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

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EDITOR'S NOTE

As so often where discussion of Korea is concerned, mention of rivalry and conflict runs like a thread through the majority of papers in this volume, whether it be the factional struggles of domestic politics (Andrew Jackson (1), Nicolas Levi), the desperation of regional rebellion (Jackson (2)), the results of imperialistic foreign policy (Hyunsoo Kim), or the fratricidal North-South division that has now affected development across the peninsula for more than sixty years (Hoenik Kwon, Youngna Kim). Yet for all that people living through hard times might have felt depressed at the bleakness of their prospects, as when Chinese troops invaded their land in the 7th century or Japanese colonialism denied them freedom and opportunities in the 20th, the tide would eventually begin to turn in their favour. The articles by Hyunsook Lee and Michael Shin reveal how, out of the darkness of foreign occupation, first steps were taken on the road to social and economic progress and improvement.

Once again, a volume of BAKS Papers crosses generations and brings together the work of scholars of established prowess and those younger colleagues embarking on what we hope will be a full and fascinating lifetime of Korean study. The Editor (who cannot claim to belong to either category!) is proud to be associated with them all. Together with the Council of the British Association for Korean Studies, he is particularly grateful for the generous financial assistance given towards the publication of this volume by the Academy of Korean Studies, and for the support frequently afforded to BAKS by the Korean Embassy and Korean Cultural Centre in London. He is also pleased to acknowledge the ever prompt advice and assistance of Chris Reed at BBR.

Keith Pratt
Durham

THE MEDICINE OF SILLA IN EAST ASIA

LEE HYUNSOOK

1. Introduction

While studying the political mechanisms of ancient Korea, my research paid particular attention amongst various factors to the bureaucratic systems (官僚制度),[1] government statements by the literati,[2] political meanings of divination rituals[3] and medicine, and attempted to reveal how these were used by the ruling class in solidifying their power over society. In other words, the ruling entities effectively systemized their dominance through public offices such as the law code and various other institutions, communicated with their subjects through written government statements of the literary officials, calmed opposition through divination rituals, and secured loyalty through the monopolization of high-quality medical personnel and resources. One result of this research is my PhD dissertation, "A Study on the Medical History of Silla", a work that examined how the rulers had used medicine and medical treatments in ruling the populace.[4]

I came to understand that medical service was used as an important arm of governance in medieval Korea. Particularly, the fact that the rulers of East Asia always attempted to monopolize advanced medical information related to human life helped me to understand that medieval Asian countries paid attention to the political aspect of medicine. There was a political reason for the fact that, unlike in the West, the medical system developed in East Asia under a centralized bureaucracy.

Medicine and the medical treatment system of the Tang (唐) dynasty became the model for medieval East Asian medicine and the medical treatment system. I found this system had several distinct characteristics. First, reflecting patriarchal ideology, medical benefits were provided in the form of the highest-ranked ruler's favour. Using medicine, the emperor governed officials, aristocrats and the common people under the centralized bureaucracy. Such forms were confirmed through the Tang law code, and later, as Unified Silla and Japan adopted this system, it could become the basis for East Asia's medical system. In short, medical service was utilized as a ruling mechanism.

Second, at the core of medieval East Asia's medical system lay the fact that medical service was provided under the bureaucratic system. The highest rulers nurtured medical professionals and employed them as medical bureaucrats, placing

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them under the control of the state. Medical bureaucrats were responsible for looking after the health of the highest-ranked rulers, the aristocrats. In the Goryeo dynasty (918–1392), literary officials above 5th rank (品), military officials above 4th rank and highest-ranked Buddhist monks were provided with this medical service while preparing and distributing medicinal materials which were bestowed by the rulers and used to show off their power. It came from the Tang Code and presumably Silla accepted this system as well.[5] The fact that medical service was provided at the state level for people in the core bracket to prop up the regime distinguishes the medieval East Asian medical system from that of the West. I assume that this stems from the early advent of a centralized state in East Asian society, unlike the decentralized society of the medieval West.

Third, East Asian medicine of the medieval age earned a universality and compatibility that were not achieved in ancient times. By adopting Chinese medicine which assumed a central position in East Asian medicine, neighbouring countries such as Korea, Japan and Vietnam naturally came to use Chinese-style names of illnesses, medicinal materials and measurement units. Just as medical exchange can take place actively among today's East Asian nations thanks to the operation of the American-British medical system, which is the global standard, so too in East Asian countries of the medieval era active medical exchange could also take place through the adoption of Chinese medicine as a standard framework.

So, when did Korean medicine gain the universality and compatibility to communicate with Chinese medicine as the centre of East Asian medicine? I intend to regard the establishment of the national medical college, 'I-hak (醫學)', by Silla in 692 as the starting point. After the end of the unification wars, Silla set up the educational institution to teach Chinese medicine and produced medical professionals on a regular basis. By introducing Chinese medicine as the standard framework, Silla was able to exchange with East Asian medicine more actively.[6] This paper seeks to discuss Silla's medicine from the perspective stated above.

2. The Development of Silla's Medicine

According to *Samguk sagi*, Silla lasted from 57 BCE to 935 CE. In early Silla, as in other ancient tribes of Northeast Asia, shamans (*mu* 巫) had cured people. There is a legend regarding a shaman physician and Buddhist monk physician in *Samguk yusa* (三國遺事), according to which when Princess Sungkuk (成國公主) fell ill during the reign of King Michu (味鄒王, r. 262–284), it was Buddhist monk Ado who came from Goguryeo and cured the Silla princess when a shaman physician failed to heal her.[7] This was a turning point for Buddhism spreading to Silla. The author of *Samguk yusa* argues that it was during the reign of King Nulji (訥祇王, r. 417–458), not King Michu, when Buddhism was introduced to Silla, but my point is that according to

the anecdote it was a shaman physician who had been supposed to cure the princess. Hence after Buddhism came to Korea, Buddhist monks took a role as healers and a kind of physician. They were called physician monks (醫僧).[8]

It is assumed that Silla's medicine underwent a remarkable development in the 5th and 7th centuries. In the 5th century, Silla's medicine took the form of ancient medicine influenced by that of Goguryeo, and in the seventh it acquired universality in East Asia by adopting the medical system of the Tang dynasty, which had become the standard for East Asian medicine.[9] What's interesting is that both periods of time experienced war and foreign troops long stationed in Silla, the armies of Goguryeo and Tang respectively. During the war foreign troops came to be stationed within the territory of Silla over a long period of time and their medicine flowed into Silla through military doctors.[10] Similar in context is the fact that military surgeons of the United States participating in the Korean War (1950–1953) played an important role in the development of modern Korean medicine.[11]

Major consequences included the career of Kim Mu (金武), a Silla physician with the official rank of Pajinchan (波珍飡: the 4th of 17 ranks) who treated the Japanese Tenno Inkyo (允恭帝) in 414 CE,[12] and the foundation of the medical institute I-hak in 692 CE. Briefly, we can visualise the state of Silla's ancient medicine from an anecdote about Kim Mu, and Silla's efforts to shift to medieval features can be found in I-hak, founded by King Hyoso (孝昭王) in the first year of his reign.

I intend to look first at the former example. Located in the south-eastern part of the Korean peninsula, Silla was not only the last among the three ancient kingdoms of Korea in terms of the development of the state, but also the least-developed one in the aspect of culture and general technology. Nevertheless, it was Silla's doctor, Kim Mu, who cured Tenno Inkyo of Japan.[13]

How could this be possible? Tenno Inkyo was said to have been pro-Silla. Furthermore Silla medicine seems likely to have been influenced when Goguryeo's army was stationed within the territory of Silla in 400 CE. Korean scholars hardly mention Kim Mu, who was dispatched to Tenno Inkyo in the 13th year of King Silsung (實聖王, r. 402–417). Kim Mu was called *kusuri* in ancient Japan, which meant 'medicine' at the time. Some Chinese scholars deny the fact that Kim Mu cured Tenno Inkyo, because only one ancient Japanese historical book, *Kojiki* (古事記) conveyed the story. According to *Kojiki*, it was a Silla envoy, Kim Pajin Hanki Mu (金波珍漢紀武), who had the good medical knowledge that cured Tenno Inkyo's chronic disease. At that time, a person's name revealed his job as well as his family's registered place. Therefore, Kim's name tells us that he had the 4th rank official title pajinchan and came from Hanki region which was in the south-eastern part of Silla's capital, modern Gyeongju. Japanese scholar Misina Shoei (三品彰英, 1902–1971) and Chinese medical historian Wang Yousheng (王有生), who just followed Misina's theory, denied the possibility of Kim Mu's medical activity on behalf of Tenno Inkyo.

But in *Samguk yusa* (三國遺事) written in 1285 CE, I found Kim Mu'al (金武謁) who accompanied King Naemul's (奈勿王, r. 356–402) son Bohae to Goguryeo when he was sent as a hostage in 412 CE, the 11th year of King Silsung's (實聖王) reign (402–417), and Kim Mu seems to be the same person as Kim Mu'al.[14] As I already pointed out, at that time a name showed the owner's job. Hence Kim Mu'al might be a kind of chamberlain for King Silsung, because there was an officer *alza* (謁者, Ch. *ye zhe*) in Qin-Han China and Goryeo Korea as well. He escorted Bohae, who was a brother of King Silsung's political rival King Nulji (訥祗王, r. 417–458), to Goguryeo and King Silsung eliminated one of his rivals. Kim Mu probably refined his own medical art by embracing Goguryeo's advanced medicine during his stay there. In fifth-century Silla there were only a few aristocratic people even among the ruling class who had Chinese-style names and could read and write Chinese characters. According to *Kojiki* pajinchan Kim Mu would be Korea's first scholar studying medicine as a hobby (學醫).[15] Why was Kim Mu ignored in Korean history? I think he and his family may have been killed when King Silsung was murdered by Bohae's brother King Nulji. The new king sent an emissary to Goguryeo to rescue his brother Bohae, now held hostage.

In addition, a prescription by Silla's Jinmyoung (眞明方), who treated Tenno Inkyo's concubine Sodo Osi no Iratsme (衣通郎女), survives in the Japanese medical book of 808 CE, *Daidou luishu hou* 大同類聚方.[16] According to Japan's medical historian Fujikawa Yu (富士川游, 1865–1940), most Japanese scholars thought that the surviving *Daidou luishu hou* was fabricated in the Edo period. But here it is not my concern whether it was fabricated or not. I introduce that book because from *Daidou luishu hou* we may see the differences between Chinese- and Japanese-style names for the same medicinal materials and diseases.

Maki Sachico (槙佐知子), a specialist of Japanese ancient literature, translated the *Daidou luishu hou*, which was written in Manyoshu (萬葉集) Japanese, into modern Japanese.[17] The extant *Daidou luishu hou* records 8 medicinal materials in Silla Jinmyoung's prescription to cure a sore throat for Tenno Inkyo's concubine. Jinmyoung seems like a Silla physician's name. According to the anecdotes in *Gojiki* and *Daidou luishu hou*, Silla's envoy Kim Mu cured Tenno Inkyo and Silla physician Jinmyoung cured his concubine in the early 5th century.

Maki translated the ancient Japanese medicinal herb names into Chinese. For some of them she suggested several possible Chinese names. For example, she suggested three possible names for the translation of *Biyi yangji* (比以良支), namely Chinese Skullcap (*Scutellaria baicalensis*), the dried root of Indian mulberry (*Morinda officinalis*, Ch. *ba ji tian* 巴戟天), and *cornutae folium* (枸骨, Ch. *gou gu*) which is dried leaves of holly, *Ilex cornuta Lindl.* Of course *Biyi yangji* was so-called in ancient Manyoshu Japanese, but I guess it was influenced by ancient Korean pronunciation. I searched for these 8 materials in ancient Chinese medical books and realized that most of them

Table 1. Medicinal names referred to in four medical books

Names				Medicinal Properties and Sources
Western	Chinese	Jinmyoung-bang	HYGKbang	
Arrowroot		久壽加豆良	叱乙根	Used to treat conditions with stiff neck and back and diarrhoea. Also used for headache. *Shang*, p.168
				Sweet taste and non-poisonous. Flower good for hangover, leaf treats injuries by metal. Roots gathered in May and used after drying in the sun. *Yak*, p.275
Angelica polymorpha	芎藭	袁美奈加豆良	蛇休草, 蛇避草	Used in the prescription of physician Hou's black powder (**候氏黑散方** *Houshi heisan fang*) along with *Wolfiporia cocos* (**茯苓**, see below). *Shang*, p.151
				Essential for headache. *Yak*, p.488
				Hot taste, warm property, non-poisonous. Gathered in the 3rd, 4th month and used after drying in the sun. Good to gather in the 9th and 10th month in the lunar calendar. *Hyang*, p.271
Sinomenium acutum	防己	阿保加通良		Relieves swollen legs. *Shang*, p.165
				In traditional Korean medicine, mainly used as an antiphlogistic, painkiller, and diuretic. *Yak*, p.309
Rose of Sharon	無翳花	支波知寸乃美		Used to treat gastritis, haemorrhoids, dysentery, itch, anal prolapse, emesis and thirst. Flower and root skin used for the same purpose. *Yak*, p.472
Wolfiporia cocos	茯苓	万豆保度		Mainly used to treat symptoms such as dizziness, hallucination, heart pounding, thirst and urination problems. *Shang*, p.147
				In Korean medicine, mainly used as a diuretic and sedative. *Yak*, p.100
				Sweet taste, non-poisonous. Good ones look like a human or turtle. Gathered in February and August and used after drying in the shade. The one with roots in it was called *Boksin* (**茯神**, Ch. *fushen*). *Hyang*, p.297
Buxaceae		也左奈支	楊木	Leaf and stalk used to treat festering. *Ben*, p.1163
				Inner skin used as a fever remedy and painkiller for rheumatic fever and malaria. For inflammation in the mouth and throat, rinse mouth with water boiled down with the herb. *Yak* p.165
				Whereas *Buxaceae* (**楊木**) has short leaves, willow (**柳木**) has long branches. Skin and roots used for treating a large boil. Flower tastes bitter. Cold in nature, it is non-poisonous. To treat a boil that is hard to cure, paste with this and cauterize). *Hyang*, p.303
Skullcap		比以良支	精朽草	Used to treat conditions accompanying fever, haemorrhage, lump around the pit of stomach, diarrhoea, nausea and pain in the chest and side. *Shang*, p.187
				In Korean medicine, mainly used as an antiphlogistic and fever remedy. *Yak*, p.619
				Bitter taste, cold property. Roots gathered in the 2nd and 8th months and used after drying in the sun. Otherwise roots are gathered in the 3rd month and dried in the shade. *Hyang*, p.279
Ginger		波自加民		Mainly used for conditions accompanying nausea, excessive saliva in the mouth without feeling thirsty. *Shang*, p.90

Shang refers to *Shang han lun*, a modern compilation by Huang Huang (**黃煌**) translated into Korean (Seoul: Beopin Munwhasa, 2000); *Ben* to *Bencao gangmu* (**本草綱目**, 'Compendium of Materia Medica', Taipei: Wenyou shudian, 1959); *Yak* to *Yakcho i seongbun kwa iyong* ('Ingredients and Usage of Herbs', republished by Ilwol seogak **日月書閣**, Seoul, 1991); *Hyang* to *Bangjung hyangyak mok* (**方中鄕藥目**, 'Korean Medicinal Prescription Materials') cited from Shin Youngil, *Hyangyak gukeupbang ae Daehan yeonku* ('A Study of *Hyangyak gukeupbang* **鄕藥救急方**', PhD. dissertation, Kyunghee Univ. Dept. of Oriental Medicine).

were popular in 3rd-4th century China. From my research, I selected Chinese Skullcap as *Biyi yangji*. In *Hyangyak gukeupbang* (鄕藥救急方, *First Aid Prescriptions with Korean Medicinal Materials*) published in 1236 CE, Chinese Skullcap was written with a perfect Chinese-style name, *jeonghucho* (精朽草, Ch. *jingxiucao*).

From this prescription, we can see what the ancient medicinal name had been in countries not influenced by Chinese medicine, such as ancient Korea and Japan, where they used their own names. I made a table of Jinmyoung's prescription to compare the medical materials' names in different eras and different countries for the purpose of extracting the traits of ancient medicine.

In Oriental medicine, it is said that the notion of 'medical proof (藥證)' began from *Shang han lun* (傷寒論, 'Treatise on Febrile Diseases'), created by Zhang Zhongjing (張仲景: c.150–219 CE) of the Eastern Han (後漢: 25–220 CE) dynasty, which contained guidelines and evidence regarding the use of medicines. Table 1 examines the main purposes of medicinal materials used by *Jinmyoungbang* based on *Shang han lun* and compares them with the records of related materials appearing in *Hyangyak gukeupbang*. The peculiarity of the ancient medicine of Silla and Japan appears distinctly in the names of medicinal materials. Such peculiarity can also be demonstrated by the following anecdote of a monk from Silla who went to Tang for study in the 8th century.

A. According to *The Biography of Weilingxian* (威靈仙傳) written by Zhou Junchao (周君巢) during the Zhen Yuan (貞元: 785–805) period of Tang, "*Weilingxian* (*Clematis florida*) removes paralysis (風), helps twelve channels (*jingmai* 經脈) pass through, and is effective if taken in the morning.... There was someone in Changzhou (尙州) who hadn't been able to walk for decades because of serious illness. Although skilful doctors applied various techniques, they only failed to treat his condition. When [the patient] went out to the roadside personally to look for someone who could cure him, he encountered a monk from Silla who said, 'This disease can be cured with only one medicine, but I'm not aware if the medicine is available here.' At that, he went out into the mountains in search of the medicine and found it. It was none other than *weilingxian*. After [boiling down the herb and] taking it, he became able to walk in several days. Later a hermit, Deng Siqi (鄧思齊), discovered the event and recorded it."[18]

What we should note here is that the Silla monk didn't know if *weilingxian* was available in Tang. In other words, it implies that he was only aware of the Korean name (鄕名) by which *weilingxian* was referred to in Silla, and that he had little knowledge of Chinese medicine. That the *weilingxian* prescription applied by the Silla monk was not one introduced by Buddhist medicine can be supported by the fact that even the royal doctors of Tang boasting the finest medicine at the time didn't recognize the efficacy of *weilingxian*. Since the Buddhist medicine transmitted to Silla had passed through China, Tang medicine already included most of the Buddhist medicine from

India.[19] The *weilingxian* prescription became a Chinese prescription and was covered by the *Daguan bencao* (大觀本草, 'Great Compendium of Medicinal Materials') in 786.[20]

In addition to *weilingxian*, Silla had its own prescriptions like *nobong* (露蜂, Ch. *lufeng*) from *Silla bupsabang* (新羅法師方, 'A Compendium of the Prescriptions of Silla Buddhist Monks'), which has been preserved in the Japanese medical book *Isimpo* (醫心方) of 983 CE.[21] Nobong (露蜂) means a beehive, and this medicine was served as a sexual enhancer. According to *nobongbang*, the hive was dried and burnt to powder, which was then supposed to be applied to the male sexual organ. A Silla priest provided a prescription using the hive powder that would make the penis bigger, longer and stronger.[22] Kim Doojong said that this is a very authentic and exclusive usage for hives in East Asia of the period.[23] It reveals that the customers for *Silla bupsabang* were mainly royal families as well as aristocrats, one of whose concerns was sexual issue.

Because medical books of Silla dealing with homegrown medical materials or prescriptions completely disappeared long ago, we can only glimpse the unique features of Silla's medicine through the records of China or Japan. As the anecdote about *weilingxian* suggests, Chinese medicine comprised all medical knowledge from neighbouring countries. Thus, Silla's medicine, like that of Goguryeo and Baekje, came to survive within the prescriptions of Chinese medicine. In other words, when the Silla monk presented the prescription for paralysis of the legs, it was Silla's own prescription. After being carried in *Daguan bencao*, however, it changed into a prescription of Chinese medicine. Later, in the 13th century, the Goryeo dynasty

Table 2. Comparison of Curricula in Silla, Tang and Japan

Silla	*Classic of Materia Medica* (本草經), *Systematic Classic of Acupuncture and Moxibustion* (甲乙經*), *Classic of Plain Questions* (素問經), *Canon of Acupuncture* (針經*), *Pulse Classic* (脈經), *Classic of Channels and Acupoints* (明堂經*), *Classic of Medical Problems* (難經*)
Tang	*Materia Medica* (本草), *Acupuncture and Moxibustion* (甲乙*), *Plain Questions* (素問*), *Canon of Yellow Emperor's Acupuncture* (黃帝針經*), *Pulse Classic* (脈經), *Channels and Acupoints* (明堂*), *Pulse Formulae* (脈訣*), *Illustrated Manual of Meridian Flow for the Practice of Acupuncture and Moxibustion* (流注圖*), *Illustrated Manual of Channels and Acupoints in Lying Down Posture* (偃側圖*), *Classic of Red Crow's Holly Acupuncture* (赤烏神針經*)
Japan	*Materia Medica* (本草), *Acupuncture and Moxibustion* (甲乙*), *Plain Questions* (素問*), *Canon of Yellow Emperor's Acupuncture* (黃帝針經*), *Pulse Classic* (脈經), *Channels and Acupoints* (明堂*), *Pulse Formulae* (脈訣*), (小品方), *Collection of Examined Prescriptions* (集驗方), *Illustrated Manual of Meridian Flow for the Practice of Acupuncture and Moxibustion* (流注圖*), *Illustrated Manual of Channels and Acupoints in Lying Down Posture* (偃側圖*), *Classic of Red Crow's Holly Acupuncture* (赤烏神針經*)

(Based on Miki Sakae, *Chosen igakushi oyobi shippeishi* ('The History of Medicine and Diseases in Korea', Sakai City, Japan, 1962, p.14)
(*) refers to acupuncture textbooks, and in the case of Silla, to textbooks for acupuncture and moxibustion.

re-imported the prescription when publishing *Hyangyak gukeupbang* because there were no medical books of Silla that had survived.

