before arriving at Pusan. In July 1928, this decision was followed by the modification of the Travel Prevention System (*tokō soshi seido*) to the Local Prevention System (地元諭旨制度 *jimoto yushi seido*). This new system monitored the mobility of Korean emigrants at the local level.¹¹³ While keeping most of the categories of the preceding regulation, a Letter of Introduction (紹介状 *shōkaijō*) was added. The Government-General required every traveler to obtain it from the local police department in his hometown or village, which was to be presented to the officials at the Pusan Coastal Office before departure.¹¹⁴ It proclaimed that only applicants meeting the following categories were permitted to enter Japan:

1. Those who had secure employment.
2. Those who possessed more than sixty yen besides ferry tickets and other necessary travel expenses.
3. Those who were not morphine addicts.
4. Those who were not traveling through brokers.¹¹⁵

While additional layers of restriction were added to eliminate as many *manzen* travelers as possible, the fourth requirement signified the gravity of the prevailing issues caused by brokers. As discussed previously, the authorities issued an edict in as early as 1913 to control the recruitment activities of brokers. The implementation of this requirement thus demonstrates the ongoing contingency of Korean labor. Moreover, although Koreans crossed to Japan most prevalently through chain migration by this time, it shows the continuous attempts by brokers to

recruit Koreans into the Japanese labor market as well as the thickening web that caught Koreans in the commodification of their labor force.

Table 7 displays a considerable decrease in the number of travelers who were denied emigration from 1929 and onwards. While this seems that the Local Prevention System was loose in regulating Korean migration, the numbers were collected at the port every year. The notable difference in the numbers from 1929 to 1937 indicates that the Local Prevention System indeed impeded the departure of Korean laborers from their hometowns before arriving at the port in Pusan.¹¹⁶ The Local Prevention System remained in effect until 1937, the year in which Korean laborers were once again in need to fill labor shortages, this time produced by the Second Sino–Japanese War.

Koreans who were prevented from emigrating to Japan included those who were approached by agents from the employment exchange offices. In an attempt to eradicate *manzen* travelers, the Home Affairs Bureau Social Affairs Division executed a plan to institute agencies for employment placements and labor adjustments. This was to recruit laborers within the peninsula starting in November 1926.¹¹⁷ Korean migration to Japan around this time came to be known as the 内地渡航問題 *naichi tokō mondai* (problem of immigration to Japan proper) surrounding the issues of unemployment, employment dismissals, social instability, crimes, disputes with the Japanese, rapid population increase, and illegal entries.¹¹⁸ The imperial authorities proclaimed that, from 1927, they would facilitate the mobility of Korean laborers within the peninsula by subsidizing travel fares and employing more officials in the Home Affairs Bureau Social Affairs Division to mediate employment placements more progressively in needed regions. Accordingly, the Government-General and the townships installed government-operated agencies in the major cities of the peninsula in 1928.¹¹⁹

The Ministry of Home Affairs also released an ordinance in May 1929 to limit the recruitments of Koreans only to cases where employers were unable to gather the desired number of employees in Japan.¹²⁰ Because Pusan was one prominent emigration point to Japan, two officials from the Home Affairs Bureau Social Affairs Division were dispatched to Pusan to introduce occupations within Korea to *manzen* travelers. Between September 1927 and September 1929, they consulted 15,600 Koreans in pursuit of employment and successfully aided 2,522 people in finding employment in factories in Korea.¹²¹ Between 1925 and 1937 when the prevention of rambling passage (*manzen tokō*) was in effect, 1927 exhibited the highest number of Korean travelers who were stopped from departing for Japan. This indicates that the immigration regulations promulgated from 1925 and onwards and the installation of the employment exchange agencies functioned as a double layer of emigration prevention to discourage Korean laborers from immigrating to Japan.

Additionally, certificates of temporary return (一時帰鮮証明 *ichiji kisen shōmei*) were implemented in August 1929 to avoid the inconvenience of processing new applications for Korean laborers who had temporarily repatriated to the peninsula. Those in possession of this certificate were able to bypass the requirement of obtaining a Letter of Introduction from the local police department.¹²² For those already residing in the peripheral regions of Japan, the government announced that it would give them training to enhance their labor performance.¹²³ This illustrates the government's effort to keep the maximum number of Koreans on the peninsula by impeding new laborers from being recruited and facilitating the mobility of Koreans already in employment on the two adjacent lands. Furthermore, the years in which these changes were introduced overlapped with the onset of the worldwide depression, which reflects the economic crisis Japan was tackling and its incapability to absorb impoverished Korean emigrants into the labor market where there was already a surplus of laborers.

Examining the immigration regulations that were thus far enforced on Koreans, it was only in 1919 that the restriction on immigration was placed for the general population. In other words, the regulations from 1923 specifically targeted Korean laborers to eradicate those the authorities considered to be *manzen* travelers. In comparison, the mobility of students, activists, and the like, whom some possessed thoughts against Japanese rule, was only regulated when there were serious threats, injuries, or in some cases deaths within the authority. Though the regulations towards Korean laborers exhibited some degree of flexibility, they were never to once again freely travel to Japan. The attempt of the Japanese empire to control and maneuver the mobility of laborers progressively manifested once it penetrated into Manchuria in 1931.

Encouragement of Migration to Manchuria

As it is evident from Table 1, the ceaseless reforms and reinforcement of the immigration systems did not diminish the rising tide of Koreans into Japan. Needless to say, this population included *manzen* travelers the imperial authorities attempted so diligently to get rid of. Following the Mukden Incident in 1931 and the establishment of Manchuria as a puppet state in the subsequent year, the Government-General and the Ministry of Home Affairs began to consider subsidizing Koreans' travels to Manchuria for its agricultural development. This was to solve the following two obstacles: (1) unemployment and the economic hardships of Korean farmers on the peninsula which incited their mobility to urban centers and (2) unemployment and the scarcity of employment opportunities among Japanese and Korean workers in Japan, which were allegedly

caused by the uncontrollable influx of Koreans from the southern peripheries of the peninsula to Japan.¹²⁴ Having seized Manchuria, another motive by the authorities was to propel the migration of both Korean and Japanese farmers to Manchuria to protect the territory by tending arable land, much of which was still uncultivated.¹²⁵

In October 1934, the government introduced the Korean Immigration Measure (朝鮮人移住対策 *chōsenjin ijū taisaku*) in spite of the dispute with the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.¹²⁶ As opposed to the Government-General, which was a proponent of this measure, the Kwantung Army responded that Korean migrants in Manchuria might languish the security by joining the anti-Japanese sentiment.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, this measure aimed to encourage as many Korean laborers as possible to remain in Korea and to distribute them to areas for agricultural development. Koreans in the overcrowded peripheries of the peninsula were also encouraged to emigrate to Manchuria.¹²⁸ In Pusan, for instance, Korean laborers who were planning emigration to Japan were stopped by the officials and asked to remain in Korea if no engagement had been made.¹²⁹ As it is evident in Figure 1, applications for emigration declined remarkably from 1935. The number of applications steadily declined until 1937, which marked the outbreak of the Second Sino–Japanese War. In this same year, changes were introduced to the immigration regulation that undoubtedly facilitated the migration of Korean laborers to Japan. In contrast to the preceding regulations that aimed to alleviate the *naichi tokō mondai*, Koreans witnessed a rise in labor demands and their needed presence to assist Japan’s war effort.




Figure 1 Emigration applications by Korean laborers vis-à-vis denied applications in all thirteen provinces of the Korean Peninsula.

Source: Chōsen Sōtokufu (朝鮮総督府), *Saikin ni Okeru Chōsen Chian Jōkyō* (最近に於ける朝鮮治安状況) (Tokyo: Gennando Shoten, 1938), 320.