In 692 CE, Silla founded I-hak (醫學), the medical institute, to produce medical professionals annually who practised Chinese medicine. Through the textbooks used at I-hak, we may observe the universality that Silla's medicine aimed at.

I don't think that Silla's I-hak adopted only seven textbooks. Comparing the list with those used in Tang or Japan, we can perceive that only the names of scriptures (經) remain. In short, not all of the textbooks taught at I-hak have been recorded, but only those enumerated as scriptures. It can be inferred from the comparison of textbooks used in Korea, China and Japan that these three countries ran somewhat different curricula according to the character of each country. In the case of Silla, it is noticeable that books on acupuncture and moxibustion assumed great importance. Of all seven scriptures, five are related to acupuncture. Considering that *Maekyung* (脈經, Ch. *maijing*) is also not irrelevant to acupuncture, we can see that scriptures related to acupuncture were valued. I think that this was possibly related to the fact that following Goguryeo's techniques, acupuncture made considerable progress in Silla.

The establishment of I-hak is significant because after unification, Silla adopted Chinese medicine and embraced it proactively as its medical standard. It is easy to guess from the textbooks that Silla must have changed the official names of medical-related items into Chinese terminology. By obtaining a universality not requiring translation, Silla's medicine was transformed into a system immediately compatible with that of neighbouring countries, and in the process, smoothly acquired an international character.

3. The International Trade of Medicines in Silla

The trading of medicine was very important, because no country could produce every kind of medicinal materials at that time. Hence, the commercial exchange of medical goods may have begun much earlier than we imagine. By dispatching envoys to China and Japan, Unified Silla engaged in distributive trade and public trade (公貿易). Medicinal materials seem to have comprised a large portion in public trade between Korea, China and Japan, because medical goods were expensive but light, creating high profits. In private trade (私貿易) as well as public trade, medicinal materials were probably important items. Considering that epidemics swept through East Asia in the 8th and 9th century,[24] we can guess that demand for medical supplies probably skyrocketed.

In public trade with Tang, Silla mainly imported silk, books and jewellery while exporting gold, silver, iron, ox bezoar, ginseng, weasel and seal leather, etc.[25] Among imported books, medical titles appear to have represented an important share. As

Pak Yeoeon (朴如言), Silla's envoy dispatched to Tang in 804 CE, couldn't find the latest medical book, *Kwanglibang* (廣利方, Ch. *Guanglifang*), compiled in 796 CE, in the market he made a request to Du You (杜佑, 735–812), who was then provincial minister of Yangzhou (揚州). This is one example suggesting that Silla's envoy enthusiastically collected Tang medical publications.[26] When *gakgan* (角干, 1st rank) Chung Gong (忠恭), who was King Heondeok (憲德王)'s younger brother, was prime minister (sangdaedung 上大等) and fell ill in 809, an official doctor prescribed 'dragons' teeth soup' (龍齒湯, Ch. *longchitang*) using fossilised mammoth teeth as the main ingredient.[27] Since this was a rare material available only in China, the anecdote suggests that the import of medicinal materials from Tang took place actively. In the trade of medicinal materials with Tang, Silla seems to have imported those that were not available in Silla such as dragons' teeth (龍齒, Ch. *longchi*) and dragons' bones (龍骨, Ch. *longgu*), while selling ox bezoar and ginseng as its major export items.

Medicinal materials were also important items in the trade with Japan. The items that the Japanese government purchased from Silla's envoys sent in 686 CE, the 5th year of King Sinmun (神文, r. 681–692), included medicinal materials along with gold, silver, silk and leather goods. In particular, the delegation dispatched in 752 CE, the 11th year of King Gyeongdeok (景德王, r. 742–765), is worth noticing when discussing Silla's trade in medicinal goods. A large delegation of up to 700 persons, they were on a mission to attend the ceremony of dotting the eyes (開眼會) for the Vairocana statue (毘盧舍那佛), the main icon of Tōdaiji (東大寺). *Bai siraki motsge* (買新羅物解), which was the purchase register between the envoys of Silla and Japanese aristocrats, currently survives. The delegation from Silla arrived on the 22nd of the intercalary month (閏), the third month, and stayed through the 24th of the seventh month in the lunar calendar. In order to buy items brought by the delegation, Japanese aristocrats above the 5th rank of bureaucracy made out the purchase register, which contains approximately a hundred kinds of items including perfumery, medicines, paints, dyes, metals, vessels and books, and about 200 items were traded.[28] Among these were such medicinal materials as haritaki (阿梨勒), ginseng, [the yellow inner part of] cinnamon bark (桂心), dried root and rhizome of rhubarb (大黃), ox bezoar, the Javanese long pepper Piper longum L. (畢拔, pilbal, Ch. *biba*), licorice, Cistanche deserticola Y. C. Mai (肉縱容), the dried root of Polygala tenuifolia Willd. (遠志), honey (蔗蜜), etc.[29]

Meanwhile, I think that the *List of Diverse Medicines* (種種藥帳) currently stored at Nara (奈良) prefecture's Tōdaiji Shōsōin (正倉院) well exhibits an aspect of Silla's medical industry. In the 49-day memorial ceremony (49祭) for Japan's Tenno Shomu (聖武) on 21 June 756, his queen dedicated items used by the deceased king and other royal belongings to Tōdaiji, among which medical materials donated are recorded in the *List of Diverse Medicines* (hereafter referred to as the Shomu list) in this article. A total of 60 kinds of Oriental medicines are contained here, and 16 are assumed

to have been imported from Silla.[30] This list shows the medicinal materials used by the tenno during his struggle with illness, which can be broadly divided into four categories. The first group refers to the medicinal materials produced in the western and southern regions such as moschus (麝香, the dried secretion of the musk sac of the adult male musk deer), rhinoceros horn (犀角) and pepper (胡椒), the second group those from Silla including ginseng, rhubarb and licorice, the third group from China including *longgu* (龍骨) and mirabilite (朴硝, hydrated sodium sulphate), and the fourth refers to prepared medicines such as powdered mica (雲母粉), 'Gold stone mound' Keumseokleung (金石陵, Ch. *jinshiling*) and 'Purple snow' Jaseol (紫雪, Ch. *zixue*).[31]

The prepared medicines that caught my attention are Keumseokleung (Shomu list no. 56) and Jaseol (Shomu list no. 47).[32] 'Keumseokleung', in which the main ingredients are mirabilite, Natrii Sulfas (芒硝, crystalline sodium sulphate) and Gypsum Fibrosum (石膏, a soft mineral chiefly composed of hydrated calcium sulphate) is similar to the prescription for mirabilite 朴硝煎方 introduced in the *Qianjinfang* 千金方.[33] Especially, 'jaseol', adding gold to various medicinal materials, is identified with the prescription used by the wealthy that the *Qianjinfang*'s author Sun Simiao (孫思邈) criticised.[34] It is said that these medicines were prepared by the Pharmaceutical Office (藥典) in Silla, a famous gold-producing country, for export to Japan.[35]

In my view, this seems to be closely related to the fact that in 804, Silla asked provincial minister Du You for *Guanglifang* (廣利方), then Tang's latest medical book published in 796,[36] because the book contained many popular prescriptions that would have been absolutely necessary to Silla's medical industry. In addition, I reckon that the medicinal materials of Silla probably took up an important position in the trade fleet of Chang Pogo (張保皐) during the mid-9th century. After unifying the Korean peninsula, Silla secured not only home-grown materials such as ginseng and ox bezoar, but was also able to import various top of the market materials with which it created a valuable new industry in exportable compound medicines.

And then, what specific medicinal materials were chiefly distributed from Silla? Chinese and Japanese literary sources list the following materials: ginseng, ox bezoar, root of Korean indigo plant (藍藤根), sea eel grass (大葉藻), tangle, Aconitum coreanum R. Paymond (白附子), dried root of Trichosanthes cucumeroides (土瓜), mint (薄荷), Herba Schizonepetae (荊芥), chrysanthemum (菊), pomegranate (海石榴), dried flower of Carthamus tinctorius (海紅花), lotus stem (茄子), rock moss (石髮), pine nuts (海松子), peach (桃), Corylus heterophylla (榛子), seal penis (Callorhinus testis et penis, 膃肭臍), *weilingxian*, Silla sheep fat (新羅洋脂), and so forth.[37] A full-blown introduction of Silla's medicinal materials to China was probably prompted in the process of Silla performing joint operations with Tang during its unification war of the 7th century. The following medicines and medical goods appear to have been supplied by Silla during the war:

B. In the first month of the 9th year of King Munmu (文武王) (669 CE), the Tang monk Fa An (法安) came to seek lodestone, citing the Emperor's order.[38]
C. In the ninth month of the 12th year of King Munmu (672 CE), 33,500 *keun* (斤, Ch. *jin*) of silver, 33,000 *poon* (分, Ch. *fen*) of copper, 400 needles, 120 *poon* of ox bezoar, 120 *poon* of gold, 6 rolls of very thin, size 40 cotton cloth (40升布), and 60 rolls of size 30 cotton cloth (30升布) were paid as tribute.[39]

The reason Tang demanded lodestone from Silla is that [magnetic] iron oxide was used as a haemostatic drug.[40] Apart from the conflicts on the Korean peninsula, Tang was then engaged in a war with the Tibetans (吐蕃) as well. It can be deduced that Tang sought lodestone from Silla after experiencing its efficacy during the war on the Korean peninsula.

Record C is related to the tribute that Silla offered to Tang during the war between the two countries. Items following silver and copper, including needles, ox bezoar and gold,[41] appear to have been described as medical goods. Silla sent to Tang 400 needles for acupuncture, presumably because the excellence of Silla's needles along with its acupuncture techniques was recognized. Moreover, we might consider that not only were simply needles sent, but also that acupuncture methods went over with them to Tang.

The superiority of Silla's acupuncture can be reaffirmed by an anecdote circulated in the Japanese acupuncture community that Kikawa Henki Maru (紀河邊幾男麿) entered Silla to learn its acupuncture techniques and returned to Japan in 642 (11th year of Queen Sundeok), becoming 'a master of acupuncture (針博士)'. This anecdote is conveyed by Fujikawa Yu in *Nihon igakushi* (日本醫學史, *History of Japanese Medicine*).[42] I consider this story credible because it is very likely that Silla inherited Goguryeo's outstanding acupuncture techniques. There are anecdotes to exhibit the excellence of Goguryeo's acupuncture. One is the story of a Goguryeo acupuncturist during the Wei Dynasty whose techniques were so marvellous that he could even piece hairs together.[43] Another is about Kuratsukuri no Tokushi (鞍作得志) who was a Japanese of Baekje ancestry and came to Goguryeo to learn acupuncture.[44] Silla's acupuncture seems to have inherited none other than that of Goguryeo.

Discussion up to this point suggests that Silla became an exporter of medicines, compounding a variety of medicinal materials imported from Tang and re-exporting them in the form of finished goods. The international character of Silla's medicine can be inferred from the fact that after unifying the Korean peninsula, Silla positioned itself as an important consumer and exporter in the trade of medical materials in East Asia. In brief, Silla came into full-blown contact with Tang medicine through the unification wars of the mid-7th century. Silla not only embraced Tang medicine, but also exported homegrown medicinal materials along with acupuncture needles and techniques. After accomplishing the unification of the Three Kingdoms, Silla even put together medical traditions possessed by Goguryeo and Baekje, and at the

same time adopted the medical system of Tang as the standard, thereby achieving the prototype of traditional Korean medicine (韓醫學). The establishment of I-hak in 692 CE demonstrated that Silla's rulers set goals for its medicine by adopting a Tang-style medical system. Through such moves, Silla's medicine was able to gain universality and compatibility that were acceptable in the medical community of East Asia. Moreover, as it came to be transcribed in Chinese characters (漢文), Silla's traditional medical knowledge was absorbed into Tang medicine, and in some cases, converted into Chinese medicine. This was also revealed by the anecdote about the Silla monk involving *weilingxian*.

Through this research, we have been able to understand that while Tang medicine constantly embraced diverse knowledge available within East Asia and supplemented it so that it could become the standard framework of this region, Silla's medicine existed within the broad boundaries of East Asian medicine as a branch of medicine equipped with universality, compatibility and international character.

Notes

1 Lee Hyunsook, 'Sillamal eodaejaei sunipkwa unyong (新羅末魚袋制的成立和運用, Establishment and operation of the yutai system at the end of Silla)', *Sahak yeonku* (史學硏究) vol. 68, Korean History Society (韓國史學會), 1992.

2 On this, see my papers 'Namal yeocho Choi Enuwui e jungchijeok whaldong kwa uisang (羅末麗初 崔彦撝의 政治的活動과 位相, Choi Eunwui's political activities and his political status in late Silla and early Goryeo)', *Ewha sahak yeonku* (梨花史學硏究), vol. 22, Seoul: Ewha sahak yeonkuso (梨花史學硏究所), 1995, pp.7–40; 'Namal yeocho Choi Chiwon kwa Choi Eonwi (羅末麗初 崔致遠과 崔彦撝, Choi Chiwon and Choi Eunwui in late Silla and Early Goryeo)', *Toikeihak kwa Hanguk munwha* (退溪學과 韓國文化) vol. 35, Daegu: Kyungbuk Toikeihak Yeonkuso (慶北大退溪學硏究所), 2004, pp.187–232; 'Namal yeocho seonsa bimun e seongkyuck (羅末麗初 禪師碑文의 性格, The characteristics of the inscriptions of Zen Buddhist monks in late Silla and early Goryeo)', *Hankuk yeoksa yeonkuwhoi Keumseokmun ban* (韓國歷史硏究會金石文班發表論文集), 2005, pp.1–15.

3 Lee Hyunsook, 'Paekche sidae jeombok kwa Jeongchi (百濟時代 占卜과 政治, Divination and politics in the Paekche dynasty)', *Yeoksa minsokhak* (歷史民俗學) vol.28, 2008.

4 'A Study of the Medical History of Silla (Silla ihaksa yeonku, 新羅醫學史硏究)', Seoul: Ewha Women's University 梨花女大, 2002.

5 Lee Hyunsook, 'Goryeosidae Kwanryoje hai iryowa mingan ihak (高麗時代 官僚制下의 醫療와 民間 醫療, The governmental and the non-governmental medical care systems in the Goryeo dynasty 913–1392)', *Dongbang hakji* (東方學誌) vol. 139; Seoul: Yonsei Kukhak Yeonkuso (延世大國學硏究所), 2007, pp. 7–45.

6 Lee Hyunsook, 'The birth of Korea's medieval medicine (韓國中世醫學的誕生)', *Isahak* (醫史學, *History of Medicine*) 16–2; Seoul: Society for the History of Medicine 大韓醫史學會, 2006.

7 Trans. Ha tae-Hung and Grafton K. Mintz, *Samguk yusa,* book 3, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1972: 'Ado Brings Buddhism to Silla: In the third year of the reign of King Michu (264) the King's daughter Songguk Kongju was stricken with a strange malady which *neither medicine nor sorcery* could cure. Greatly worried, the King sent messengers throughout the land to seek a physician who could heal the princess. Finally Ado was summoned to the palace, where he at once restored the princess to perfect health.' (pp. 181–2). But I think it is more correct to interpret '*i mu* (醫巫)', not as 'neither medicine nor sorcery' but as 'shamanic medicine'.

8 Lee Hyunsook, 'Jilbyoung, chiryo, jongkyo: Hankuk godae bulkyo ihak (疾病, 治療, 宗教; 韓國古代佛教醫學, Disease, healing, and religion: Buddhist medicine in ancient Korea)', *Hankuk sasang kwa munwha* (韓國思想과文化) vol. 48, 2009, pp.170–3.

9 Although the two concepts of peculiarity and universality seem to be opposed to each other, they should be treated very cautiously in discussing the characteristics of medicine in each era. That is because when Silla was developing ancient medicine around the 5th century, it was the medicine of Goguryeo that had the greatest impact, and to Silla, Goguryeo's medicine would have been perceived as having universality. Likewise, when the medicine of the Tang dynasty was fully introduced to Silla in the 7th century, the medicine that had been commonly used before would have been considered to be a medicine with strong characteristics of Silla. In brief, when it comes to medicine, such notions as universality and peculiarity are comparative ones. Thus, according to whichever standard is applied, those notions are newly defined. In this sense, as a standard framework of Tang medicine was set up with the establishment of I-hak in 醫學 692, prescriptions like *weilingxian* 葳靈仙 or *nobobang* 露蜂房, lacking in Tang medicine, become examples of the peculiarity of Silla's medicine.

10 At an early date China introduced a system to dispatch doctors to military troops and labour forces where a large number of people lived in a group, and the *ritsuryō* state (律令國家) of Japan also adopted the system in the 8th century. Niida Noboru 仁井田陞, Ikeda On 池田溫 et al, ed., *Douryo shui hoi* 唐令拾遺補, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press 東京大出版會, 1997: "(唐)諸行軍及作役之處, 五百人以上太常給醫師一人. (日本)行軍及作役之處, 典藥給醫師一人" (p.1413). The Tang code was influenced by the Northern Dynasties' codes, such as those of Northern Wei and Northern Ji, as well as that of Sui. It appears that Goguryeo probably had such a military doctor system.

11 Military surgeons of the United States dispatched to Korea in the 1950s conducted various operations, many of which were first introduced to the nation by them, and Korean doctors assisting them are said to have acquired new techniques. After the end of the Korean War, the US government implemented the "Mississippi Project" to invite Korean doctors to America for retraining. This is considered to have had a critical impact when modern Korean medicine became rearranged, from the past inclination for Japanese-style German medicine towards an American style.

12 "三年春正月辛酉朔, 遣使求良醫於新羅. 秋八月, 醫至自新羅, 則令治天皇病. 未經幾時, 病已差也. 天皇歡之, 厚賞醫以歸于國." *Nihonshoki*, book 13, Tenno Inkyo 3rd year (http://miko.org/~uraki/kuon/furu/text/syoki/syoki13.htm).

13 "... 及壯篤病, 容止不便.... 皇子謝曰, '我之不天, 久離篤疲, 不能步行, 且我旣欲除病,

獨非奏言, 而密破身治病, 猶勿差. 由是, 先皇責之曰, 汝雖患病, 縱破身. 不孝孰甚於玆矣. 其長生之, 遂不得繼業. 亦我兄二天皇, 愚我而輕之. 群卿共所知.... 寡人弗敢當." Ibid., Tenno Inkyo's accession (允恭天皇 卽位).

14 Lee Hyunsook, 'Osegi cho Silla isa Kim Mu wa ihaki baljeon (五世紀初 新羅醫師 金武와 醫學의 發展, Silla's doctor Kim Mu of the early 5th century and the development of medicine)', *Hankuk sasang kwa munwha* (韓國思想과 文化), vol. 12, 2001, p.12.

15 Lee Hyunsook, 'Sillai minkan Iryoin 新羅의 民間醫療人', *Sillasa hakpo* (新羅史學報) vol. 6, 2005, pp.124–125.

16 For the translation of ancient Japanese I referred to Maki Sachiko 槇佐知子, *Daidou luishu hou* 大同類聚方 book 3; Tokyo: Shinsensha 新泉社, 1992, pp.44–5.

17 Ibid.

18 "發明:(頌曰)唐貞元中, 嵩陽子周君巢作威靈仙傳云, 威靈仙去風, 通十二經脈, 朝服暮效,... 先時商州有人病手足不遂, 不履地者數十年. 良醫殫技莫能療, 所親置之道傍以求者, 遇一新羅僧見之,告曰,此疾一藥可活,旦不知此土有否,因爲之入山求索,果得,乃威靈仙也. 使服之, 數日能步履. 其後山人鄧思齊知之, 遂傳其事...." *Bencao gangmu* (本草綱目) book 18, *caobu* (草部); Taibei: Wenhua shudian 文友書店, 1959 ed., p.758.

19 An obvious example is *Beiji qianjin yaofang* 備急千金要方 (briefly called *Qianjinfang* hereafter), compiled in the early 7th century. *Qianjinfang* borrowed many theories and prescriptions from Buddhist medicine. See Ma Boying (馬伯英) et al., trans. into Korean by Jeong Wooyeol, *Jungwe ihak kyoryusa* 中外醫學交流史, Seoul: Jeonpa kwahak sa (電波科學社), 1997, pp.162–165 & pp.178–180; Lee Hyunsook, 'Dang ihakseo Kwanglibange doip kwa ke iei 新羅哀莊王代 唐醫學書 廣利方의 導入과 그 意義, Introduction of the Tang medical book *Kwanglibang* during the reign of Silla's King Aejang and its implications (1)'. See *Dongyanggojeon yeonku* 東洋古典硏究 vol.13; Dongyang gojeon hakwhei 東洋古典學會, 2000, pp. 253–5.

20 "貞元二年九月, 山人鄧思齊獻威靈仙草, 出尙州, 能愈衆疾. 上于禁中試用有效, 令編附本草, 授思齊太醫丞." *Tang hui yao* 唐會要 vol. 82, *yishu* 醫術; Shanghai: Guji chubanshe 古籍出版社, 1991, p. 1806.

21 It is known that *nobongbang* 露蜂房 burning a wasp hive to use as a tonic was a unique prescription hardly found in any other medical books. Kim Doojong, *Hanguk ihaksa* 韓國醫學史; Seoul: Tamgudang, 1964, pp.74–7.