During Japan's sovereignty over Korea, Korean migration continued to be employed as a mechanism to build the empire. Korean laborers, the majority of whom were originally peasants, became the primary target of commodification in this process. On the one hand, the imperial authorities emphasized the importance of *naisen yūwa* and insisted that Koreans should be allowed to freely travel within the Japanese imperial territories. On the other hand, the Free Travel System was revoked from as early as 1919 and although it was reintroduced in 1922, the immigration of laborers soon came to be limited to those who fulfilled a number of requirements to ensure there would not be Koreans the authorities regarded as *manzen* travelers. In the midst of capital accumulation, the authorities were never successful in fully eradicating these *manzen* travelers who would be a burden to the empire. However, the immigration regulations and measure were undeniably executed to seize the control of Korean mobility according to the economic, social, and political needs of the empire.

Conclusion

The key players in the mobility of Korean laborers across the sea were the following: different institutions of the imperial government, capitalists, and Korean laborers themselves. The annexation of Korea was followed by the promulgation of the Free Travel System that permitted Koreans to freely migrate within the Japanese imperial territories. Koreans did not initially immigrate to Japan of their own volition, but as the labor demands of the First World War surfaced and the need of capitalists to collect disposable labor spiked upwards, Korean labor force became increasingly commodified and Koreans were pulled ever more rigidly towards Japan. When Korean labor was most desired in the later years of the First World War, the land survey had also been completed on the peninsula. It was followed by the program to increase rice exports to Japan and the Great Depression in the 1920s and the 1930s. These factors pushed more Korean farmers away from their hometowns and the peninsula. Many of them first relocated to urban centers, but these areas were already burdened with a surplus of laborers. This condition on the peninsula functioned as another push factor for Koreans to depart for Japan. As the Korean population expanded in Japan and even surpassed the size of the Chinese population, both of which primarily consisted of workers, a Korean resident community began to form in Japan. They not only invited their family, relatives, and friends to Japan, but they also increasingly resided in Japan permanently in family units. Moreover, they brought home with them tales that galvanized the emigration of others to Japan and instilled prosperous images of Japan that did not necessarily represent the

economic state of the country correctly. What further contributed to the formation of these images were recruiters and brokers who approached Korean laborers to recruit them into Japanese industries. Interestingly, contrary to the statements of Korean laborers who lamented that the immigration to Japan was an unavoidable result brought by Japanese colonial oppression, considerably more impoverished Koreans immigrated to Manchuria than to Japan until 1942. In addition to the factors mentioned above, this was also attributed to cultural affinity and cheaper cost of travel which were enabled by geographic advantage. Indeed, the majority of Koreans who traveled to Japan originated from the southern provinces of Korea, albeit these provinces being most susceptible to the commercialization of land.

As opposed to Koreans who progressively used kinship connection as a channel of migration after the end of the First World War, those who crossed to Japan in the earlier stage of annexation were employed by Japanese entrepreneurs and their recruiters from 1911. However, labor contracts soon gained complaints from Korean laborers who claimed that they experienced working conditions that were more strenuous than what were stated in the contracts. Recruiters also transported Koreans in a manner that conflicted with the intent of the imperial authorities. As the war boom diminished and Japan faced a postwar recession, Koreans were more vigorously absorbed into day and seasonal labor. As Korean laborers were commodified as a disposable resource, a by-product of this process were flocks of Koreans who became stranded in Japan. In order to resolve this, the imperial authorities soon began to regulate the migration of Koreans with immigration systems. The first time the authorities restricted the mobility of Koreans was not due to conflict with capitalists or Korean laborers. Around the end of the First World War when the rising tide of Koreans subsided temporarily, the empire was shaken by the March First Independence Movement. This incited the empire to abolish Koreans' eligibility to freely travel to Japan. This conveniently coincided with the postwar economic recession, which meant that Japan no longer required Korean laborers to the same degree as the later stage of the First World War. In spite of the fewer attempts by recruiters to encourage Koreans for labor imports, Koreans nonetheless continued to enter Japan through chain migration. They were also steadily pulled towards Osaka where it developed as a global city that created job opportunities for Koreans primarily in factories. As Japan and Korea entered the worldwide depression in the late 1920s, Koreans were crossing the straits from Korea to Japan in remarkable numbers and increasingly becoming the target of disposable and cheap labor.