22 Lee Hyunsook, 'Jilbyoung, chiryo, jongkyo: Hankuk godae bulkyo ihak (疾病, 治療, 宗敎; 韓國古代佛敎醫學, Disease, healing, and religion: Buddhist medicine in ancient Korea)', *Hankuk sasang kwa munwha* (韓國思想과文化) vol.48, 2009, p.170–3

23 Kim Doojong, op.cit, p.77.

24 Lee Hyunsook, 'Silla tongilki jeonyeombyeong e yuhaengkwa dae eung (新羅統一期 傳染病의 流行과 對應策, Epidemics of Unified Silla and counter-measures)', *Hanguk godaesa yeonku* 韓國古代史硏究, vol.31, 2003, pp.170–173.

25 Gwon Deokyoung, *Godae Hanjung oikyosa* (古代韓中外交史, History of Early Korean-Chinese Relations); Seoul: Ilchokak, 1997, pp.279–281.

26 Lee Hyunsook, 'Introduction of the Tang medical book *Guang li fang* during the reign of

Silla's King Aejang and its meanings (1) and (2)'. See *Dongyang gojeon yeonku* 東洋古典硏究 vols.13 and 14 (op. cit.).

27 *Samguksagi* 三國史記 vol. 45, Biography 列傳 5, *Nokjin* 祿眞, "時忠恭角干爲上大等 坐政事堂 注擬內外官 退公感疾 召國醫診曰: 病在心臟 須服龍齒湯 遂告暇三七日 杜門不見賓客".

28 Douno, Haruyuki 東野治之, '烏毛立女屛風下貼文書の硏究-買新羅物解の基礎的硏究', *Shilin* 史林 57–6, 1974; Yun Seontae, 'Controversial interpretation of historical materials from Unified Silla, Silla's trade with Japan of 752 and 「買新羅物解」– focusing on the interpretation of 「貼布記」 owned by the Shōsōin', *Yeoksa wa hyunsil* vol. 24, 1997, p.47.

29 Choi Jaeseok 崔在錫, 'Relations between Unified Silla and Japan based on medicinal materials owned by Japan's Shōsōin', *Minjok munwha yeonku* 民族文化硏究 vol. 26, Korea University, 1993, p.8.

30 The 16 kinds of Oriental medicine included musk (麝香), Prinsepia uniflora (蒺核), Glauberitum (寒水石, a natural crystalline of glauberite), wonchung (元靑), Celosiae Semen (靑┌草), white skin (白皮, error for Bletilla Striata 白芨), dragon horn (龍角, actually deer horn 鹿角), stalactite (鐘乳石), Polygala tenuifolia Willd. (遠志), ginseng (人蔘), rhubarb (大黃), beeswax (蜜臘), licorice (甘草), skin of hedgehog (蝟皮), maca (雲母), dried root of Euphorbia fischeriana Steudel (狼毒), etc. Besides, it is considered that prepared medicines such as Jaseol (紫雪, list no. 47), Keumseokleung (金石陵, Shomu list no. 56), Suck su bing (石水氷, Shomu list no. 57) were imported in the form of finished goods from Silla's Pharmaceutical Office (藥典). Choi Jaeseok, ibid. pp. 9–15. For translation from the Oriental medicinal materials into English, the web site of Korea Institute of Oriental Medicine was helpful, specifically http://210.218.196.134/kiom/eng_dic/dic_search_result.php

31 Torigoe, Yatsyosi 鳥越泰義, *Shosoin yakubutsu no sekai* 正倉院藥物の世, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005, see pp. 80–81.

32 Keumsuckleung (金石陵 Ch. *jinshiling*) is a powdered medicine compounded with 1 *geun* (斤) each of high quality mirabilite (上朴硝) and high quality glauber salt (上芒硝), 3 *nyang* (兩) of Gypsum Fibrosum (石膏), and 2 *nyang* of glauberite (凝水石). Jaseol (紫雪, 'purple snow') is a medicine prepared through multiple processes using 100 *nyang* of gold, 3 *geun* each of Glauberitum (寒水石), lodestone (紫石, iron oxide), Gypsum Fibrosum (石膏), and talc (滑石), 1 *seok* (石) of water, 5 *geun* each of powdered antelope horn (羚羊角屑), powdered water buffalo horn (犀角屑), Aristolochia contorta (靑木香) and Aquilaria agallocha (沈香), 1 *nyang* of dried clove buds (丁香), 1 *geun* each of Scrophularia (玄蔘) and Cimicifuga heracleifolia Komarov (升麻), 8 *nyang* of licorice, 10 *geun* of mirabilite (朴硝), 4 *seung* of niter (硝石), 1 *nyang* and 2.5 *jeon* (錢) of musk (麝香), grains of musk (當門子), and lastly 3 *nyang* of cinnabaris (朱砂, a mineral, containing mainly mercuric sulphide). Asahina Yatshiko 朝比奈泰彦, *Shosoin yakubutsu* 正倉院藥物, 大阪: 植物文┌刊行┌, 1955, p.7; Choi Jae-Seok, op. cit. p.15.

33 "論曰, 凡人患大熱, 皆須候脉, 若大大熱者, 不得一準方用藥, 皆準病用藥. 大熱不可那者, 當兩倍三倍. 大大熱者, 乃至十倍用之, 乃可制之爾. 有人苦熱不已, 皆有服石所致, 種種服餌不能制止. 惟朴消煎可以定之. 武德中, 有貴高人師市奴謂之金石凌非也, 此方直用二消寒水石石膏可也, 卽不勞金, 有金者, 貴高人所加也." *Beiji qianjin yaofang* 備急千金要方, book16, 'Stomach (*weiwan* 胃腕)', Beijing: Renmin weisheng chubanshe 人民衛生出版社, 1998, pp. 299–300. Detailed contents

of the mirabilite prescription (朴硝典方) are as follows: 1 *geun* of mirabilite (*poxiao* 朴硝), 8 *nyang* of glauber salt (*mangxiao* 芒硝), 4 *nyang* of glauberite (*ning shui shi* 凝水石), 2 *nyang* of plaster (石膏), 2 *nyang* of gold.

34 The prescription for powdered medicine of Jaseol (紫雪散) contained in *Waitai biyao* 外臺秘要 book 31 (ibid., p. 848) is as follows: 100 *nyang* of gold (黃金), 3 *geun* each of Glauberitum (寒水石) and Gypsum Fibrosum (石膏, replaceable with talc), 1 *geun* of Scrophularia (玄蔘), 5 *nyang* each of powdered antelope horn and rhinoceros horn, Aquilaria agallocha (沈香), and Aristolochia contorta (青木香), 1 *nyang* of dried clove buds (丁香), and 8 *nyang* of licorice. Then, the prescription transmitted to Silla and Japan has 7 additional ingredients including magnets (紫石), talc (滑石), Cimicifuga heracleifolia Komarov (升麻), glauber salt (朴硝), niter (硝石), Moschus (麝香), grains of musk (當門子) and cinnabaris.

35 See Choi Jaeseok, op. cit., pp. 9–20.

36 Lee Hyunsook, op. cit. vol.15, 2000, pp. 201–234.

37 Kim Doojong, op. cit., pp. 80–81.

38 *Samguk sagi* 三國史記 Book 6, *Silla bonki* 新羅本紀 6, King Munmu文武王 上, " (9年 春正月) 唐僧法安來, 傳天子命, 求磁石". In the 5th month of the same year, Silla dispatched an officer Jijinsan 祇珍山 to take two boxes of lodestone 磁石 to Tang.

39 Ibid.

40 "治金瘡方:... 磁石末傅之, 止痛斷血" *Qianjinfang* 千金方, Book 25, 金瘡血出條 'bleeding cuts', op. cit. p. 460; *Bencao gangmu* 本草綱目, 卷 10, op. cit., pp. 341–3; "廣濟飛黃散, 療諸惡瘡腫方:曾青, 雌黃, 白礬石, 磁石, 雄黃, 丹砂 各一兩", *Waitai biyao* 外臺秘要 book 30, op. cit. p. 818, citing *Guangjifang* 廣濟方 compiled during the reign of Tang Xuanzong 玄宗. Powdered medicines could be prepared in advance in large volumes and thus, *feihuangsan* (飛黃散) applying magnetic iron sulphide (磁石) would have been very useful in wartime.

41 It is very likely that gold sent by Silla to Tang was gold processed for use as medicinal material. My conjecture is based on two facts: first, gold was stated just following ox bezoar, which is a medicinal material; second, Silla sent it in a very small quantity of 120 *poon* (分).

42 Fujikawa Yu 富士川游, *Nihon igakushi* 日本醫學史, Tokyo: Shogabo, 1904, p.77.

43 "魏時有高句麗客, 善用鍼, 取寸髮斬爲十餘段, 以針貫取之, 言髮中虛也, 其妙如此." Duan Chengshi 段成式 [Tang], ed., *Youyang zazu* 酉陽雜俎 book 7, Yi (醫 medicine) (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, p. 57). This suggests that Goguryeo owned a sophisticated technique for fine needles.

44 *Nihoshoki* 日本書紀 book 24, the 4th year of Kokyoku 皇極, "夏四月, 戊戌朔,高麗學問僧等言:「同學鞍作得志,以虎爲友,學取其術.或使枯山變爲青山,或使黃地變爲白水,種種奇術,不可殫究.又虎授其針曰:愼矣愼矣,勿令人之.以此治之,病無不愈.果如所言,治無不差.得志,恒以其針隱置柱中.於後虎折其柱,取針走去.高麗國知得志欲歸之意,與毒殺之". Referring to the year 645 CE, this anecdote shows that when asked by a Japanese man about Kuratsukuri no Tokushi (鞍作得志), a scholar monk from Goguryeo said that he had been killed. Thus, it would have been much earlier than 645 that Kuratsukuri learned acupuncture techniques in Goguryeo, namely the early 7th century.

THE CAUSES AND AIMS OF YŎNGJO'S CHŎNGMIHWAN'GUK

ANDREW DAVID JACKSON

In the seventh month of 1727, Yŏngjo shocked his entire court by removing the Noron (the Old Doctrine) faction and restoring to power the Soron (the Young Doctrine) faction. What was shocking was that Yŏngjo removed a faction that was loyal to his rule, and restored a faction that had campaigned against him and in favour of his brother Kyŏngjong. In addition, within eight months of this Soron restoration or Chŏngmihwan'guk, rebels launched the largest military rebellion of the eighteenth-century against Yŏngjo's rule. This was the Musillan rebellion, and it was led by supporters of this same Soron faction, some of whom Yŏngjo had restored to office in the Chŏngmihwan'guk.

This study forms part of an ongoing investigation into the Musillan rebellion. In this paper, I aim to analyse the causes of the Chŏngmihwan'guk. What was the character of the political events and strategies that led Yŏngjo to restore to power the Soron? The answer to this question lies partly in the character of Chosŏn factional conflict that had developed over two centuries, and partly in the complex succession crisis that engulfed the reigns of three kings between 1689 and 1727, and these subjects will form the basis of this paper.

The growth of late-Chosŏn factionalism

Chosŏn factions can be defined as 'political associations on a quest for power,'[1] and many histories see the start of institutionalised factionalism in a 1575 quarrel over appointments in the Ministry of Personnel between two officials.[2] Officials took sides in this dispute, and two factions, the Sŏ'in (Westerners) and the Tong'in (Easterners) grew as a result. Between 1575 and 1727 several different factions dominated the Chosŏn bureaucracy, including the Sŏ'in, Namin (Southerners), Noron, and Soron. Most factions took their names from the location of the capital residences of their leaders. Over the years these factions often subdivided into new factions that went on to contend power.

The splits of late-Chosŏn factions could provide the subject matter of many studies, but several points are salient to this discussion. Firstly, factions splintered

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into smaller groups that operated within a unified factional shell, and sometimes these groups went on to form their own faction proper. Internal splits often occurred after personal quarrels amongst factional leaders, and new groups formed behind these different charismatic leaders. Of the different factions that feature in this study, the Sŏ'in split into Noron and Soron sub-factions between 1683 and 1701, after which they began to operate as separate and mutually antagonistic entities.[3] In addition, the Soron split into a hardline Chunso and moderate Wanso sub-faction in 1721, but never formed two fully independent factions. Secondly, splits often occurred after factions took control of the bureaucracy, and these dominant factions split over the severity of punishment for defeated factions.

There were some clear distinctions between the different factions. Often factions associated with philosophical schools of Confucian thought: for example, the Noron faction were associated with Song Siyŏl, and the Soron were associated with Yun Chŭng. There was also a geographical element to factions. Private Confucian academies followed the teachings of one particular scholar and, therefore, were associated with that scholar's faction. Supporters of some factions were concentrated in certain areas, like the Namin in Kyŏngsang province. Later factional allegiance was often transferred along educational, family and marriage lines, so fathers passed their allegiances on to their sons, who were educated in academies associated with their faction. Different factions dominated politics during different periods; for example, the Sŏ'in and the Namin dominated the political scene between 1591 and 1694. By the time of the Chŏngmihwan'guk and the Musillan rebellion two factions, the Noron and Soron, fought over power.

Starting points for conflicts were often important political issues, and early clashes dealt with various issues including personnel appointments, the selection of the Crown Prince, the capacity of individual kings to rule. Perhaps the most famous dispute was the rites dispute of 1659 and 1674.[4]

Factions and the political decision-making process

It is important to understand the relationship between factionalism and the late-Chosŏn political situation, particularly the decision-making process of government. There was a discrepancy between official Confucian notions of the duty and loyalty of officials, and the practical administration of late-Chosŏn government. In philosophical terms, loyalty of subject and minister to the king was a cornerstone of Confucian political and social thought. 'Legitimacy and supreme authority' was vested in the king,[5] and bureaucrats in office were supposed to be completely loyal to the throne. The reality of Chosŏn government was significant competition between the monarchy and the *yangban* bureaucracy over power. In this situation, the power of the king was restrained by institutions of the bureaucracy, and the result was

fluctuations in the balance of power between the monarchy and bureaucracy over the course of the Chosŏn period.[6] Bureaucrats attempted to restrain the authority of the king by using government offices like the censorate (responsible for monitoring governmental conduct, and impeaching corrupt officials). Officials abused these offices to remonstrate over policy, hirings and firings. Major policy issues were generally discussed by bureaucrats headed by a Chief State Councillor, but proposals had to be approved by the king, and neither the important bureaucrats nor the Chief State Councillor could make decisions *instead* of the king.[7] For example in the area of appointments to the bureaucracy, generally the Board of Personnel gave nominations for candidates to the king, who could ignore these nominations and risk resistance from the censorate, but the king had the final say on decisions.[8]

This then was a system where the bureaucracy was in unofficial competition with a monarchy it claimed to follow unconditionally. James Palais (1984) describes this as one of the 'contradictory potentialities' of Confucianism. Palais' notions are particularly helpful for an understanding of the complex position of factions within the late-Chosŏn political system. He argues that Confucianism had both unofficial/practical and official/ideal components, with practical Confucianism employed by those bureaucrats who took office, who adhered to an ideal Confucianism that preached absolute loyalty to the monarch, and at the same time, officials used ideal components of Confucianism to condemn opponents and restrain the power of the king.[9] This decision-making process is vital for an understanding of how factional conflict worked in practice, and Palais' notion of the contradictory potentialities of Confucianism is important for an understanding of how factionalism was tolerated in the political process.

Late-Chosŏn factions: Goals, political culture, self-perception

Factionalism served as a practical/unofficial means of securing office, and shaping governmental policy. Rather than acting independently, officials organised into factions had a greater influence over the king and other officials in the political decision-making process. Factions helped protect their members' interests over the interests of competing groups,[10] and this battle was fought over positions in government. In practice, being in power meant members of a particular faction dominated the principal government offices, especially the censorate.

In a Confucian state, factions and factional conflict within the bureaucracy were stigmatised and considered subversive, because factionalism 'placed the private political interest of officials over the greater interests of the throne or state.'[11] In other words, factionalism stressed self-interest (*sa*, i.e., getting positions) over common interests (*kong*, serving the interests of state and society). Factionalism was by definition a phenomenon that should *not* exist in a government run along Confucian

principles. However, factionalism existed and its paradoxical existence helped shape a political culture of secrecy, insinuation and euphemism, and a specific method of intervention in the political process.

Late-Chosŏn factions differed from legal political parties in several ways. Everyone knew the factional affiliation of bureaucrats, most of whom were members of factions, and every official claimed to be non-partisan and above factional conflict. There were no official membership lists, no formal requirements for membership, no leadership contests, and the discussion of factional allegiances was taboo, so people referred to factional allegiance euphemistically.[12] For example, Yŏngjo's officials once referred to the Noron as 'one group' and the Soron as 'the other side.'[13] Affiliation was identifiable through kinship, political association, and education, and membership was fixed by external recognition. If people identified a bureaucrat as belonging to a certain faction, then that was his faction.[14]

Although at odds with prevailing Confucian orthodoxy, factions managed to justify their own existence and their impact on the government's decision-making process. In policy disputes, officials from different factions appealed to the throne for support, since the king had the final say on policy decisions. If one group of officials had the support of the king over policy, then these same officials were automatically right (*si*), and therefore acting for common-interest. In the eyes of the victors of policy disputes, opposing officials, whose policy recommendations had been rejected, were wrong (*pi*), and therefore, acting out of self-interest. The victors saw themselves as officials fulfilling their duty as Confucian scholars (*kunja*) to resist the actions of the defeated, selfish officials (*so'in*).[15] As a result, for the victors in policy disputes it was the defeated who were factions, engaging in factionalism. Members of factions saw themselves and their adversaries in the following terms: *right/wrong, working for self-interest/common-interest, Confucian scholars/selfish officials*;[16] and this binary *right/wrong* logic of factionalism had specific ramifications. Attacks on other members of factions were rarely made in political terms according to 'clearly defined rights and duties', but mainly according to 'abstract principles' or moral positions.[17] Accepting an opponent's position on a policy, or majority decisions, were not seen as pragmatic, political measures taken for the sake of the country. Compromise measures were seen as betrayals of personal morality. Factions believed they were engaged in a moral mission, and in order to fulfil their duty of creating harmony in both society and the soul of man, factions had to hold power.[18] Officials connected to factions fulfilled their obligations as moral, Confucian men by taking power, deciding on policy, and providing public service to the country.[19] Part of this moral mission of factions focussed on the removal of other factions. Once judged 'right' by the king, it was that faction's moral duty to remove the faction that had been judged 'wrong.' By removing selfish men who had worked against the public good, the victors were restoring harmony.

Formulaic clashes, the involvement of the king, and mutual expectations

Factionalism followed patterns of behaviour that developed over a two hundred-year period. Factions took power by winning the king over to their side and against opponents. One way was to back a prospective candidate for the throne in the type of succession dispute that affected Sukchong's rule. Factions also took power by winning the support of the king on important policy matters, and then by encouraging him to remove the incumbent faction en masse. Another method used by factions to take or consolidate their power was to use their influence over the censorate to encourage the king to employ allies and dismiss foes. Naturally, such interference was contrary to the principles of the government. The Chosŏn political system was supposed to be a meritocracy where the examination system provided the best candidates for posts, and the censorate removed the rotten apples. However, in practice the system was abused by factions. Factions adopted a step-by-step approach to discredit and eliminate opponents. Initial attacks targeted incorrect protocol, incompetence or corruption, while later attacks might target the morality of opponents, thus inability to carry out public duty was a manifestation of a morally flawed character. Since the official's character was fundamentally flawed, the accusations followed him for the rest of his career. Royal approval for the removal of officials was followed by calls for exile, then severe interrogations, and so on. If factions were unable to get opponents removed on serious charges, then they went for minor infractions instead. In practice, elimination meant removal from office, but bloodshed was common. Once removed from office, the defeated faction attempted to regroup and regain its position in government, starting the cycle of conflict again.[20]

Factional conflict could run according to its own logic, regardless of national needs. With one faction out of office, and one faction dominant, the practical relevance of the original issue was often forgotten, and the loss or defence of moral positions became the issue. Increasingly, past grievances dictated policy making, and as the past dominated the present day thinking of the factions, their activities became less restrained. If a strong king was unable to settle problems, then factional conflict could take on a self-perpetuating character of vendetta politics, as 'factionalism itself' became the issue.[21]

The role of the king was another 'contradictory potentiality' in the character of late-Chosŏn factionalism. All legitimate methods of fighting had to go through the king, and were dependent upon winning over the king. This royal recognition meant the king was complicit in factionalism. Kings often had ambivalent attitudes to factions. Officially, kings condemned factionalism, which distracted from national affairs. Unofficially, factional fighting kept the focus on factions rather than the throne,[22] and kings used factionalism as an excuse to change administrations or

destroy opponents and strengthen their own rule when it was politically expedient.[23] There appeared to be a quid pro quo relationship between factions and the king. Kings used factions, factions could help the king, and factions expected their support to be reciprocated. If factions backed the king's policies, or protected him when he was in contention for the throne, then once in power, factions expected the king's help to consolidate their own position and eliminate opponents. Thus, both the king and faction were expected to behave in a certain way, once they had achieved power.[24] This practical/unofficial use of factionalism might explain how factionalism was apparently tolerated by successive kings over a two hundred-year period. As a system shaped by two hundred years of history, the culture of secrecy and euphemism, the quid pro quo politics, and the *right/wrong* binary logic of factionalism were likely to continue influencing the responses of the king and factions to political problems like the succession crisis that emerged during Sukchong's reign.

The rule of Sukchong and Kyŏngjong and the succession crisis

In 1689, by naming Kyŏngjong as crown prince, Sukchong helped initiate a bloody cycle of factional conflict that led to the Chŏngmihwan'guk. This was a succession battle that raged over the reigns of three very different kings: Sukchong, his sons Kyŏngjong, and Yŏngjo.

Succession, Sukchong, his royal consorts and the factions

One important role of any king is to ensure a smooth succession to his throne by producing as uncontroversial an heir as possible. The problem was that succession in Chosŏn was based on a vague area of the law, and there was room for both flexibility and controversy in equal measure. No fixed rules had been formalised and no precedent established by the founders of the dynasty. The Chosŏn kings practiced polygamy, and married both primary consorts and concubines. The status of the queen determined the status of the son or crown prince: if a royal prince was born to a primary consort, he was legitimate; if he were born to a concubine, he was illegitimate. Primogeniture was not essential, the 'consanguinous proximity to the main line of succession' was not a hard and fast rule for selection, and royal princes were not denied the throne because of their legitimacy.[25] The reason for this flexibility was that it was impossible to guarantee that the oldest son, because of intelligence, character or constitution, would be suitable to rule the country.

Within these rules for succession, there was also room for controversy. Officials distinguished between the primary consorts and concubines of the king, and between legitimate and illegitimate sons of incumbent kings. Officials (who had to be born

legitimate) looked down on crown princes born of secondary consorts.[26] There was an incentive for kings to choose sons by primary consorts to avoid controversy. In practice, the choice of crown prince was left to the discretion of the ruling monarch, and kings might select the sons of their favourite wives regardless of legitimacy. This subjective and affective element meant factions might try to influence the succession process. This was the complex background to the Sukchong succession controversy.

Different factions lined up behind two candidates for the throne, Kyŏngjong and Yŏngjo. Initially the Namin, and from 1701, the Soron backed Kyŏngjong's candidacy. Yŏngjo was backed by the Sŏ'in, and later the Noron. Factions fought to ensure their respective candidate ruled instead of candidates backed by factional enemies. These factions fought over many controversial issues concerned with the succession of both Kyŏngjong and Yŏngjo. The most serious problem was Kyŏngjong's poor health. It worsened as he grew older, and his suitability to rule was a source of controversy until his death. The second problem was that neither Kyŏngjong nor Yŏngjo were legitimate. Sukchong had tried for seventeen years to produce a legitimate heir with his primary consort, Queen Inhyŏn, who was unable to conceive. Kyŏngjong was born to Lady Chang Hŭibin, a concubine. Yŏngjo was born in 1694 to concubine Lady Ch'oe Sukpin, who had allegedly been a slave. Sukchong attempted to settle controversies about Kyŏngjong's legitimacy by making Lady Chang the primary consort and deposing the incumbent primary consort Queen Inhyŏn. The Sŏ'in opposed this move, arguing that Sukchong had time to produce a legitimate heir.[27] The Namin supported Sukchong and were restored in 1689, while the Sŏ'in were removed.[28]

A third problem was that the mothers of both men were involved in serious palace controversies. Both women attempted to guarantee power for themselves and their male progeny. When Queen Inhyŏn died in 1701, Lady Chang was accused of using black magic rituals to kill her. Further complicating matters, it was Yŏngjo's mother Lady Ch'oe who informed on Lady Chang, casting doubt on the veracity of these allegations. Was Lady Ch'oe establishing her own legitimacy by eliminating a rival to the affection of the king, and a rival future queen mother? The Chang Hŭibin controversy was the catalyst for the two Sŏ'in splinter groups, the Soron and Noron to form their own factions proper. The Soron urged clemency for Lady Chang and supported Kyŏngjong, and they were dismissed; the Noron urged firmer punishment, and they were left in office.[29] Lady Chang was made to drink poison.

One final problem concerns the actions of Sukchong, a man described by scholars as fickle and ruthless. Sukchong was fickle in his affections to both his consorts and also his sons, and whenever he changed his favourite, he demanded factional backing.[30] Sukchong was ruthless in his domination of the bureaucracy through a deliberate divide and rule strategy.[31] Evidence of these character traits emerged in the 1717 solitary audience (*Chŏng'yudokdae*) with Noron leader Yi Imyŏng. This

closed meeting caused a great controversy that plagued the next few years of the succession dispute. Royal audiences usually occurred in the presence of officials who documented proceedings. Naturally, because it was a closed meeting the content of the discussion could never be confirmed, but the Noron claimed Sukchong expressed extreme doubts about Kyŏngjong's ability to rule, and requested the Noron ensure that Kyŏngjong did not remain crown prince.[32] It is unclear what Sukchong wanted from this solitary meeting. There are two possible explanations. One is that Sukchong had cooled in his affections towards Kyŏngjong after the death of Lady Chang. The other is that Sukchong wanted to ensure the safety of Yŏngjo by making his intentions deliberately vague. Knowing that Kyŏngjong was sickly, Sukchong hoped to protect Yŏngjo from mortal enemies. Whatever Sukchong's intentions, Kyŏngjong remained crown prince, but this meeting sowed the seeds for further factional conflict during Kyŏngjong's reign.[33]

The rule of Kyŏngjong

During the four-year period of Kyŏngjong's rule (1720–24), factional conflict intensified as both the Noron and the Soron sought advantage for themselves. The Noron tried to advantage the position of Yŏngjo, while Soron extremists sought the elimination of their Noron counterparts. After Sukchong died in 1720, and Kyŏngjong inherited a Noron bureaucracy from his father, the Noron quickly raised concerns about Kyŏngjong's successor. They were concerned that Kyŏngjong had not produced an heir, and he was sickly. The Noron administration urged that Kyŏngjong name Yŏngjo crown prince, inappropriate given Kyŏngjong had not been on the throne for long.[34] In 1721, Kyŏngjong acquiesced to the Noron, and named Yŏngjo crown prince. Having received one concession from Kyŏngjong, the Noron sought further concessions to advantage their side. Within two months of the proclamation of Yŏngjo as crown prince, a Noron memorial demanded the appointment of Yŏngjo as regent, an emergency measure only implemented when the king was incapable of ruling. This move would have made the Soron rule less secure, and empowered Yŏngjo. The main motivation of the Noron appeared to be cynical. By ousting Kyŏngjong and having their own candidate Yŏngjo installed as regent, this would safeguard the Noron's political position. Certainly the Soron considered the Noron action a brazen bid for power.

The Soron counter-attacked against what were seen as Noron attempts to weaken Soron power. Ten days after accepting, Kyŏngjong reversed the ruling approving the regency, and was clearly angered by what he saw as Noron brass-neck.[35] Soron Kim Il'gyŏng and others sent a memorial, accusing four important Noron ministers Kim Ch'angjip, Yi Kŏnmyŏng, Yi Yimyŏng, and Cho T'aech'ae of leading a plot to

overthrow the king. The four Noron ministers were sent into exile and fifty other Noron were punished. This was the 1721 Noron purge, and Soron restoration.

Now in the ascendancy, the Soron splintered over the Yŏngjo regency issue into moderates, the Wanso, and a dominant hardline group, the Chunso. This split in the spring of 1722 saw the Chunso led by Kim Il'gyŏng claim absolute loyalty to Kyŏngjong, and the Wanso take a line closer to that of the Noron.[36]

The Chunso sought further concessions that would tighten their grip on power. They looked for an opportunity to damage their opponents, and this opportunity presented itself very quickly when the Namin *nothoi* (the son of a concubine, therefore legally illegitimate and not privy to the same rights as primary sons) Mok Horyong claimed to have uncovered a palace plot to remove Kyŏngjong and enthrone Yŏngjo. Mok alleged the plotters, who included the sons of the four Noron ministers exiled in the 1721 purges, planned to have Kyŏngjong assassinated, poisoned, or forced to abdicate. This incident was steeped in ambiguity, and even after torture, the accused men never admitted their guilt, but the damage was done.

This second wave of attacks was a disaster for the Noron, and Yŏngjo. Over an eight-month period, thirty Noron, including the four Noron ministers, were executed, one hundred and fourteen were exiled, nine made to kill themselves and one hundred and seventy-three were jailed. Yŏngjo had already had attempts made on his life, and now his position as crown prince became more precarious.[37] By the end of this purge, the Chunso were in powerful positions in the Soron-led bureaucracy of Kyŏngjong. Sukchong and Kyŏngjong's reigns had intensified a cycle of factionalism driven solely by a desire for revenge over past grievances. This was a cycle of factional vendetta that continued into Yŏngjo's reign.

The early reign of Yŏngjo, and the T'angp'yŏng policy: Problems of legitimacy and stability

When Yŏngjo took the throne in the eighth month of 1724, he was immediately jettisoned into a problematic relationship with the two main factions. While the activities of many Soron threatened the legitimacy of Yŏngjo's rule, the anti-Soron activities of the Noron threatened the stability of Yŏngjo's government.

Yŏngjo inherited a Soron bureaucracy that was partly antagonistic because it had campaigned for his brother Kyŏngjong, and Chunso like Kim Il'gyŏng questioned Yŏngjo's legitimacy. Serious allegations were raised against Yŏngjo, including the low status of his mother and even accusations of regicide. Kyŏngjong had died from food poisoning after eating dishes that had allegedly been sent to him by his brother. The threat from the Soron extremists could not be ignored by Yŏngjo.

Yŏngjo's relationship with the loyalist Noron was also extremely problematic.

With the death of Kyŏngjong and the enthronement of Yŏngjo, the Noron saw a more favourable environment for their anti-Soron activities, perhaps an opportunity to destroy their Soron enemies in revenge for the 1721–2 purges. The Noron thought Yŏngjo was in their debt, after all, the four ministers and many other Noron had laid down their lives to defend Yŏngjo's interests.[38] This meant that Yŏngjo would have to handle the loyalist Noron as carefully as any antagonistic Soron.

Yŏngjo had different aims from the factions. He wanted to strengthen his hold on the throne by removing threats and stabilizing his rule, but his options were limited by personal obligations. Yŏngjo needed to put an end to Soron attacks on his legitimacy. In addition, he wanted to prevent the type of destructive factional fighting that had raged under his brother's rule by strengthening the monarchy over factions. This meant while Yŏngjo was indebted to the Noron for their protection, he needed to control Noron political excesses, *and* at the same time retain their support in case of future attacks on his throne. These problems affected important aspects of Yŏngjo's rule, so it was clear that any solution could not be short-term.

The T'angp'yŏng policy and its implementation

Yŏngjo proposed to resolve these problems through the T'angp'yŏng policy (or Policy of Impartiality). The term was used by Sukchong, but originated in the Confucian classic *Book of Documents* in which it was stated that:

> The path of a ruler will unfold clearly if there is no bias or favouritism towards a faction. If the ruler remains impartial, he will govern fairly.[39]

In this context, the notion of 'T'angp'yŏng' refers to a principle or ideal of good government to which kings and the bureaucracy should aspire. What is important for my argument is the practical implications of the T'angp'yŏng policy in the context of the early part of Yŏngjo's reign between 1724 and 1727. During this period, Yŏngjo and his officials made many references to the implementation of a T'angp'yŏng policy, and it was clear from the context of their conversations that it was meant to be a way of suppressing factionalism.[40] However, in this period it was not a policy in the sense of a coherent and clear cut set of measures formulated in response to events. In the *sillok*, there is little detail about the formulation or implementation of any specific T'angp'yŏng policy. As for the initial actions of Yŏngjo and his officials, it is probably more helpful to think of the T'angp'yŏng policy as a 'technique.'[41] Seen in this sense, Yŏngjo's T'angp'yŏng policy appeared to entail the king refusing to engage in quid pro quo politics.

There are several specific instances where Yŏngjo's implementation of the T'angp'yŏng policy can be seen. In his first actions as king, Yŏngjo promoted Wanso

Soron ministers, including Yi Kwangjwa, to central positions in government around the ninth month of 1724, and then to calm the fears of the Noron, he released a Noron exiled in the 1721–2 purges. Yŏngjo also gave equal punishment to infractions by the Noron and Soron. In the eleventh month of 1724, anti-Soron attacks began. The Confucian student Yi Ŭiyŏn had sent a memorial criticising Kim Il'gyŏng's role in the 1721–2 purges of the Noron and demanding the four Noron ministers be exonerated. The ruling Soron took great offence to Yi's charges, and 'fearing the effects of his charges,' they demanded his punishment.[42] Facing demands from both the Noron and Soron for the punishment of Kim Il'gyŏng and Yi Ŭiyŏn, instead of favouring one side or the other, Yŏngjo had both men tried and executed. By rewarding and punishing both sides in equal measure, Yŏngjo created a blockage to factionalism. This is confirmed by the Noron objections to this double punishment policy, such as a memorial sent by the Noron Sixth Counsellor of the Office of Special Counsellors that stated:

> "As for T'angp'yŏng, that was a legal regulation set up by the sage kings of yore. But it is essential that we first of all clearly distinguish between loyalty and evil, and only then can we hope for the beauty of harmony and respect. Your highness, first you have to distinguish between loyalty and treachery, virtue and evil, and even though you have done much to clarify a world divided into good and evil, when officials engage in factional behaviour, the best thing to do is punish them. Nowadays right and wrong are very mixed up, and the ways of dealing with these problems have been changing, so if T'angp'yŏng measures were suddenly introduced now, then trouble will be inevitable."[43]

The Noron objections are striking: the only way to remove factionalism is for the king to decide which faction is right and which is wrong, in other words, Yŏngjo should engage in factionalism to get rid of factionalism. By claiming that the Noron and Soron are at times equally right and equally wrong, Yŏngjo was refusing to cooperate with vendetta, and quid pro quo politics. The psychological effect of this was powerful. If neither the Noron nor the Soron were *right*, then that exposed the reality that both sides were factions engaged in factionalism. Neither side could count on the legitimising authority of the king to justify their actions.

This initial application of the T'angp'yŏng policy around 1725 appeared to help increase tensions in an already tense situation. The situation was exacerbated when it became clear that the king was not committed to a consistent but a sporadic use of the T'angp'yŏng policy. Yŏngjo reverted to the standard forms of factionalism to defeat his enemies when necessary. The 1725 Kim Il'gyŏng case gave him the opportunity to attack his enemies and allow the Noron to consolidate power. During his trial Kim Il'gyŏng made attacks on the legitimacy of the king, and alleged Yŏngjo's involvement in the death of his brother, and the Soron grudgingly supported Kim Il'gyŏng fearing this would be 'the beginning of a deluge.'[44] Now the Soron was backing a politician

who questioned the legitimacy of Yŏngjo and this made Soron rule untenable. In the new year of 1725, when Yun Pongjo sent up a memorial attacking the Soron, Yŏngjo used this as the opportunity to change the bureaucracy rapidly. Those associated with Kim Il'gyŏng and Mok Horyong were targeted for punishment, and the Chunso and senior Soron were sacked or exiled. According to many scholars, Yŏngjo had deliberately guided the attacks of the Noron, to remove enemies who attacked his legitimacy.[45] He continued in the same vein, and used the old patterns of factionalism to allow the Noron to consolidate their rule. When it was opportune and would benefit him, Yŏngjo had stood back to let Noron defeat the Soron.

From this stage, with the Noron in charge of the bureaucracy, Yŏngjo appeared to employ his T'angp'yŏng policy again, and once more his actions clashed with Noron expectations. With the Chunso exiled or dead, the Soron out, and the Noron firmly in control, the Noron sought to consolidate their power. They had received the backing of the king and were therefore *right*, so it was now the Noron's opportunity to suppress factions (the Soron) forever. However, Yŏngjo refused to cooperate with Noron demands for vengeance. The reasons why are unclear, but perhaps with his enemies removed, Yŏngjo felt he could restrict factional conflict and stabilise his rule by refusing to take part in quid pro quo politics.

Yŏngjo's attempts to restrain further attacks against the Soron only frustrated the Noron. Having previously followed the old patterns of factionalism, Yŏngjo now tried to apply his T'angp'yŏng policy and prevent the Noron from pursuing their *right/wrong* logic. The Noron went on the offensive, a move that led to political gridlock. They insisted on further action against the Soron perpetrators of the 1721–2 purges. In a series of memorials, the Noron wanted to refer to Kyŏngjong's illness, which Yŏngjo thought was unfilial. In addition, the Noron asked that the removal of the Soron be described as the 'subjugation of the rebels.'[46] In order to defuse the situation, Yŏngjo replaced Noron extremists with moderates who were viewed with suspicion by other Noron. In the end, the Noron bureaucracy refused to cooperate. Factional tensions had reached such a point that government had ceased to function.

Total breakdown in the functioning of government was clear evidence that Yŏngjo's initial attempt to repress factionalism through the T'angpyŏng policy was a failure. There are various opinions about the reasons for this failure. Chŏng Manjo (1983), for example, believes that the early attempts to introduce a coherent anti-faction T'angp'yŏng policy struggled to cope with a changeable political situation, and were nothing more than a patch-up 'policy'.[47] But the main reason for the failure of Yŏngjo's efforts appears to be his inconsistent application of the T'angpy'ŏng policy that only served to raise factional tensions. At times, Yŏngjo refused to engage in the factional fight, and exposed the lie of factional politics. At other times, when it suited him, Yŏngjo reverted to quid pro quo politics. Many scholars believe it would have been easier had Yŏngjo supported the Noron and done what was expected of him.[48]

The aim, implementation and result of the Chŏngmihwan'guk

On the fifth day of the seventh month of 1727, Yŏngjo began a widespread transformation of the entire bureaucracy. As a result of continued gridlock, he dismissed over a hundred Noron and reinstated the Soron. Those Soron who had been deprived of office under the Noron administration were restored to office, and sixty exiled Soron were released. This was the Chŏngmihwan'guk, and while both Yŏngjo and Kyŏngjong had inherited administrations that were not entirely sympathetic towards them, this was the first time in this period that a king had willingly installed a faction that had previously campaigned against him.

The Chŏngmihwan'guk should be seen in terms of both short- and long-term aims. On one hand, it was a pragmatic move to make government work, since the Noron had refused to cooperate with the running of the government. In the short term the Chŏngmihwan'guk resolved political gridlock, and helped government function again.[49]

Yŏngjo was probably looking for more than just short-term political stability. One encounter between Yŏngjo and two Wanso, Cho Munmyŏng and Song Inmyŏng, just after the Chŏngmihwan'guk, gives some indication of Yŏngjo's longer-term aims:

> The councillor in the Board of Personnel, Cho Munmyŏng, said: "The key to the fate of the country depends completely on hiring people impartially, and having weighed things up, I wonder, amongst those Noron who have been thrown out, can there not be some men of talent? If we really want to promote impartiality, then we can't have a situation where only the Soron are employed."
>
> Song Inmyŏng said: "As for those sacked for their crimes, no matter how much we want to reemploy them, inevitably in the future some quarrels will break out and we'll be unable to suppress them. First of all, we should let a little time pass, and then it'll probably be more fitting to wait until after the situation in court has settled down, and then decide whether people are guilty of misdemeanours or not and talented or not, and it'll be proper to rehire them."
>
> The king said: 'What you said is right."[50]

The conversation with Yŏngjo gives an indication of the king's long-term aims from the Chŏngmihwan'guk. The comments of all three men appear to show the best way to ensure long-term stability was to hire men of merit from both factions in the future. This notion of a joint Noron-Soron administration has become a commonly accepted understanding of the overall aim of the T'angp'yŏng policy. The first step in creating such an administration was the reinstatement of moderate Soron like Song Inmyŏng and others who were antagonistic to factional politics and sympathetic to attempts to implement a T'angp'yŏng policy. Yŏngjo also needed a way to deal with the Noron. In the extract above, officials conceded that the Chŏngmihwan'guk was only a temporary exclusion of the Noron, and that this was not his long-term aim. His aim must have

been to break the Noron in, and make them more amenable to cooperation with the Soron. The pro-Yŏngjo Noron had refused to cooperate with Yŏngjo in the post-1725 period, so Yŏngjo had to prove he was serious about his policy of dampening down factionalism by teaching the Noron a lesson. Thus, the Chŏngmihwan'guk may have been a short-term means (a temporary exclusion of the Noron) to a long-term end (a joint Noron-Soron administration). With the Chŏngmihwan'guk, Yŏngjo may also have been making a clear sign to Soron who were less sympathetic to Yŏngjo and his T'angp'yŏng policy. Theoretically, Yŏngjo could not be accused of engaging in quid pro quo politics, of victimising the Soron, and backing the Noron because they had supported his claim to the throne. Hence, Yŏngjo probably also hoped to win the cooperation of the Soron, prevent attacks on his legitimacy, and stabilise his throne.

The extract above also points to some slight differences in the emphasis of the pre- and post-Chŏngmihwan'guk T'angp'yŏng policy. In the pre-Chŏngmihwan'guk period, the focus had been on occasional acts designed to deliberately frustrate the two factions by refusing to engage in the right/wrong binary logic of factionalism. After the Chŏngmihwan'guk, there was a more concrete goal of developing a joint administration, and there were also some hints about hiring people purely on the basis of talent, rather than factional affiliation. The implementation of the Chŏngmihwan'guk, then, should be understood in the context of an ongoing attempt by Yŏngjo to reduce factionalism. This was a rational attempt to make government function in both the short and long term, it was not the caprice of a king who changed administrations when he failed to get his own way.

Conclusion

There was no single political event that led to the Chŏngmihwan'guk, rather an extremely complex interaction of factors surrounding the succession of Yŏngjo and Kyŏngjong, including bitter feuding amongst factions, the legitimacy issues concerning Kyŏngjong and Yŏngjo, and the mysterious death of Kyŏngjong. There were patterns to factional behaviour established over the years. By a certain stage in the crisis, most factional policy was decided according to past grievances, so although Kyŏngjong was dead, and Yŏngjo was the only candidate for the throne, the factional blood shed in the name of the two crown princes would always have to be answered for. Yŏngjo inherited this extremely fragile and unstable situation, and initially he attempted to break with the quid pro quo aspect of factionalism through his T'angp'yŏng policy. But his implementation of the T'angp'yŏng policy was inconsistent. Yŏngjo sought compromise from factions when it suited him, and used traditional patterns of factional conflict to destroy his enemies. There appeared to be widespread mistrust over his policy, and frustrated expectations.