In order to cease the entry of *manzen* travelers or in other words Korean laborers who had a potential to become stranded in Japan, the imperial authorities introduced a system in 1925 to prohibit the emigration of such travelers. However, a considerable number of Koreans who were regarded as *manzen*

travelers continued to find a way into Japan legally or illegally. This, coupled with the capitalists' tendency to employ Koreans for arduous and unstable jobs, rendered many Koreans destitute in Japan without employment and with no financial capability to return to the peninsula. The 1934 immigration measure to discourage Koreans from emigrating to Japan and instead to impel their immigration to Manchuria illustrates the concern of the empire with Koreans' unemployment, accompanied by other issues including social instability and illegal entries. While it also demonstrates the empire's attempt to keep unwanted Koreans at bay, it is important not to interpret the government institutions as a monolithic existence. As opposed to the Ministry of Home Affairs who often provided a lukewarm response to the idea of free migration of Koreans, the Government-General of Korea emphasized the importance of *naisen yūwa* and attempted to solve the problem of Korean migration to Japan (*naichi tokō mondai*).

The regulations issued by the authorities towards Korean migration imply that on the one hand, the Japanese empire was willing to permit the mobility of Koreans freely within the Japanese imperial territories. On the other hand, the political, social, and economic situations and intentions of the empire led it to defeat its initial claim and to place surveillance on the mobility of Koreans. What reinforced it was capitalist penetration and the commodification of Korean labor force in the process of state-building. Another contributor was Koreans themselves who were also caught in a dichotomy. On the one hand, immigration to Japan was not an immediate decision they made as a benefit presented by the annexation. On the other hand, the visibly worsening economic situation on the peninsula pushed Koreans, the majority of whom were in the agricultural sector, outside their hometowns, and Japan appealed to destitute Koreans as an ideal destination in vicinity that exhibited potentials of economic success.

Notes

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5. This law was named 外国人労働者入国制限 *gaikokujin rōdōsha nyūkoku seigen*. See, Kōsei Rōdōshō (厚生労働省), “Zainichi Chōsenjin ni Taisuru Dōka Seisaku no Kyōwa Jijō (在日朝鮮人に対する同化政策の共和事情),” in *Zainichi Chōsenjinshi Shiryōshū 2* (在日朝鮮人史資料集2). ed. Zainichi Chōsenjin Undōshi Kenkyūkai (在日朝鮮人運動史研究会) (Tokyo: Rokuin Shobō, 2011), 469.

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13. This was named the 山陽汽船 Sanyō Kisen.
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31. *Ibid.*, 43–44.
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43. Ōsakafu Gakumubu Shakaika (大阪府学務部社会課). *Zaihan Chōsenjin no Seikatsu Jōtai* (在阪朝鮮人の生活状態), Osaka, 1932, 10, 85.
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49. *Ibid.*, 140–141, 160.
50. Weiner. *Race and Migration*, 44; Lee. “Keizaishiteki ni mita,” 55.
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 69. *Ibid.*, 102.
 70. Kawashima. *Proletarian Gamble*, 54–55.
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 81. Kawashima. *Proletarian Gamble*, 71–72.
 82. Keishōnandō Keisatsubu. “Naichi Dekasegi Senjin Rōdōsha Jōtai Chōsa,” 576.
 83. Weiner. *Race and Migration*, 114.
 84. Ōsakashi Shakaibu Chōsaka Hensan. *Chōsenjin Rōdōsha Mondai*, 5.
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 86. Kōsei Rōdōshō. “Zainichi Chōsenjin ni Taisuru,” 469–470.
 87. Pak. *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 36.
 88. Chōsen Sōtokufu. *Saikin ni Okeru* (1933), 189–190.
 89. Pak. *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, 36; Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 28–29.
 90. Kawashima. *The Proletarian Gamble*, 40.
 91. Kōsei Rōdōshō. “Zainichi Chōsenjin ni Taisuru,” 470; the statement was called 朝鮮人労働者募集に関する件 (*Chōsenjin Rōdōsha Boshū ni Kansuru Ken*).
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 96. Chōsen Sōtokufu. *Saikin ni Okeru* (1933), 189–190.
 97. The affected areas by the Great Kantō Earthquake in this study were: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Gunma, Tochigi, and Ibaraki.
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 99. Kawashima. *The Proletarian Gamble*, 70.