The Chŏngmihwan'guk was Yŏngjo's attempt to implement the T'angp'yŏng

policy (a joint Noron-Soron administration), his long-term plan for stability. However, there was an unintended consequence of his restoration of the Soron. One small group of rebels including Yi Sasŏng, Nam T'aejing and Pak P'ilhyŏn were restored to power in the Chŏngmihwan'guk. This group of future fifth-columnists went on to play significant roles in the Musillan rebellion. The effect of these six fifth-columnists on the rebellion is a subject for further study.

Glossary

Book of Documents 書經
Ch'oe Sukpin 崔淑嬪
Chang Hŭibin 張禧嬪
Cho T'aech'ae 趙泰采
Chŏng'yudokdae 丁酉獨對
Chŏngmihwan'guk 丁未換局
Chunso 峻少
Concubines 後宮
Kim Ch'angjip 金昌集
Kong 公
Kunja 君子
Ku Yangsu 歐陽脩
Mok Horyong 睦虎龍
Musillan 戊申亂
Nam T'aejing 南泰徵
Namin 南人
Noron 老論
Pak P'ilhyŏn 朴弼顯
Pi 非
Primary consorts 正妃
Queen Inhyŏn 仁顯王后
Sa 私
Si 是
Sŏ'in 西人
So'in 小人
Song Inmyŏng 宋寅明
Song Siyŏl 宋時烈
Soron 少論
T'angp'yŏng policy 蕩平策
Tong'in 東人
Wanso 緩少
Yi Imyŏng 李蓬命
Yi Kŏnmyŏng 李健命
Yi Kwangjwa 李光佐
Yi Sasŏng 李思晟
Yi Ŭiyŏn 李義淵
Yi Yimyŏng 李明誼
Yun Chŭng 尹拯
Yun Pongjo 尹鳳朝

Notes

1 Haboush 1988, 119.

2 Yi Ki-baik 1984, 208.

3 The Sŏ'in splintered into the Noron and Soron in 1683, with the Soron following Yun Chŭng and the Noron supporters following Song Siyŏl. According to Palais (1996), Yun Chŭng was irritated by the arrogance of Song Siyŏl (539–540). Both splinter groups continued to cooperate together as the Sŏ'in against the Namin until 1701.

4 Setton 1992, 55. See Setton (1992) for an in-depth analysis of the rites issue.

5 Palais 1976, 3.

6 This may have been due to the relative strength of the *yangban* which dominated the Chosŏn

bureaucracy. The *yangban* were not completely dependent on the crown for power, since they drew wealth from land ownership (Palais 1976, 5).

7 Palais 1976, 14.

8 Yim 1976, 30 & 32.

9 Palais 1984, 458.

10 Han'guk Yŏksayŏn'guhoe 2003, 65.

11 Palais 1991, 46.

12 Yim 1976, 121 & 143.

13 Yi Chaeho 1994, 188.

14 Yim 1976, 143.

15 Han'guk Yŏksayŏn'guhoe 1992,136.

16 Sŏng Nak'hun 1979, 165. Sŏng also claims late-Chosŏn factions borrowed this Confucian scholar/petty-minded official justification for their existence from Ku Yangsu in the Sung period (168–9).

17 Reischauer 1960, 437–9.

18 O Kap'gyun 1977, 65.

19 Lankov 1990, 51.

20 Lankov 1990, 63.

21 Haboush 1988, 123 & Lankov 1990, 63.

22 Palais 1976, 15.

23 Sŏng Nakhun 1979, 168. Sukchong deliberately cultivated tensions between the Noron and Soron over his successor (Yi Sŏngmu 2000, 119).

24 Haboush 1999, 63.

25 Hahm 1971, 90–5.

26 For example, concubines were forbidden to enter the royal pantheon (Haboush 1988, 54) or die in the palace compound (Haboush 1988, 58–9). Illegitimate sons were given different titles and also given different listings in the royal genealogy, and were one degree lower than legitimate sons (Hahm 1971, 92).

27 The great Ming code stated that kings should keep trying to produce a legitimate heir to the throne, and not make any illegitimate son the heir, before the primary wife had reached the age of fifty (Yi Yŏngch'un 1994, 243).

28 The Sŏ'in had definite interests in the queen that produced an heir. Queen Inhyŏn was allegedly from a Sŏ'in background, so presumably her heir would be backed by the Sŏ'in.

29 Palais 1996, 539–40.

30 Palais 1996, 539–40.

31 Haboush 1988, 31.

32 Yi Yŏngch'un 1994, 259.

33 Haboush 1988, 122.

34 Yi Sŏngmu 2000, 128.

35 Haboush 1988, 121–3.

36 Yi Chongbŏm 2003, 191 & 231.

37 Haboush 1988, 31.

38 Haboush 1988, 127.

39 Yi Chaeho 1994, 183.

40 For example, in the tenth month of 1727, Song Inmyŏng requested the publication of Pak Sech'ae's 1694 political writings urging the destruction of factions, and Song declared such ideas might be borrowed for the current T'angp'yŏng policy. *Yŏngjo sillok* 3/10/13 (year/month/day) (ŭlmi) volume 13: folio 34a–b, p.675.

41 One of Yŏngjo's officials talked about a T'angp'yŏng technique. *Yŏngjo sillok* 1/1/17 (pyŏngjin) 3:26b–30a, p.463–5. For convenience sake, I use the widely recognised term T'angp'yŏng policy.

42 Haboush 1988, 126.

43 *Yŏngjo sillok* 1/2/2 (kyŏng'o) 3:36a, p.469.

44 Haboush 1988, 126–7.

45 Yi Sŏngmu 2000, 144–148.

46 Haboush 1988, 124–7.

47 Chong 1983, 64. Other scholars claim there was an inherent inconsistency in the T'angp'yŏng policy that meant a coalition of Noron and Soron, while other factions like the Namin were ignored (Yi Chaeho 1994, 229).

48 Haboush 1988, 118–120 & 133–5.

49 Haboush 1988, 135.

50 *Yŏngjo sillok* 3/7/1 (ŭlmyo) 12: 3a, p.641.

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REBEL MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE MUSILLAN REBELLION OF 1728

Andrew David Jackson

Introduction

On the fifteenth day of the third month of 1728, rebels led by Yi Injwa seized Ch'ŏngju, marking the start of the Musillan rebellion (also known as Yi Injwa's rebellion). The rebels controlled areas of Ch'ungch'ŏng, Kyŏngsang and Kyŏnggi provinces for more than a week. However, after these serious losses, government forces rapidly annihilated the rebel threat.

The Musillan rebellion had its roots in the bitter Noron-Soron factional conflict that surrounded the rule and death of Kyŏngjong (r. 1720–24) and the succession of Yŏngjo (r. 1724–76).[1] Factional conflict led to frequent changes of bureaucracy, and after taking power, Yŏngjo replaced a Soron bureaucracy with the Noron, and then restored the Soron in 1727.[2] Plotting had begun prior to the restoration of the Soron, and this meant there was a fratricidal element to the rebellion, as hardline Soron rebels fought with moderate Soron officials, and a rebel fifth-column in office plotted to mobilise state resources against the crown. This combination of factors characterises the Musillan rebellion: the fratricidal element, the fifth-column, the combination of rapid rebel success and defeat, the armed rebellion in a period when rebellions were rare.

Most researchers have focussed on the 'why' of the Musillan rebellion: Why it occurred, why it failed, 'why' it is (un)important in late Chosŏn history. Scholars read in-built failure into the rebellion explaining that while elite rebels may have been motivated by grievances like political or regional discrimination, they were incompetent military amateurs, with an 'incoherent' strategy.[3] In addition, scholars claim their pro-Kyŏngjong ideology ignored the "needs of the *minjung*,"[4] thus, despite occurring during a period of economic change, structural change and famine, their rebellion was an "immature" stage in development.[5]

This analysis raises two questions about the Musillan rebellion. Firstly, the incompetence argument explains rebel annihilation on the battlefield, but how can we account for rebel successes? For example: rebels seized around fourteen towns including P'yŏngt'aek and Chinwi (both in Kyŏnggi province);[6] soon afterwards, magistrates from Ch'ŏng'an, Chinch'ŏn, Hoe'in (all in Ch'ungch'ŏng province) fled

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because of rebel intimidation.[7] Events like these continued until the end of the month. Secondly, assuming there was discrimination and structural change, why were Musillan-type rebellions not more frequent in this period? I believe the explanation for the modest rebel successes and the stand-alone character of the Musillan rebellion lies with the 'how' of the rebellion, or the organisational features (recruitment of elites to a rebel organisation, mobilisation of non-elites to a rebel army, military capacity and strategy of the rebel side). This paper discusses the results of my investigation into rebel military strategy based on an analysis of *sillok* records between the third and seventh months, focussing on rebel confessions, and official reports.[8]

Unfortunately, the researcher is faced firstly by rebel testimony that contains contradictory information about both the proposed military strategy and actual rebel movements; and secondly, by the difficulty of assessing rebel successes in a failed rebellion. To overcome these problems, I have relied on evidence of consistent strategic behaviour as well as explicitly stated strategy; and I have looked at how rebels attempted to implement the proposed strategy using existing resources, and how the rebels coped with contingency.

The rebel military plan and strategic principles

A cursory examination of the actual rebel movements appears to confirm the incompetence argument of many scholars. For example, *sillok* accounts indicate a shambolic movement of rebels away from the capital, a motley collection of rebel troops, little evidence of effective rebel military engagement, and an indiscriminate seizure of towns. Even the original plan failed at an early stage.

(A) The rebel plan

The plan proposed creating a diversion so that rebel fifth-columnist generals like Yi Sasŏng, the P'yŏng'an military Commander-in-chief, could attack the court. Rebels would create a 'disturbance' in a strategic location near the capital. Fifth-columnist generals would then mobilise their government troops in the name of the king to crush the disturbances, but in fact these troops would be diverted to the capital, join with regular rebel troops and seize control of the court.[9]

This rebel plan was scuppered because of betrayal prior to the takeover of Ch'ŏnjgu, and fifth-columnist generals were arrested.[10] Unaware of the betrayal, the remaining rebel leaders stuck to their side of the original plan, and adhered to several strategic principles that resulted in some territorial gains.

(B) Strategic Principles, 1: Head north to the capital

The shambolic route taken by rebel groups in four provinces—often in circles, or away from the capital, suggests there was neither rhyme nor reason to the rebel strategy. An analysis of the actual rebel movements shows the rebels adhered to a basic principle of heading north to seize the capital and challenge government power. The problem was that this principle was dependent upon rebels fulfilling two logistical requirements. Firstly, leaders had to organise a mass gathering of rebels from six different provinces.[11] Rebel leaders organised this in three stages, namely local mobilisations, provincial (regional) assembly, and a mass link-up at a strategic point.[12] For example, rebels mobilised all over Kyŏnggi province, then assembled around Yangsŏng[13] before seizing Ch'ŏngju on the fifteenth, where they waited for the arrival of rebels from Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces. Secondly, the rebels needed to seize a strategically positioned town, and felt Ch'ŏngju was appropriate for a link-up of all rebel troops.[14]

When it became apparent that the Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla rebels would never arrive, the remaining rebel armies reverted to their strategic principle, left Ch'ŏngju and headed north towards the capital, only to be defeated by government troops near Ansŏng and Chuksan (both in Kyŏnggi province) on the twenty-fourth.

2: Make government troops responsible for most fighting

From the very start the mobilisation plan was beset with problems. According to the plan, there were supposed to be several different types of soldier. There would be 'regular' rebel troops consisting of non-elites (offered short-term material and financial incentives for their participation), and slaves forced by their masters into the rebellion.[15] In addition, fifth-columnist generals would fool their own government troops into attacking the crown (mobilisation by duping). Rebels also planned to commandeer government troops from Ch'ŏngju (defectors). However, leaders struggled to mobilise a sufficient number of regular troops, and those they found were 'rabble-like.'[16] Rebel leaders also clashed over whose troops would form the vanguard of the rebellion, with Yi Sasŏng insisting his fifth-columnist-led army could win the rebellion, no matter the quantity and quality of regular troops.[17] Finally, with the betrayal of the fifth-columnists, the mobilisation by duping plan failed.[18]

Despite these problems, the remaining rebel leadership managed to mobilise a significant number of rebel troops thanks to large-scale defections of government troops in rebel-occupied territory. Evidence of this can be seen in the ten-fold increase in the number of rebel troops after the seizure of Ch'ŏngju.[19] After the takeover of Ch'ŏngju, rebel leaders actively sought the defection of government troops by sending out appeals to nearby settlements for military support, and by using threats and short-term incentives.[20] Thus, in response to a problematic situation, rebel generals found an effective and pragmatic way of mobilising troops.

3: Psychological warfare and trickery over military violence

Reports indicate that most seizures of government territory occurred with little or no violence. Rebels managed to challenge the government by waging a psychological warfare campaign that became the only truly effective weapon in the rebel armoury. From the outset, rebel leaders like Yi Yu'ik understood the importance of psychological warfare:

> If we spread words like this around then we should be able to spread suspicion in people's hearts, and the more we spread these words then the more everyone will think that this is natural. As for the achievement of this affair, it depends solely on people's hearts.[21]

The rebels spread rumours and written propaganda in the form of posters,[22] appeals and threatening letters to intimidate opponents, capture resources, create panic and spread sympathy for their side. Seditious posters implied Kyŏngjong had been murdered by an 'illegitimate' usurper, Yŏngjo. Rebel generals used appeals to intimidate government officials into surrendering their towns, troops, supplies and weapons, for example in Kŏch'ang and Chuksan.[23] Thus, government control often fell with little or no bloodshed, just intimidation, propaganda and rumour-mongering about rebel action.

In addition to their use of propaganda and intimidation, the rebels used trickery and subterfuge to make territorial and material gains. For example, the rebels infiltrated and seized Ch'ŏngju by disguising themselves as a funeral cortege. Rebels also forged or stole government documents to mobilise resources for their side. For example, rebel leader Chŏng Seyun made counterfeit edicts ordering Iksan, Yŏsan, Kobu, Pu'an (all north Chŏlla province) government troops to crush rebels, but in fact these troops would be mobilized for the rebels.[24] By deliberately pursuing a strategy of psychological warfare and trickery over violence, rebel leaders were using their best resources. Many rebel leaders were involved in isolated political factions, and would have been skilled in polemic, intimidation, and propaganda. Other leaders had inside contacts, and an inside knowledge of the workings of the military system that they could use to their advantage.

4: Maximise control of government resources

The random scattering of seized towns looks as if rebels were engaged in plunder for plunder's sake. In fact, the main aim in seizing towns far from the capital was neither for plunder, nor to set up an alternative rebel government: the purpose was to maximise control of government resources to prepare for an attack on the court. These were resources rebels had failed to mobilise in the pre-rebellion period.[25] Thus, appeals like the one sent to the Kŏch'ang magistrate were partly complaints about the state of the nation and partly appeals for support, troops, and supplies:

> This is an affair of the nation, magistrates of provincial villages should … give us the troops and horses and various weapons of your village, and then within the next few days we will rush north because of the national crisis.[26]

There was also a more pragmatic reason for the acquisition of government supplies. The rebels required more troops and arms to intimidate more government positions into surrender, and also more booty, grain and provisions to supply an expanded army whose continued loyalty depended partly on short-term incentive, and partly on a sense of association with the dominant side in the rebellion. This explains why the communal rebel feast is a constant feature of the rebellion.[27] Captured government booty bought the loyalty of some troops, and provided a display of material power—that by supplying meat and alcohol, the rebels were the true holders of power.

Conclusion

While many of the Musillan rebel strategic principles might seem common-sense and self-evident (the seizure of the capital and government resources, intimidation before confrontation), other tactics might seem incongruous to our notion of a rebellion (more feasting than collective violence; the mobilisation of troops who believed they were loyal to the king). Yet this unusual combination of common-sense principles and less conventional tactics characterises the actual strategy of the Musillan rebels. Followed by rebels in different regions, this was a strategy that resulted in unusual territorial losses for the eighteenth-century Chosŏn court.

Can these strategic principles and tactics explain the Musillan's stand-alone character, and both rebel success and military annihilation?

To answer these questions, we need to consider also the presence of fifth-columnist rebels in court. The rebel plan was only made possible by a political environment that restored the Soron to power and provided an opportunity the rebels could exploit, an opportunity perhaps never again offered on such a scale to other dissenters in the eighteenth century. The entire plan was dependent upon fifth-columnists mobilising state resources against the crown. The presence of rebel generals controlling powerful resources provided the 'potential' military strength that drove on the rebel plan, despite last minute doubts.

Fundamental flaws in this plan explain the military disasters of the rebels. Fifth-columnist generals were susceptible to betrayal, and despite rebel assumptions to the contrary, neither government nor regular rebel troops were easily duped by their rebel generals. Because of poor communications, the other rebel generals stuck to the doomed plan and used their common-sense application of general strategic principles, as well as their political skills and cunning, to achieve some limited successes in the Musillan rebellion.

Notes

1 Haboush 1988, 140.

2 Ibid., 135.

3 O Kap'gyun 1977, 88 & Cho Ch'anyong 2003, 59.

4 Kŏch'anggunsap'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe 1997, 578.

5 Yi Chongbŏm 2003, 287–9.

6 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/22 (year/month/day) (imshin) volume 16: folio 21b, p. 24.

7 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/26 (pyŏngja) 16: 31b–33a, p.29–30.

8 From the outbreak of the rebellion to the celebration of the suppression.

9 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/04/22 (imin)17: 26b–28a, pp. 47–48.

10 Used as an assurance to encourage the recruitment of elite rebels, the fifth-columnist generals were vulnerable to betrayal.

11 Mainly from Kyŏnggi, Kyŏngsang, Ch'ungch'ŏng and Chŏlla provinces.

12 For example, when Yi Injwa seized Ch'ŏngju, he sent out appeals notifying regional rebel leaders. *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/05/24 (kapsul) 18: 18a, p. 61. Some rebels confessed that other locations were originally chosen for a general link up, for example, Sosa. *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/05/13 (kyehye) 18: 12b, p. 58.

13 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/04/01 (shinsa)17:1b, p. 35.

14 Chang Hŭm claimed rebels would wait for the Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla province troops and then march on the capital. *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/17 (chŏngmyo) 16: 11b–12a p. 19.

15 Plus a gang of bandits called the Nongnimdang.

16 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/25 (ŭlhye) 16: 27b–29a, pp. 27–28.

17 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/04/11 (shinmyo) 17: 14b, p. 41.

18 The only example of mobilisation by duping—by Pak P'ilhyŏn in Chŏlla province—was an unqualified disaster, when government troops grew suspicious of the true intentions of Pak, and fled en masse.

19 Mainly government troop defections. Yi Chŏngbŏm 1997, 201. Ch'ŏngju government troops subsequently led rebels during engagements. *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/24 (musul) 16: 26b, p. 26.

20 For example rebel Min Wŏnbo used incentives and threats to mobilise government troops. *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/05/10 (kyŏngshin) 18:10b–11a, p.57.

21 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/04/29 (kiyu) 17: 34b–35b, pp. 51–52.

22 The posters probably implied Kyŏngjong had been murdered by an 'illegitimate' usurper, Yŏngjo. Haboush 1988, 136.

23 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/27 (chŏngch'uk) 16: 35a–36b p. 31. *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/27 (chŏngch'uk) 16: 37a, p. 32.

24 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/26 (pyŏngja) 16: 33a–b, p. 30.

25 Chŏng Seyun complained about fundraising. *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/04/13 (kyesa) 17:17a, p. 43.

26 *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/03/27 (chŏngch'uk) 16: 35a–36b, p. 31.

27 Like the feast organised by Cho Tŏkkyu in *Yŏngjo sillok* 04/04/12 (imjin) 17: 16a.

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Character Glossary

Ansŏng 安城
Ch'ŏng'an 淸安
Ch'ŏngju 淸州
Chinch'ŏn 鎭川
Chinwi 振威
Cho Tŏkkyu 趙德奎
Chŏng Seyun 鄭世胤
Chuksan 竹山
Chuksan 竹山
Hardline Soron 峻少
Hoe'in 懷仁
Iksan 益山
Kobu 古阜
Kŏch'ang 居昌
Kyŏngjong 景宗
Min Wŏnbo 閔元普
Moderate Soron 緩少
Musillan rebellion 戊申亂
Nongnimdang 綠林黨
Noron 老論
P'yŏng'an military Commander-in-chief 平安兵使
P'yŏngt'aek 平澤
Pak P'ilhyŏn 朴┌顯
Seditious posters 掛書
Pu'an 扶安
Soron 少論
Sosa 素沙
Yangsŏng 陽城
Yi Injwa's rebellion 李麟佐의亂
Yi Sasŏng 李思晟
Yi Yu'ik 李有翼
Yŏngjo sillok 英祖 實錄
Yŏngjo 英祖
Yŏsan 礪山

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BRITISH FLEET'S WITHDRAWAL FROM PORT HAMILTON (KŎMUNDO) AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE LI-LADYGENSKY JOINT AGREEMENT OF 1886

HYUNSOO KIM

I. Introduction

On 28 April 1884, Britain and Korea exchanged ratifications for the Second British-Korean Treaty of Amity and Commerce (the 'Parkes' treaty). With this treaty's ratification, Britain and Korea created an official diplomatic channel and wrote clearly the first page of British-Korean diplomatic history. However, the Port Hamilton affair (May 1885–Feb 1887), in which the British navy occupied a Korean island group known as Kŏmundo (Port Hamilton to the British) seemed to undermine the meaning of the Parkes treaty. Several events connected with the occupation indicate that the British-Korean diplomatic link created by the treaty was ignored. Firstly, the British government occupied Port Hamilton without contacting the Korean government.[1] Secondly, the British government discussed the future of Port Hamilton with neighbouring countries such as Russia and China, while excluding Korea, the sovereign power.[2] Finally, the British withdrawal from Port Hamilton followed on from the Li-Ladygensky Joint Agreement (L-L Agreement—sometimes known as the Tianjin Agreement) of 1886, which resulted from Sino-Russian negotiations without involving Korea. The British government did not even discuss the practical arrangements for the evacuation of the islands with the Korean government.[3]

If the above accounts are accurate, do existing studies about the Port Hamilton affair fully deal with their meaning? Firstly, there are several existing studies that focus on linking the occupation to the 'Great Game' of the nineteenth century. Seo Jung-suk's article insists that the affair is related to the Great Game.[4] Park Jun-kyu's article has clearer views about the Great Game. He mentions that Britain occupied Port Hamilton (PH) because of a secret agreement between Korea and Russia.[5] Ch'oe Mun-hyong's article has similar views. Ch'oe says that suspicions of a secret agreement between Korea and Russia persuaded the British government to occupy PH to prevent Russian expansion in Korea. He also argues that while the PH occupation may have stopped Russian expansion into Korea, it increased Chinese intervention in

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Korean domestic policies.[6] Kim Yung-chung has a different view in her thesis. She insists that the British government did not know the terms of the secret agreement between Korea and Russia until PH had been occupied.[7] Kim's view matches that of T. Dennett.[8] In addition, Kim Hyun-soo insists in his thesis on the importance of the Great Game in the PH affair, since he has a view that it had a great influence on British diplomacy in imperial times.[9]

Secondly, several studies deal with the focus on the British Empire's economic relations. No Kyae-hyun's article argues that the PH affair is a British strategic arrangement to obtain a colony in East Asia.[10] F. C. Jones, in his thesis, asserts that the PH occupation took place in order to protect British trade in China and Japan.[11] On the other hand, Kim Yung-chung said that the PH affair should be understood in relation to the Great Game, not to economics and trade. She adds that Britain's economic interest in Asia only related to India.[12]

Thirdly, Lee Yong-hee asserts that the Korean government tried to assert her sovereign power in relation to the PH affair.[13] This interpretation indicates that Korea becomes the core of the great powers' Eastern Asian diplomacy because of the PH Affair.

In addition, there is a study that focuses on the British interest in Kŏmundo itself. Katsmi's article tells that PH is already an area of interest to the British government before they decide to occupy the islands.[14] Some historical materials including Parkes's interest in 1876 form the background of Katsmi's assertion.[15] Lastly, Hoare introduces overall geographical, historical, and political views about Kŏmundo.[16]

In fact, while checking existing studies, I found that most articles tell about the occupation of PH, but I can find little about the withdrawal. Therefore, in this paper, I will deal with British foreign policy relating to the PH withdrawal, and in particular, with the L-L Agreement which was at the core of it.

II. Background of the L-L Agreement

By analysis of existing studies about the Port Hamilton Affair, it is clear that the Great Game is the background to both the occupation of and withdrawal from Port Hamilton. Therefore, understanding the Great Game is the first step in analyzing the withdrawal from Port Hamilton.

What was the cause of the Great Game? First of all, it should be understood both from the point of view of George Canning's ideas (Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, 1807–27) and Viscount Palmerston's activities (Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, 1830–51). Canning had 'non-interference' and 'neutrality' as the core ideas of his foreign policy. In the case of non-interference, he focused on 'isolation diplomacy', which meant that Britain would not have an alliance with any European power because he did not want to interfere in the movement for independence of

weak countries.[17] When other powers tried to block developments in the weak countries, however, Canning had a principle of trying to work for a balance between the powers and the weak countries. This was called 'neutrality'.[18] Therefore, in the case of neutrality, Canning's idea was developed in a dual concept which included both non-interference and interference.

What were Viscount Palmerston's diplomatic activities? In the first Reform Act (1832), which led to the reform of the House of Commons, the British middle classes got increased political power in parliament. After getting political power, the middle classes endeavoured to preserve and protect their position by expanding their economic power. Palmerston, Foreign Secretary in a Whig government, thought that the middle classes' political power could both maintain the liberty of Britain and give legitimacy to his party. Therefore, he set out some diplomatic principles that were concerned with trade because he understood that expanding economic power was closely related to trade activity. Firstly, he wanted a policy of free trade with all nations without being tied down with alliances. That was 'isolation policy'. Secondly, if a nation disturbed British trade activities, Palmerston would intervene in that country; this was his 'pan-intervention policy'. Thirdly, in order to protect sea routes for trade, he reinforced British naval power; this was the 'navy reinforcement policy'.[19]

On the other hand, Russia, which lay outside the nineteenth-century European revolutionary tradition, must also be examined in order to understand the causes of the Great Game. In order to prevent the spread of European revolutionary thinking to Russian society, the Russian Czars thought that their power could be strengthened by an active trade policy. For this, Russia needed to obtain ice-free ports in order to ensure all-year-round trade.[20] This was a major and continuous principle of Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century, when Russia sought ice-free ports in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean. Under the above-mentioned circumstances, Britain and Russia pursued their separate foreign policies in order to maintain the middle classes' power on the one hand, and Czarist power on the other. However, when regions in which they were interested in trade overlapped, they might find themselves struggling with each other.[21] That is the simple meaning of the Great Game.

In order to analyze the significance of the withdrawal from Port Hamilton, it is also necessary to understand how the occupation came about. On 1 March 1885, Russian forces seized Afghan territory south of the Oxus River around an oasis at Panjdeh. At the time, Afghan forces were encamped on the west bank of the Kushk River, with a Russian force on the east bank.[22] On 30 March, the Russians attacked the Afghan forces and drove them across the Pul-i-Khishti Bridge with a loss of some 40 men. Afghan troops were reported to have been 'wiped out to a man' in their trenches, with losses of up to 600.[23] The incident raised the possibility of a British-

Russian struggle within the sphere of the Great Game. Prime Minister Gladstone drew on public Russophobia (anti-Russian sentiment), which covered a wide spectrum of prejudices, dislikes or fears of Russia, Russians, and Russian culture. In a speech to parliament in early April, he said, that "In order to protect British India, we need to defend the Afghan border. For our prestige and faith, we should fight with Russia".[24] Russia also expressed her position through the journal *Russki Vedomosti*, which wrote about the Panjdeh incident that "It is impossible to keep peace with England. We should escalate the War".[25] Thus, rather than seeking a diplomatic compromise, both countries adopted a warlike and confrontational approach.

Before going to war, the Gladstone cabinet wanted a preliminary assessment of Russian expansion. In the Mediterranean area, Britain had the possibility of legal intervention against Russia because Russian expansion was limited by international agreements such as the London Straits Convention of 1841, the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and the Congress of Berlin of 1878. In the case of the Indian Ocean area, Britain could check Russian movement because of its sovereignty over India. But the Pacific area was different. While Britain had Hong Kong, this related to China, not Russia. If Russia expanded through Vladivostok, Britain did not have the possibility of a legal intervention against such a move because there was no relevant international law to prevent it and the Pacific area was a blind spot in British defence strategy. Therefore, Britain might need to make a reason for intervention in this area.

The British government thus developed the scenario that Russia was looking for an outpost via Vladivostok to expand her power to East Asia.[26] Then the Navy Committee suggested the possibility of PH occupation to the government because PH, 300 miles from Shanghai, 160 miles from Nagasaki, and 100 miles from Pusan, was the best strategic outpost linking British open ports in East Asia.[27] The government's response to this suggestion was positive and came from the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Northbrook, who said in a memorandum that "If Britain does not get it, Russia will get it".[28] Therefore, it is clear that the decision to occupy Port Hamilton was part of the proceedings of the Great Game.

On 10 May 1885, Port Hamilton was occupied by three ships of the Royal Navy on orders from the Admiralty.[29] At the time, China, Japan, and even the United States feared Russian expansion into East Asia because of the terms of 'a Secret Agreement between Korea and Russia' (한로밀약 韓露密約).[30] So, even though these countries complained that the British move was outside international law, they did not press the issue because they hoped to use Britain to control Russia, thus giving Britain tacit permission to continue.[31] In the circumstances, perhaps, Britain thought that the Port Hamilton occupation was a diplomatic victory because she had now prevented Russian expansion towards ice-free ports in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.

In order to understand the decision to withdraw from Port Hamilton, one must

examine the link between the withdrawal and developments in the Great Game. In September 1885, by terminating the Afghan crisis, the British government lost the basis for continuing the PH occupation. Now the British government was faced with the problem of how to control Russian movement in East Asia. First of all, Britain considered taking legal possession of PH, and made contact with the Korean government and raised the possibility of purchasing, renting, or leasing the territory, but without success.[32] By then, Britain was ready to withdraw from PH, and wanted to get the best strategic advantage from leaving the islands. That is the reason why Britain spent a year and five months from the settlement of the Panjdeh crisis of 1885 before withdrawing from PH.

In April 1886, Lord Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary, expressed to China the British wish for a reasonable PH withdrawal. Lord Rosebery said, 'If China gives a guarantee of no Russian movement toward Korea, Britain could withdraw from PH without hesitation.'[33] He also sought for arbitration by Li Hongzhang, the Viceroy of Zhili and Minister of Beiyang. This British approach was similar to that used at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, when Britain controlled Russian advance to the Mediterranean area using Bismarck's arbitration. Eventually, Viceroy Li accepted the British proposition, which fitted in with his policy of 'using barbarians to control barbarians (이이제이 以夷制夷)'. For example, Li had arbitrated the first British-Korean Amity & Commercial treaty of 1882 because he wanted to control Russian movement by using British power.[34] So, in case of PH, he believed that his arbitration could simultaneously solve both the problem of Russian expansion and that of the withdrawal of the British fleet. And he also thought that this would be an opportunity to keep Korea under Chinese influence.

After Viceroy Li accepted Britain's proposition, he firstly contacted the Russian minister to China, Count de Ladygensky, seeking the Russia government's agreement.[35] Having received a positive reply from the Russian government on 25 September 1886, he started negotiations with Russia to draw up an official document pledging 'no occupation'.[36] During the treaty negotiations, Li persuaded the Russian Government through Count de Ladygensky that the treaty could firstly achieve a complete British withdrawal from PH; secondly, would allow Russia to concentrate on East European problems such as the issue of Bulgarian independence[37]; and thirdly, would help to limit Japanese ambition. With Russia's accepting Li's persuasion, the L-L Agreement was completed on 6 October 1886.[38] On 31 October, Li then sought British withdrawal from PH.[39]

What did the British Government think of the L-L Agreement's position on withdrawal from PH? Was this a victory for British foreign policy in the Great Game? Was it the best way to avoid direct conflict with Russia in East Asia as part of the Great Game? The evidence is that the British Government seemed to accept L-L Agreement as a victory. On 24 November 1886 Britain announced a withdrawal from

PH to Korea's neighbouring countries, and it finally withdrew from the islands on 27 February 1887.

III. Evaluation of the L-L Agreement

1. Evaluation in the context of the Great Game

The British Prime Ministers who oversaw the PH withdrawal were Gladstone and Salisbury. In the case of Gladstone, he had considered the issue during his third period as Prime Minister (2 January-20 July 1886), because of the defusing of the Afghan crisis. In case of Salisbury, the withdrawal can be ascribed to him, since he began to discuss the question during his first premiership, and it was completed during his second (25 July 1886 -11 August 1892).

Temperley wrote that "Canning is the Statesman of Liberty, Palmerston is the Bagman of Liberty, and Gladstone is the Prophet of Liberty".[40] He meant that Gladstone followed a similar political line to Canning and Palmerston. But that Gladstone's foreign policy was slightly different from the others. His policy, which he called 'Moral policy', was based on 'Six Right Principles of Foreign Policy.'[41] After his first premiership (1868–1874), he pursued his own style. Firstly, Gladstone thought that Palmerston's intervention policy was very costly.[42] So, during his first premiership, he tried a policy of reducing army expenditure. But the policy failed because of Bismarck's appearance in the European political sphere. Secondly, Gladstone agonised over the decision to launch military operations during the Sudan Rebellion of 1885 because he thought that the Sudanese had rational reasons for their behaviour; but while he hesitated, General Gordon was murdered by Sudanese rioters, and this caused him serious political damage.[43] In these circumstances, it is understandable that he saw the beginning of the Afghan crisis of 1885 as a means of undoing some of the political damage he had suffered. Thus he followed Palmerston's intervention policy instead of his own.[44]

On the other hand, during his third premiership (February 1886-July1886), when he faced the issue of withdrawal from PH, he had no wish to maintain an interventionist policy because the Afghan crisis was settled in September 1885. Gladstone also wanted to concentrate on the Irish Home Rule bill. Therefore, he wanted a simple solution to the PH Affair without becoming entangled in the complications of the Great Game. It meant that for Gladstone, the L-L Agreement was not central to his policy.

What was Salisbury's diplomatic policy? His basic principle was to look at the 'realities behind diplomacy'.[45] In 1878, he had the leading role at the Congress of Berlin as Foreign Secretary. In 1887, he again had the leading role of in the Mediterranean Agreement as Prime Minister. Salisbury concentrated on controlling

Russian expansion through the use of international law. This was Salisbury's practical diplomacy. It means that he tried to keep Britain as a central player in constraining Russia by diplomatic intervention.

Of course, Salisbury's foreign policy, in the case of the L-L Agreement, was connected to the Great Game because it sought control of Russian expansion in East Asia. However, in the case of the L-L Agreement, there was no attempt to put Britain in a central position. The third clause of the L-L Agreement, which states that 'Russia and China pledge themselves to discuss any part of Korea's political circumstances together', is evidence that Britain was not central to the agreement. Does the L-L Agreement differ from the other cases where his principles prevailed? Salisbury considered that the protection of the Indian trade route was the main focus of British foreign policy to Asia.[46] And he also thought that keeping a good relationship between China and Britain meant protection for East Asian trade routes.[47] It meant that any political problems in Asia except India and China were of minor concern to him. So, in the case of the L-L Agreement, he thought that it would help in maintaining a good relationship with China, and would also help in controlling any form of Russian expansion, which fitted in with his own practical approach. Therefore, for Salisbury too, the L-L Agreement was not a central concern.

What is the final estimation of the PH withdrawal as it related to the Great Game? From the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894, China's diplomatic role in East Asia was weakened, while Russia pursued a strong policy with plans for Siberia railroad construction.[48] At the time, Britain could not directly oppose Russian expansion in East Asia. This was because Gladstone and Salisbury had not seen the crucial importance of the L-L Agreement to British interests and therefore Britain did not have a well thought out position for controlling East Asian Affairs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the effect of the L-L Agreement was not positive for Britain's role in the Great Game.

2. Evaluation in relation to British Foreign Policy in East Asia

The L-L Agreement indicates differences in British foreign policy in East Asia and in the Great Game. When assessing British Foreign Policy towards East Asia, it is necessary to examine Sir Harry S. Parkes' diplomatic activities since he served as a representative diplomat in East Asia for over 30 years.[49] When analyzing Parkes' approach to foreign policy, some principles are evident: firstly, he sought to increase economic profits for Britain; secondly, in order to eliminate intervention by surrounding countries in a country in which Britain had interests, he would try to conclude a clear treaty with that country; and thirdly, in order that Britain might have a basis for its own intervention to a country of direct interest, he would also try to conclude a clear treaty. Thus it can be concluded that Parkes' diplomatic principles

are very similar to those of Palmerston. This is not surprising since the origin of Parkes' principles came from meeting with Palmerston in London in 1849, and Parkes thereafter regarded Palmerston as his mentor.[50]

How did these principles operate in East Asian countries? In the first place, how did his principles emerge in China? In the 1850s, Ye Mingchen, Guangzhou commissioner of China, tried to stop foreigners' residence in Guangzhou, breaching the 1842 Nanjing Treaty. In October 1856, Ye sparked off the '*Arrow* incident'. The *Arrow* was a Chinese-owned ship (a lorcha) that had been registered in Hong Kong, which placed it under British protection. During the incident, Chinese subjects on the *Arrow* were arrested and imprisoned, and Chinese soldiers insulted the British flag that *Arrow* had been flying.[51] Parkes, British consul in Guangzhou, complained at the connivance of the Chinese Government in this breach of the Nanjing Treaty, and insisted that Britain needed a mission and should establish a British legation in Beijing to prevent such breaches (principle 1).[52] When faced with the *Arrow* incident, he thought that it was an opportunity to remedy the defects of the Nanjing Treaty (principles 2, 3). The British Government therefore tried to revise the Nanjing Treaty on the basis of the *Arrow* incident. But because of tepid attitude of the Chinese Government, the British Government entered the second Opium war.[53] Parkes was an avid supporter of the war, especially when he experienced a period of imprisonment by the Chinese. The 1860 Treaty of Beijing, which brought the war to a conclusion, became the basic framework of Western foreign policy towards East Asian countries.[54] Under its terms, Parkes achieved his hope of establishing a British legation in Beijing to prevent treaty breaches (principle 1), having used the *Arrow* incident as the opportunity to revise the Nanjing Treaty (principles 2, 3).

Next, how did he apply his principles to Japan? Firstly, after being appointed the British minister to Japan in 1865, he concluded the treaty of 1866 (개세약서 改稅約書) in order to amend the Ansei Five-Power Treaties of 1858. At the time, Parkes played the role of overall representative of the Great Powers. During the period of negotiation, he did remarkable diplomatic work, presenting a united front of western diplomats negotiating with the Japanese Government for revision of the Ansei Treaty, using 'gunboat diplomacy' for negotiation, and persuading hitherto anti-foreign Daimyo to abandon resistance to Western Powers.[55] In this, he followed principles 2 and 3 of his foreign policy. Secondly, when the Iwakura mission visited the United Kingdom on its diplomatic and investigative tour in 1872, he was their escort, and encouraged them in their commercial observation of the whole country. Why did he escort the Iwakura mission? He believed that if the Japanese copied British industry, this would lead to active trade exchanges between Britain and Japan. Then, he also thought that this would help expand British influence in Japan because of converging economic interests: this was linked to principle 1 of his foreign policy.[56]

Lastly, how did he manage his diplomatic ideas with regard to Korea? The first

British-Korean Treaty of Amity and Commerce of May 1882 (the Willis Treaty) was regarded as imperfect by the British government and never ratified. Under Parkes' leadership, this treaty was replaced by the November 1883 British-Korean Treaty (the Parkes Treaty), which was ratified in 1884. In this treaty, Parkes obtained a profitable tariff for Britain (principle 1). He also created an independent relationship between Korea and Britain without China's assistance (principles 2 and 3), because while the Korean government hoped to be recognized internationally as a sovereign power, Parkes expected to increase British influence and to reduce interference from other powers surrounding Korea.[57]

How far did the PH affair occupation relate to Parkes' principles? Despite the Parkes Treaty, with its promise of amity, the PH affair, with the direct occupation of the islands, was more like a hostile act. The British Government did not abide by Parkes' principles. On the contrary, the Korean Government tried to keep to them when Kim Yun-sik, the Foreign Secretary, demanded British withdrawal under the terms of article 8 of the Treaty, which referred to the control of British ships within Korean ports.[58] However, Britain herself seemed to realize that she had broken the principle. The British government first sought for an understanding of the occupation as a response to fear of possible conflict.[59] Then, Britain offered to purchase or rent the islands from the Korean Government.[60] Thus, diplomatic principles did not entirely collapse during the occupation of PH.

What then was the relationship between the withdrawal from PH and Parkes' principles? Once the Afghan crisis had passed, the PH Affair remained as a diplomatic problem only between Korea and Britain. But in diplomatic terms, Britain excluded Korea from the PH Affair. She was only concerned with the question of Russian expansion into East Asia, and tried to solve the problem of PH withdrawal with China through the L-L Agreement. Furthermore, when Britain decided to withdraw from PH after the L-L Agreement, she carried out the withdrawal without reference to the Korean government.[61] Now, it is clear that the exclusion of the Korean government from the issue of the PH withdrawal was a major issue in international law. As it was, the Parkes treaty was completely ignored, and Korea and Britain abandoned Parkes' diplomatic principles.

Why did this happen? One reason was the death of Parkes on 22 March 1885.[62] He was no longer there to insist on his diplomatic principles during the PH Affair. Instead of being able to consult Parkes, the British government used the Griffis' book *Corea: the Hermit Nation* for information of Korea in June 1885.[63] In Asia, British foreign policy had two strands. One was an economic policy, to benefit from oversea markets, the other the strategic policy of protecting its trade routes from Russian expansion in the Great Game. After Parkes' death, no British diplomatic agents in the East Asia followed his diplomatic way. Why? The British government pursued its diplomatic policy in a strategic manner. This is second reason why Parkes treaty' was

ignored. In a confidential letter to the Korean government, Nicholas O'Conor, British chargé d'affaires in Beijing, expressed his displeasure at its assertion that the PH occupation contravened international law as set out in article 1 of the Parkes Treaty.[64] This indicates that O'Conor did not understand Parkes' economic concept at all.

What is the final estimation of PH withdrawal in relation to the British foreign policy towards East Asia? The L-L Agreement cannot be judged positive because it led to the resumption of Li Hongzhang's intervention in Korea affairs. When concluding the 1883 British-Korean Treaty, Parkes had tried to limit Li's role in East Asian diplomacy. But during the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War, Li seriously interfered in Korean domestic and external politics against the Japanese advance. If Britain had maintained its 1883 treaty, it could have intervened during the war in order to preserve British interests in Korea. But Britain actually played no role.