100. Kōsei Rōdōshō. “Zainichi Chōsenjin ni Taisuru,” 470.
101. Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 30.
102. *Ibid.*, 35.
103. Ōsakashi Shakaibu Chōsaka Hensan. *Chōsenjin Rōdōsha Mondai*, 4–5.
104. Chōsen Sōtokufu. *Saikin ni Okeru* (1933), 178.
105. *Ibid.*, 183–184.
106. Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 33; Yamaguchi-ken Keisatsubu Tokubetsu Kōtōka (山口県警察部特別高等課), “Raijū Chōsenjin Tokubetsu Chōsa Jijō (来住朝鮮人特別調査事情),” in *Zainichi Chōsenjin Kankei Shiryō Shūsei Vol. 1* (在日朝鮮人関係資料集成1) ed. Pak Kyōng-sik (朴慶植) (Tokyo: Sannichi Shobō, 1975), 558–562.
107. Chōsen Sōtokufu. *Saikin ni Okeru* (1933), 179.
108. Fukui. “Fusei Tokō,” 6; Chōsen Sōtokufu. *Saikin ni Okeru* (1933), 181.
109. *Ibid.*, 8.
110. Keishōnandō Keisatsubu. “Naichi Dekasegi Senjin Rōdōsha,” 568.
111. Fukui. “Fusei Tokō,” 18–19; Tonomura Masaru (外村大). “Nihon Teikoku no Tokō Kanri to Chōsenjin no Mikkō (日本帝国の渡航管理と朝鮮人の密航),” in *Nihon Teikoku wo Meguru Jinkō Idō no Kokusai Shakaigaku* (日本帝国をめぐる人口移動の国際社会学), ed. Araragi Shinzo (蘭信三) (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2008), 41.
112. Fukui. “Fusei Tokō,” 29; Tonomura. “Nihon Teikoku no Tokō Kanri,” 42.
113. Fukui Yuzuru. “Tokō soshi seido kara Jimoto yushi seido e-1920 nendai kōhan no Tokō kanri seisaku (渡航阻止制度から地元諭旨制度へ—1920年代後半の渡航管理政策),” *Zainichi Chōsen-jinshi Kenkyū* (在日朝鮮人史研究), no. 45 (October 2015): 27, 39.
114. Chōsen Sōtokufu. *Saikin ni Okeru* (1933), 179.
115. Kōsei Rōdōshō. “Zainichi Chōsenjin ni Taisuru,” 470.
116. Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 51.
117. Fukui. “Tokō soshi seido,” 56.
118. Kōsei Rōdōshō. “Zainichi Chōsenjin ni Taisuru,” 471.
119. Chōsen Sōtokufu. *Saikin ni Okeru* (1933), 186; Employment exchange agencies by the Government-General of Korea were established in Sōul, Inch’ōn, Pusan, Taegu, P’yōngyang, Sinūiju, and Ch’ōngjin. Those by the townships were set up in Sōnch’ōn and Hamhŭng.
120. Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 32.
121. Chōsen Sōtokufu. *Saikin ni Okeru* (1933), 186–187.
122. *Ibid.*, 179; Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 32.
123. Kōsei Rōdōshō. “Zainichi Chōsenjin ni Taisuru,” 471.
124. *Ibid.*; Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 35, 36.
125. Park. *Two Dreams in One Bed*, 140–141.
126. Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 36.
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128. Tonomura. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai*, 36.
129. Mitchell. *The Korean Minority in Japan*, 79.

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