Moreover, it became clear in the Sino-Japanese War that because of the disappearance of the Parkes Treaty and the acceptance of the L-L Agreement, Korea seemed not to be a sovereign nation. On 1 June 1894, the Tonghak (anti-Western group) Rebel Army moved towards Seoul. The Korean government requested Chinese government support to suppress the rebellion. On 6 June 1894, under the terms of the April 1885 Convention of Tianjin (Tientsin), the Chinese government informed the Japanese government of its military operation. About 2,465 Chinese soldiers were transported to Korea within days. Then, on 8 June 1894, the first of around 4,000 Japanese soldiers and 500 marines landed at Jemulpo (Incheon), despite Korean and Chinese protests. Additional Japanese troops arrived in Korea on 22 June 1894. Japan thus broke the Convention of Tianjin. On 23 July 1894, Japanese troops entered Seoul, seized the Korean King and established a new pro-Japanese government, which terminated all Sino-Korean treaties and granted the Imperial Japanese Army the right to expel the Chinese Beiyang Army troops from Korea.[65] These actions proved that Korea was not a sovereign nation, a direct consequence of the conclusion of the L-L Agreement.

IV. Conclusion

The research focus of this paper is the evaluation of the L-L Agreement in the context of the Great Game (i.e. Anglo-Russian rivalry) and British foreign policy to East Asia. In the case of the former, the L-L Agreement is positively evaluated because the British government succeeded in interrupting Russian expansion toward East Asia without direct conflict. And in the latter, the L-L Agreement can also be evaluated positively because it gave Britain a good reason for withdrawing from Port Hamilton. However, this paper tries to look at the issues from a different perspective.

Two negative aspects of the L-L Agreement have been identified: firstly, it failed to control Russian expansion in East Asia. By the L-L Agreement, China alone

undertook the task of stopping Russian expansion toward East Asia. After the first Sino-Japanese War, however, China's diplomatic role in East Asia was weakened. By then no country, not even Britain, could control the Russian drive towards East Asia as represented by the planning for Siberia railroad construction. To stop this kind of Russian expansion, Britain arranged the 1902 Alliance with Japan, the victor in the Sino-Japanese War. This shows that Britain, as a result of the L-L Agreement, could not become the victor in the Great Game in East Asia.

The second negative evaluation of the Agreement relates to British foreign policy towards East Asia. Through the conclusion of the 1883 treaty, Sir Harry Parkes prevented Li Hongzhang from intervening in Korea. But the effect of Parkes' treaty was overturned by the L-L Agreement because Li resumed his intervention in Korea. And, by accepting the L-L Agreement, Britain herself gave up recognition of Korean sovereignty. Therefore, the major principles of British foreign policy in East Asia which were formed by Parkes were thrown into confusion, as was shown during Sino-Japanese War. Following this British example, China and Japan did not treat Korea as a sovereign nation during the process of the war. Moreover, if Britain had kept to the principles behind Parkes' treaty, she could have arbitrated between China and Japan in order to preserve British interests in Korea, and war might have been avoided. Consequently, it is safe to say that Britain's abandonment of the recognition of Korean sovereignty led to the outbreak of the war.

In conclusion, the British government may have thought that withdrawal from Port Hamilton was a tiny incident because the Port Hamilton occupation itself was a side issue of the Great Game. However, this paper argues that the issue of withdrawal from Port Hamilton and especially the way withdrawal was brought about through the L-L Agreement offers important evidence for the understanding of main British foreign policy of the nineteenth century.

Notes

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17 H. W. V. Temperley, *Life of Canning* (London: James Pinch & Co, 1905), p. 270.

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20 Cyrus C. Adams, 'Russia's Ice-free Port', *The New York Times*, 27 February, 1916.

21 See C. V. Doren, *The Life of Thomas Love Peacock* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1911), pp. 214, 214–6, 218–21; 'Negotiations with the Russian Government for the Demarcation of the Boundary of Afghanistan since the annexation of Merv' (Doc. 10), *British Documents on Foreign Affairs; Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, ed. D Gillard, vol.12 (University Publications of America, 1985), p. 12.

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23 Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, House of Commons, 9 April 1885, pp. 863–5; see also R. L. Greaves, *Persia and the Defence of India, 1884–92* (London, 1959), p.72.

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25 Memorandum by Michell on the opinions of the Russia press, 22 April 1885, Doc. 50; *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, vol. 12, pp. 176–77.

26 The Secretary to the Admiralty to Currie, F. O. 405/35, No. 2; see also 'Russia's"Ice-Free Port"', *The New York Times*, 14 November 1903.

27 Extract from Report of Royal Commission on Defence of British Possessions, 20 May 1885, F. O. 405/35, Enclosure, and No. 29.

28 Memorandum by Northbrook, 20 May, 1885, F. O. 405/35, No. 29.

29 Captain Maclear to Dowell, 11 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 2 in No. 68.

30 *The first trial:* (1) Some members of the Korean Mission made contact with the governor-general of Vladivostok (1884.12)—it failed. (2) Möllendorf asked the Russian minister in Japan to dispatch training instructor (1885.2)—it failed. (Result) Möllendorf, who had been recommended by Li Hongzhang, resigned his position as Officer of Korean Customs. *The second trial:* Karl Ivanovich Weber, Russian acting minister who served in Korea, contacted the Korean king, suggesting that Russia should protect Korea (1885.11)—but his proposal failed because of Chinese government intervention. The result was that Chinese intervention in Korean domestic policies was strengthened.

31 Kyung-chang Kim, *Donyang oegyosa* (Seoul: Jipmundang, 1995), pp. 358–9.

32 The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. O'Conor, no. 32; *ibid*. p. 9.

33 F.O. 405/36, Memorandum of proposed Answer to the Communication made by Sir H. Macartney on the 11th March with regard to Port Hamilton, Enclosure in no. 23; see F.O. 405/36, Sir P. Currie to Sir H. Macartney, no. 23, and April 14, 1886; see also F.O. 405/36, the Earl of Rosebery to Mr. O'Conor, no. 26, and 30 April, 1886.

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35 F.O. 405/36, Sir J Walsham to the Earl of Iddesleigh, no. 91, 6 October, 1886.

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39 F.O. 405/36, The Tsung-li Yamen to Sir J. Walsham, no. 134, 31 October, 1886.

40 Temperley, *Life of Canning*, p. 276.

41 The 'Six Right Principles of Foreign Policy' were (1) To foster the strength of the Empire by just legislation and economy at home and to reserve the use of strength for great and worthy occasions abroad; (2) To defend the cause of peace; (3) To strive to cultivate and maintain the Concert for Europe; (4) To avoid needless and entangling engagements (with the emphasis on selective intervention); (5) To acknowledge the equal rights of all nations; and (6) To ensure that the foreign policy of England should be inspired always by the love of Freedom.

42 Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston* (London: Constable, 1970), p. 563.

43 Edmond George Petty Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville, K.G., 1815–1891*, vol. 2, (London: Longman, 1905), pp. 379–406.

44 Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville*, vol. 2, pp. 407–53.

45 Lord Blake and Hugh Cecil, eds, *Salisbury: The Man and his Policies* (London: Macmillan, 1987), vii, pp. 148–84.

46 Keith M Wilson, ed, *British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy* (London: Crook Helm, 1987), pp. 119–37.

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Chinese loans from England (1881–1885)

Year	Cost	Interest Rate
1881	£1,096,000	8%
1883	£500,000	9%
1884(1)	£285,000	9%
1884(2)	£1,500,000	10%
1885(1)	£500,000	10%
1885(2)	£250,000	10%
1885(3)	£750,000	9%
1885(4)	Tls 4,000,000 (£1,088,500)	9%

48 See Mun-hyong Ch'oe, *Han'guk ul dulesan Chegukchuui yolgang ui gakchuk* (Seoul: Jisiksanupsa, 2001).

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52 Lane-Poole, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes,* vol. I, p. 259.

53 Bonner-Smith & Lumby, 'The Second China War', p. 390.

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57 Hyun-soo Kim, 'A Study of the Anglo-Korean Treaty by Reviewing Sir H. Parkes's Documents', *Yŏngkuk Yŏnku*, No, 11, (the Korean Society for British History, 2004), pp. 63–88.

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59 *Gu-hankuk oegyo munseo* vol. 13 (Youngan vol. 1), no. 248, pp. 147–48.

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62 'Death of Sir Harry Parkes', *The Times*, 23 March, 1885.

63 William Elliot Griffis, *Corea: the Hermit Nation* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882); see also Yong-bok Shin, *Unja ui Nara* (Jipmundang, 1999) pp. 445–563.

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PYEONGAN PROVINCE AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SOCIETY

MICHAEL D. SHIN

> Since Taejo [Yi Seonggye, the founder of Joseon] took over the kingship from the Wang family by military force, there were many valiant commanders from the northwest among the retainers who aided him. However, after he established his government, he ordered that people from the northwest not be appointed to high positions.
>
> During the next 300 years, no one from Pyeongan or Hamgyeong province had a high post…
>
> The *sadaebu* of Seoul did not associate with or marry people from the northwest. People from the northwest did not dare to think about associating with *sadaebu* from Seoul.
>
> As a result, *sadaebu* ultimately disappeared from the two northwest provinces…. The two northwestern provinces of Hamgyeong and Pyeongan are not fit to live.
>
> Yi Junghwan (1751)[1]

> The strength [of Christianity] is significant to the point that it makes people wonder whether or not Confucian Joseon will become in the future a Christian Joseon just as a Buddhist Joseon had once become a Confucian Joseon.
>
> Yi Gwangsu (1918)[2]

The northwest region was a vanguard of modernity in Korea. Though containing less than twenty per cent of the country's population, Pyeongan province produced a disproportionately high number of leaders, intellectuals, and artists during the twentieth century. They included: the writer Yi Gwangsu; activists such as An Changho; Jang Myeon, premier of the Second Republic; ROK generals Baek Seonyeop and Baek Inyeop; businessman Bak Heungsik (founder of Hwasin Department Store); educators such as Baek Nakjun (L. George Paik, president of Yonsei University and Minister of Education in the Syngman Rhee administration); poet Gim Soweol; soprano Yun Simdeok; religious figures ranging from Ham Seokheon to Mun Seonmyeong (Sun Myung Moon), founder of the Unification Church; and marathon runner Son Gijeong, gold medalist in the 1936 Berlin Olympics.[3] They formed one of the two major regional power groups in Korea during the early twentieth century, the other being from Jeolla province.

The emergence of these figures in Pyeongan province was the result of a conjuncture of factors. During the Joseon period (1392–1910), the province was politically

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marginalized with few of its residents gaining high official posts in the capital. The influence of Neo-Confucianism was weaker in the northwest, and in contrast to its low level of agriculture, commerce which was not valued highly in Confucianism was relatively developed as its merchants reached markets throughout the country and engaged in international trade. In the late nineteenth century, with the onset of imperialism, it began to adopt Western ideas, particularly Protestant Christianity, much earlier and faster than other regions of the country. The region also rapidly adopted and promoted Western-style education, producing modern individuals who became a new elite. The main objective of this article is to examine the how these three factors — commercial capital, Christianity, and modern education — contributed to transform Pyeongan province from a marginalized, backward region into a leading force in the transition to modernity. The growth of churches and schools created a new network of institutions between the family and the state that were strongly united under a single ideology. They were rooted in a modernizing economic sector that was more market-oriented and moving toward factory production. In short, developments in the province can be interpreted as the beginnings of civil society.[4]

Commerce

The northwest provinces occupied a unique place within the political economy of Joseon. At the founding of Joseon in 1392, parts of the northwest were not part of its territory. They were not completely reclaimed until 1450 during the reign of King Sejong.[5] Perhaps because of its proximity to a contested border, the northwest was politically marginalized during the Joseon period. As mentioned in the quote from Yi Junghwan's *Taengniji* that opens this chapter, northwest residents who passed the civil service examination were discriminated against in appointment to official positions, unable to gain high posts.[6] The economy of the region was also backward since wet-field rice cultivation was not widely adopted, leaving agriculture relatively underdeveloped. It is not surprising that Yi Junghwan considered the northwest to be unlivable in, but even as he was writing his text in the eighteenth century, changes were well underway that would fundamentally transform the region.

The rise of markets beginning in the seventeenth century began to transform Joseon's agriculture-based economy.[7] Confucian thought looked down upon commerce, regarding agriculture and scholarship as far more noble pursuits. In accordance with this belief system, the government of Joseon attempted to restrict commerce through a system of official merchants who were given monopolies over specific goods. From the seventeenth century, however, marketplaces began to appear throughout the country. One common form was the so-called "five-day market" where itinerant merchants gathered in a location every five days. As more farms organized their production for the market, a new class of private merchants emerged while government monopoly

merchants declined. Some amassed tremendous amounts of wealth as their operations extended beyond regional markets and engaged in international trade.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Pyeongan province became one of the main commercial centres of the country. Two factors made conditions in the northwest particularly favourable for commercial development. First, development of gold and silver mines began in the northwest in the same century, and production grew tremendously in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, providing both tribute to China and capital for commercial ventures. Second, Qing China, just as Ming China had, required tribute missions from Joseon to travel by an overland route, rather than by a sea route. Merchants from the northwest who accompanied the tribute missions were able to play a central role in foreign trade and thus accumulate great sums of wealth.[8] Many of the powerful private merchants who emerged in this period were from Pyeongan province. *Taengniji* noted that Pyeongyang and Anju (the provincial capitals of south and north Pyeongan province, respectively) had the largest number of rich merchants after Seoul and Gaeseong. In Pyongyang, over forty kinds of stores became established, selling goods ranging from daily necessities to paper, cotton, silk, and metal goods and performing services such as dyeing.[9] Some merchants were involved in commercial agriculture, selling products such as tobacco.[10] Merchants in the province reached markets throughout the country and handled goods from both Qing China and Japan.

The growth of commerce stimulated the beginnings of industry in Pyeongan province as handicraft industries began to emerge in the eighteenth century. As in other countries, they produced goods that utilized resources that were nearby and plentiful. One of the main industries to emerge in the province was brassware. As the use of metallic currency increased in the eighteenth century, some merchants involved in the bronze trade began to expand into making brassware. By the nineteenth century, artisan towns specializing in brassware emerged in regions such as Napchongjeong in Jeongju, as well as in Gaeseong. Similar developments occurred in other towns of the province. By the early nineteenth century, Anju became the centre of the ironware industry, and the silk industry thrived in Yeongbyeon and Seoncheon as well as in Anju.[11] These towns seem to have had concentrations of relatively large-scale household industries where itinerant merchants (*pobusang*) picked up their wares and brought them to the periodic markets. Opportunities for growth and expansion continued past the middle of the century as a primitive factory system developed based on specialization and division of labor.[12]

Commercial development also stimulated urbanization in Pyeongan province. Pyongyang became the second largest city in the country; by the end of the eighteenth century, it had a population of slightly over 100,000. By comparison, the population of Seoul was 189,000, and the population of Jeonju (Jeolla province) was 72,500 in the same period. Seoul grew to 250,000 to 300,000 people in 1910, and estimates for the

total population of the country in that year range from 13 to 17.4 million.[13] Pyeongan province as a whole was also more urbanized than other regions of the country. It had the most towns with a population of over 5,000, a total of thirteen.[14] Of cities with a population greater than 2.500, Pyeongan province contained thirty-one out of 137 towns, exceeding both Gyeongsang (thirty towns) and Jeolla (twenty) provinces.[15] Even small towns in Pyeongan province were active as commercial centres in the late Joseon period. For instance, the town of Jindu in the county of Bakcheon (north Pyeongan province) had a population of only 2,500 to 3,000, but it was located at a key distribution point for commercial goods. Not only was it close to larger towns, but the ferry for the Daejeong River was also located there, and it had two post-horse stations. It grew significantly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with active markets whose merchants operated throughout the province.[16]

In short, what emerged in Pyeongan province in the late Joseon period was a social space that was significantly different from the more fully Neo-Confucianized areas in the central and southern regions of the country. Social relations were more mediated by markets than in other regions of the country. In a book published in 1929, Baek Nakjun, who, like Yi Gwangsu, was from Jeongju in north Pyeongan province, summarized the characteristics of the province as follows:

> The people in northern Korea are more aggressive and energetic than those of the south. They have been hard workers, fighting against the mountainous environment in which they till the ground. Not many of the northerners held high offices in the government, but were rather subject to the oppression and extortion of the officials sent from Seoul. Their social customs were also somewhat different from those of the capital. There were no strict class distinctions, as in Seoul and the southern provinces, neither was there rigid separation of the sexes—a custom resulting from the literal interpretation of one of the five relations of the Confucian teachings. Religiously, the people largely professed Confucianism, but it had no such hold on them as it had in southern Korea.[17]

There were signs that the communities in the province were becoming politicized, growing dissatisfied with the existing order to the point of seeking its overthrow. For instance, the *Jeonggamnok*, a famous book of prophecy that predicted the fall of Joseon, appeared in the northwest in the eighteenth century, and it was spread throughout the country by fortunetellers from Pyeongan province.[18] Furthermore, the first major peasant rebellion of the nineteenth century broke out in Pyeongan province in 1811, the Hong Gyeongnae Rebellion. Though merchants were not leaders of the rebellion, they were involved in the preparations, including some large merchants. Not surprisingly, the rebellion occurred in areas where commerce was developed. For instance, a peasant army was stationed in the town of Jindu, and one of the major battles was the siege of Jeongju. However, the failure of the rebellion demonstrated that the merchant communities in the province had not yet developed into a political force.[19]

Foreign imperialism abruptly forced Joseon to confront the capitalist world system in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Joseon's first modern treaty was the Treaty of Ganghwa, which it signed with Japan in 1876. The treaty stipulated that the three ports of Incheon, Busan, and Wonsan would be open to foreign commerce. In 1897, Gojong issued a royal decree opening the ports of Mokpo in Jeolla province and Jinnampo in Pyeongan province. Two years later, in 1899, the city of Pyongyang was opened to foreign merchants.[20] The opening to foreign commerce further transformed the political economy of Pyeongan province. Competition from foreign merchants and businesses had a devastating effect on many native merchants and handicraft industries. However, the province was one of the few regions of the country in a position to take advantage of changing economic conditions to transform into a major industrial centre. By the mid 1920s, Pyongyang became the only industrial city in Joseon,[21] and although Japanese controlled most of industry, some Joseon merchants were able to transform themselves into capitalists.

One example of a merchant who was able to prosper despite the turbulence of this period was Yi Seunghun (1864–1930), who later became one of the leaders of the Sinminhoe and a key organizer of the March First Movement. Born into a poor commoner family, he was orphaned at an early age, like Yi Gwangsu, and became an errand boy (*sahwan*) in the house of one of the largest brassware merchants in Napcheongjeong. Since the owner conducted transactions from his house, Yi Seunghun learned about the business, and he also roomed with the itinerant merchants who came to pick up their wares. From 1879, he began working as an itinerant merchant himself, going to markets in both Pyeongan and Hwanghae provinces. Combining his savings with a loan from O Chieun, a local money lender from Seoncheon, he opened his own store and factory in 1887 and was successful enough that he later opened a branch in Pyongyang. Though his business was destroyed during the Sino-Japanese War, he quickly built it up again with an additional branch in Jinnampo. By the turn of the century, he started to expand into other businesses. He formed a trading company in Pyongyang in 1901, engaged in currency speculation, and started a cargo transport business in Seoul, seeking to move into foreign trade.[22] Yi Seunghun's success, despite the fact that he was a commoner and an orphan without family connections, demonstrates that until the opening of Pyeongan province, economic conditions were still conducive to the growth of native merchants.

At the turn of the century, however, Japanese merchants quickly achieved a dominant position in Pyeongan province commerce. Before the port opening, Japanese merchants based in Incheon would establish branches in Jinnampo or Pyongyang and operated through Joseon middlemen. After 1897, Japanese gradually moved their operations to Pyongyang, obviating the need for middlemen, and they generally opened trading companies or operated medicine, earthenware, and general merchandise stores.[23] Japanese merchants opened Western-style stores that were

open for business everyday, unlike Joseon merchant houses that still mainly relied on itinerant merchants and five-day markets. In 1902, there were 547 Japanese among the 639 foreigners residing in Jinnampo (89%), and by 1906, the number of Japanese grew to around 4,000.[24] Another important factor in the growth of Japanese merchants was the construction of the Seoul-Uiju railway (1902–1905?). Though the concession for the Seoul-Uiju railway was originally given to a French company and then to Busan-based entrepreneur Bak Kijong,[25] the Japanese obtained control of it by 1904 and accelerated its construction because of the Russo-Japanese War. The Busan-Seoul-Uiju railway line enabled Japanese merchants to transport merchandise cheaply to the northwest regions, giving them even more of an advantage over local merchants. Yi Seunghun's businesses suffered many setbacks around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, and his brassware company and the industry as a whole went into decline, unable to compete with imported products.[26] It is not surprising that almost all of the merchants involved in the "Incident of the 105" and the Sinminhoe were in businesses that were in direct competition with Japanese ones.[27]

In a colonial or semi-colonial situation, capitalist transformation involved not only supplanting the economic position of feudal forces but also dealing with an environment that was already capitalist and in which foreign businesses had superior resources. In Pyeongan province, it was large merchants, rather than owners of handicraft industries, who were the most successful at transforming into capitalists. There were not many cases where an individual merchant or a single merchant family acted as an entrepreneur. Instead, the tendency was for several merchants to join together to form joint-stock companies. Though large merchants had more financial resources than other potential entrepreneurs, they still had to pool their capital together in order to achieve a scale that could compete with Japanese businesses. Their strategy was summarized by Yi Seunghun's phrase, "Gwanseo jamunnon," whose characters mean "northwest region," "capital," and "gate."[28] These new companies brought about a shift in the roles within the merchant community. Originally, local money lenders had acted as financiers to the small-scale merchants in the region, and now the merchants such as Yi Seunghun and Yi Deokhwan served as "frontline" managers in the new enterprises while money lenders such as O Chieun and O Huiwon remained behind the scenes as investors.

First, merchants established several general merchandise stores/trading companies in the major towns and cities in the province. General merchandise stores were new to Joseon; there does not seem to have been any Korean-owned stores in Pyeongan province until 1903.[29] Merchants who had travelled to the periodic open-air markets in the countryside now gathered in towns as stockholders of stores that were the precursors of department stores. The modernization of their distribution systems seems to have been an effort to regain business that was lost to Japanese stores and thus to reassert their dominance in commerce. The most significant store was probably

the Sangmudongsa, which was established in Yongcheon in early 1908 as a joint-stock company, but little is known about the central store and office. More is known about its Seoncheon branch which had around 100 stockholders of its own including Yi Seunghun and O Huiwon and which was managed by Yang Junmyeong. The company was capitalized at 9,000 won, making it smaller in scale than comparable Japanese companies, but it was profitable enough that it was able to pay a dividend to its stockholders in its first year. Rather than importing through Japanese or Chinese merchants, Sangmudongsa sought to establish direct ties with Western merchants and engage directly in the import/export trade. In early 1910, they had negotiations with an Italian company that had branches in Seoul and Inchon, but nothing came of it.[30]

The first joint-stock companies focused on products that had been made by existing handicraft industries in the region. Two examples are the brassware and the dyeing and weaving industries. First, in April 1909, several businessmen, led by Yi Seunghun and Yi Deokhwan, all of whom had experience in the brassware business, joined together to form the Pyongyang Chagi Chusik Hoesa (Pyongyang Brassware Company). They sought to raise 60,000 won by selling stocks but only reached about half their goal. Despite early success, the company went through difficulties during the "Incident of the 105" years; however, the World War I years were profitable as the company was able to double its capitalization to the original goal of 60,000 won and increased the number of employees from six or seven to sixty-one. Ultimately, it seems that it was a victim of the post-war recession; it closed down and was sold to a Japanese company in 1919.[31]

Second, Pyongyang Yeomjikso (Pyongyang Dyeing and Weaving Company) was founded in September 1912 and was managed by Yi Deokhwan, one of the leaders of the Sinminhoe's South Pyeongan branch. It was the successor to the Pyongyang Dyers and Weavers Cooperative, which had been formed in 1910 but was closed down the following year. The company had a small-scale factory (29 *pyeong* in area during the years 1913–15) and about 12–30 employees. While it was able to increase production during the years 1912–14, it suffered tremendous losses in 1915; it rebounded again by 1918 but was sold in 1920 to a Chinese businessman. In general, the first generation of companies engaging in modern factory production all closed down by 1920.[32]

Despite these failures, Pyongyang began to develop into the centre of Joseon industry from the mid 1910s as a new generation of businessmen began to emerge. From 1906–1913, Japanese entrepreneurs established most of the factories in Pyeongan province, but from 1914, ones established by Joseon businessmen were more numerous. Joseon companies were concentrated in a small number of industries that did not compete directly with Japanese businesses such as textiles, food processing, rubber, and metalworks. These industries were not very capital-intensive, used raw materials that were plentiful in the region, and could rely on technology and know-how accumulated in handicraft industries.[33]

In the 1910s and 1920s, the major industries in Pyeongan province were the sock, rice polishing, and rubber industries. The sock industry is an illustrative example of the patterns and timing of growth of capitalist industry in the province. The regional sock industry began in 1906 when Gim Giho purchased sock machines and began operating them in the house of O Yunseon, a *gaekju* merchant. He operated this business until he was arrested in 1911 in the "Incident of the 105." Another pioneer was Bak Chirok, a printer and bookseller who also sold school supplies. He ran a small-scale sock business for a short time in the late 1900s, and when he quit the business, he divided up the machines among his employees, acting as a catalyst for the growth of the industry. In the 1910s, several sock manufacturers, many of whom were originally merchants, opened business, but most were small-scale operations that lasted only two to three years. During this decade, the sock industry in the Pyongyang area lagged behind that of Seoul. However, the situation changed suddenly after 1919 as Pyongyang overtook Seoul as the centre of the sock industry. Between 1918–1923, sock production in Pyongyang increased thirteen times, and it increased three times in the next two years. Companies grew in scale, and their products captured markets throughout the country.[34]

The growth of industry did not result in the disappearance of handicraft industries in the province. What emerged was a dual-structure industrial sector in which a modern sector of factory production dominated by Japanese companies coexisted with a handicraft sector dominated by small-scale Joseon companies.[35] Meanwhile, the commercial sector was increasingly coming under the control of Japanese merchants, threatening the livelihood of Joseon merchants. Foreign merchants outcompeted and supplanted native merchants, and foreign businesses undermined many existing handicraft industries. In short, Japanese imperialism had a devastating impact on the economy of Pyeongan province. However, the forms of social organization that had developed in the region in the late Joseon period also enabled merchants both to modernize their operations and to engage in resistance against the Japanese, culminating in the March First Movement.

Christianity

Another distinctive feature of modern Korean history has been the growth of Christianity, and it played a central role in transforming merchant communities into a "proto" civil society. However, in the late nineteenth century, the northwest seemed to be an unlikely place for a foreign religion to take root. At the time, the region was viewed as a hotbed of anti-foreign sentiment because of the General Sherman incident in 1866. In August of that year, an American merchant arranged with a British trading company to send a warship, the *General Sherman*, to Korea in an effort to open trade relations. It sailed up the Daedong River toward Pyongyang, and

when its first request for negotiations was denied, it proceeded to travel further up the river. It ran aground near Pyongyang, and the ensuing standoff ended in early September with a skirmish in which the ship was set afire and everyone on board was killed. Since a Protestant missionary was killed in the incident, early missionaries viewed Pyongyang the "Sodom of Korea."[36]

A few decades later, however, the situation completely changed, and missionaries came to refer to Pyongyang (and sometimes Seoncheon as well) as the "Jerusalem of Korea." Among the forms of Christianity, it was Protestantism and, more specifically, Presbyterianism that became dominant in Pyeongan province. Although the absolute numbers were not large, the growth of Presbyterian Christianity in the province was remarkably rapid by any statistical measure. Between 1893–1899, seventy-three of the 154 Presbyterian churches established in the country were located in Pyeongan province, with another fifty-one in Hwanghae province.[37] In 1907, 333 of 399 Presbyterian churches were in the two northwest provinces.[38] Of a total of around 7,500 Presbyterian converts in 1898, 5,950 or 79.3% were from the northwest. As late as 1932, believers in Pyeongan province still comprised 38.5% of the 260,000 Protestants in the entire country.[39] The objective of this section is to give an overview of the early history of Presbyterianism in Pyeongan province.

Intellectuals from Pyeongan province have offered explanations for their province's affinity for Christianity. In his history of Protestantism in Korea, Baek Nakjun wrote:

> When the country was opened to the West, the energetic people of the North soon caught the spirit of the times. Thus the character of the people, the political vicissitudes, the social background, and the religious conditions, made possible the success of Christianity in the north.[40]

Baek's explanation suggests that many of the factors behind the growth of commerce in the province—political marginalization and the weakness of the Confucian social order—were also behind the growth of Christianity. Yi Gwangsu gave similar reasons for the growth of Christianity. In "Sin saenghwallon" (Theory of a new life), an unfinished treatise serialized in 1918, he noted its democratic nature, the failures of Confucianism, and native beliefs in heaven and the afterlife dating back to ancient times. Adding that other important factors were Christianity's organizational strength and its ability to satisfy the moral demands of the people, he also emphasized that what Christianity provided was a way of life that fulfilled the needs of the people. Converts "found [in Christianity] a solemn and pious way of life."[41]

Christianity acted as a catalyst for many of the changes associated with the transition to a modern society. First, churches were a centre for the production of modern individuals. They introduced new practices of everyday life and forms of ethical regulation that disciplined individuals into modern forms of behaviour. Second,

churches also created a new network of institutions between the family and the state that fostered the formation of a new elite. They promoted reforms that altered gender and parent-child relations and placed the family under the regulation of the church. They prepared individuals to work in a modern economy and developed their political consciousness. The Presbyterian Church had strong ties to the business community in the province; in fact, the majority of Joseon businessmen in the sock and rubber industries were Christian.[42] Christian churches also played a leading role in the domestic nationalist movement in the 1910s and in organizing the March First Movement. The connections among Presbyterianism, capitalism, and nationalism are demonstrated by the fact that ninety-three of the people originally sentenced in the "Incident of the 105" were Christians of whom eighty-one were Presbyterian. The introduction of the religion transformed merchant communities into "the only community in Joseon that is as strongly united under a single ideology and banner" as Confucianism.[43]

The first missionary to travel through the northwest provinces was the Presbyterian missionary Horace Underwood (1859–1916), who had been born in England but immigrated to the United States in his youth. Arriving in Joseon in 1885, he was not formally part of a mission but initially taught at the new hospital established by Horace Allen (1858–1932) since Christian proselytizing was forbidden at the time. After the Gapsin Coup of 1884, the government slowly relaxed restrictions on Christianity, partially in gratitude to Allen, a medical doctor who treated one of Queen Min's relatives severely injured in the coup. Underwood formed the first Presbyterian church in Seoul and was the founder of the school that was the precursor to today's Yonsei University. Leaving from Seoul in the fall of 1887, he passed through Gaeseong, Songcheon, and Pyongyang and went all the way to Uiju on the border with China. This overland route to China, on which tribute missions had passed, was once an expression of the hegemony of the Chinese world order, but now it was being traversed by Western missionaries, whom the Chinese had viewed as barbarian. Travelling on foot and on horseback, Underwood sold Bibles, did some discreet preaching, and occasionally lost his way.[44] Little did anyone suspect that the arrival of this solitary missionary augured the northwest passage's future transformation into a path of steel railways that connected the region, through the open ports, to the new hegemonic centres of the capitalist world economy.

The missionaries' approach to evangelism was known as the "Nevius method" which was based on the ideas of John Nevius, a missionary from China, who came to Seoul for a short visit in 1890. The Nevius method stressed that churches should be self-supporting, self-governing, and self-propagating; that is, churches should be built and managed by the converts themselves, and native converts should be used to do evangelistic work.[45] This method seems to have been particularly effective in the north; as L. George Paik noted, "In the North, especially, the actual work of propaganda was most of it done by the Korean Christians."[46]

The first church in Pyongyang was the Neoldari Church, which was established in 1893. In 1892, Han Seokjin (1868–1939), an early convert from Uiju, established a Presbyterian mission in Pyongyang under the guidance of Samuel A. Moffett, who was the "pioneer missionary to Northern Korea."[47] Moffett was a graduate of the McCormick Theological Seminary in Chicago, the first of several who came to northern Korea.[48] When Moffett came to Pyongyang on a more permanent basis in 1893, he began holding church services in his home, and after he moved to a different place, his old home became known as the Neoldari Church. Around the same time, churches were also formed in Pyeongwon and Yonggang as well as in Jaeryeong and Anak in Hwanghae province.[49] The rise of Christianity was originally an urban phenomenon, with churches emerging in the towns and cities along the Seoul-Uiju railway line.

In accordance with the Nevius method's principle of self-propagation, many of the early churches in Pyongyang originally began as offshoots of the Neoldari Church that separated from the main congregation as it continued to expand. By 1899, the Neoldari Church had grown large enough to require the building of a new church in a different location and the election of two elders. Now that it had attained a more "proper" church organization, it was renamed the Jangdaehyeon Church, also known as the Central Church of Pyongyang.[50] In fall 1903, the Nammunoe Church split off from the main church as did the Jangdong Church in 1905.[51] After separating from the Jangdaehyeon Church in 1906, the Sanjeonghyeon Church grew to 300 members just a year later.[52] Thus, when L. George Paik wrote that "after 1898 the Pyeng Yang (*sic*) station became the center of all Christian activities in northern Korea," he was referring to more than just the city's geographical location.[53] By 1924, there were six main churches within Pyongyang city limits and 120 total in the greater Pyongyang area.[54] Not only was there an increase in the number of churches, but they were also connected through a network of inter-personal relations, creating a foundation for unity and collective action against the colonial state. As the number of churches grew, normal church activities strengthened the formal and informal networks among them. For example, from 1917, the Sanjeonghyeon Church began inviting reverends from churches in nearby towns to lead their annual winter Bible Study sessions.[55]

The northwest began to rise to preeminence among Presbyterian churches around 1895.[56] It seems to be no coincidence that two periods of growth occurred after the two major wars in this period.[57] There was a sudden growth in the number of churches both after the Sino-Japanese War and after the Russo-Japanese War during the "Great Revival" movement of 1907. One of the more immediate factors in the growth of Christianity seems to have been the devastation and dislocation caused by the wars which was especially severe in the north. For instance, during the Sino-Japanese War, Christian refugees from Pyongyang would found churches when they fled to the countryside, leading to the spread of churches throughout the province.[58]

Between 1905 and 1907, the total number of churches in the country doubled from 321 to 642, most of them in the northwest.[59]

The "Great Revival" movement of 1907 was one of the early turning points in the growth of Christianity in Joseon. It marked both the emergence of the northwest as leaders within the Joseon Christian church and a growing rift between converts and missionaries as Joseon believers began to emerge from the control and guidance of missionaries. The revival originated in a week-long session of prayer and Bible study in Wonsan in 1903 led by a local Methodist missionary.[60] It was not intended to be an evangelical movement; in fact, one of the motivations of the missionaries was to depoliticize their congregations. The Presbyterian missionary council in Joseon had resolved in 1901 to maintain a separation of church and politics.[61] As one missionary stated, "We felt that the Korean church needed not only to repent of hating the Japanese, but a clear vision of all sin against God….We felt…that embittered souls needed to have their thoughts taken away from the national situation to their own personal relation with the Master."[62] The politicization of Joseon believers became a constant source of tension within the Presbyterian Church.

What actually ensued was an outpouring of emotion that astonished the missionaries. When missionaries in Pyongyang heard about the revival meetings, they decided to hold their own in August 1906. A series of prayer meetings occurred over the following weeks, culminating in the famous revival of January 1907 during the annual Bible training class of the theological seminary. One foreign observer wrote:

> [The missionary] reached only the word "my Father" when a rush of power from without seemed to take hold of the meeting. The Europeans described its manifestations as terrifying. Nearly everybody present was seized with the most poignant sense of mental anguish; before each one his own sins seemed to be rising in condemnation of his life. Some were springing to their feet pleading for an opportunity to relieve their consciences by making their abasement known, others were silent, but rent with agony, clenching their fists and striking their heads against the ground in the struggle to resist the power that would force them to confess their misdeeds. From eight in the evening till five in the morning did this same go on, and then the missionaries, horror-struck at some of the sins confessed, frightened by the presence of a power which would work such wonders, reduced to tears by the sympathy with the mental agony of the Korean disciples whom they loved so dearly; some in prayer, others in terrible spiritual conflict. Next day the missionaries hoped that the storm was over and that the comforting teaching of the Holy Word would bind up the wounds of yester-night but again the same anguish, the same confession of sins; and so it went on for several days.[63]

From that point, revivals spread throughout the province, and one of the main leaders of the revival movement was Reverend Gil Seonju of the Jangdaehyeon Church. He also held revival meetings in Seoul, spreading them to other areas of the country.[64] The emotions of these revivals expressed the collective experience of a people who

began to emerge from the political marginalization and economic backwardness of the Joseon period only to suffer two wars on its soil fought by foreign powers and to have its livelihood threatened by Japanese imperialism.[65]

Christianity helped to bring about the changes that usually accompanied the transition to a capitalist society. First, one of its primary influences was the reorganization of the family structure of Joseon. In their effort to "elevate the status of women"[66] and liberate them from feudal forms of domination, it introduced new forms of regulation of family life and, particularly, of marital relations. Christianity was one of the earliest advocates of educating women. Although women were not allowed to become reverends or elders in the Presbyterian Church, they could become deacons (*jipsa*) and stewards (*gwonsa*) and had a voice in the affairs of the church. It is not surprising that there were a large number of women among early Christian converts. Churches also introduced new forms of gender interaction by having men and women worship in the same building, in contrast to the Confucian practice of segregating the sexes from youth. Initially, the sexes were segregated within church buildings. If the church was a traditional L-shaped Joseon house, men and women would sit in different wings, with the pulpit located in the "bend" of the "L." If it was a Western-style building, a curtain would be placed between them.[67] Segregated seating was abolished after 1913. In addition, the church sought to regulate the institution of marriage. Presbyterian churches began issuing marriage certificates in 1911, and in 1914, the General Assembly passed a resolution against early marriage, setting the marriageable age at seventeen for men and fifteen for women.[68] The church also permitted the remarriage of women which was forbidden in Confucian ethics.

Second, a presbytery system was established in Joseon, and it served as a training ground for new forms of political action. From 1893, a Presbyterian Council (*gonguihoe*) had served as the deliberative and supervisory organ of the Presbyterian missions in Joseon. At first, only foreign missionaries were involved, but beginning in 1901, they allowed Joseon delegates to serve on the council.[69] With the imminent graduation of the first class of the Union Theological Seminary in Pyongyang, it became necessary to establish a presbytery since only a presbytery had the authority to ordain ministers. In September 1907, the first Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of Joseon (Doknohoe; also known as the All-Korea Presbytery) was established in an assembly at the Jangdaehyeon Church. The location of the Presbytery was a sign of Pyongyang's central position within the church. The Presbytery elected Moffett as its first moderator with the rest of the positions going to Joseon members.[70] The presbytery system was fully implemented in September 1912 with the establishment of the General Assembly (*Chonghoe*), also in Pyongyang. A presbytery was established in every province, with North Pyeongan and South Pyeongan provinces each having their own presbytery. Performing executive, legislative, and judiciary functions, the General Assembly functioned as a microcosmic quasi-government. Some Christians have claimed that the

General Assembly constituted the first nationwide representative assembly in Korean history.[71] It had a court that functioned as the supreme judicial power in the Presbyterian Church. Furthermore, the General Assembly was also an economic corporation that registered its property with the colonial authorities; thus, high-ranking church members got experience in operating a large-scale economic enterprise.[72]

What enabled such changes, at least in part, was the penetration of the church into the everyday lives of their members. To take the example of the Sanjeonghyeon Church in Pyongyang, Sunday service was an all-day family affair with Bible study in the morning (separate classes for men, women, and children), a sermon in the afternoon, and hymnals in the evening. An extra prayer session was held on Wednesday evenings. This weekly schedule provided a temporal structure for the lives of their members. In their organization, churches usually adopted a Presbyterian hierarchy of elders, unordained elders, stewards (*gwonsa*), and deacons (*jipsa*), but northwest churches added their own innovation. Pyongyang churches created the *gwonchal* system ("Leaders of Tens"), which the Sanjeonghyeon Church adopted in 1909.[73] This system was actually based on the existing guild system of policing communities.[74] Thus, Presbyterian churches did not replace but rather combined with existing types of communal organization, reinforcing and expanding existing forms of ethical regulation. Congregations were divided into groups of ten with men and women kept separate, and *gwonchal* were appointed to each group to supervise their "spiritual interests," reporting to the elders and pastor of the church at monthly meetings. *Gwonchal* effectively acted as the "eyes of God" in their communities. As a result, churches in the northwest came to be known for the strictness of their ethical regulation and discipline.[75]

As mentioned above, the majority of the Sinminhoe's members were Christian, and their paths to conversion were diverse and illustrate many aspects of the early history of Presbyterian Christianity. An Changho, one of the founders of the Sinminhoe, was an early convert; he was a refugee of the Sino-Japanese War who turned to Christianity. Through his contacts with missionaries, he was able to go to the United States in 1902, where he became active in organizing immigrant communities. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Yi Seunghun was a relatively late convert. He did not begin going to church until 1910 when he was 46 years old. Rather than going to a local church, he went to Pyongyang to listen to the sermons of Han Seokjin, who had become a reverend at the Sanjeonghyeon Church. He later decided to establish a church at Osan Academy and began attending the nearby Jeongju Church, which had been established in 1899.[76] However, he was not baptized until 1915 and became an elder in the Osan Church in the fall of 1916.[77] Yi Deokhwan was involved in the formation of the Sanjeonghyeon Church, serving as an "unordained Elder" (*yeongsu*). While he moved to the Jangdaehyeon Church in 1907, his elderly mother Yi Sinhaeng continued to work as a female steward (*gwonsa*) at Sanjeonghyeon—an illustration of how both merchant and family networks were reconstituted in church organizations.[78]

Many of the younger members of the Sinminhoe were the children of early converts. They grew up going to church, attended Christian schools, and later became educators or businessmen. For instance, Gim Dongwon (1884—?), who was a Sinminhoe leader in Pyongyang, was the son of a rich landlord who was one of the first elders in Pyongyang churches. The older brother of novelist Gim Dongin, he graduated from the Pyongyang Japanese Language School in 1903 and then went to Japan, enrolling in the law department at Meiji University. Dropping out after one year, he returned to Joseon and devoted himself to education, becoming a teacher at An Changho's Daeseong School among other activities.[79] He joined the Sanjeonghyeon Church, becoming an elder in 1910 and serving as principal of its Youth Bible School from 1918. After 1919, he became one of the largest industrialists in Joseon, forming Pyongyang Gomu (Pyongyang Rubber Company) in 1924 and Pyeongan Yangmal (Pyeongan Sock Company) in 1929.[80] Another example is Gil Jinhyeong, the son of Reverend Gil Seonju. He graduated from Sungsil Academy (Union College) in 1907, taught at Sungsil Middle School, and was a teacher at Sinseong Academy in Seoncheon at the time of his arrest in the "Incident of the 105."[81]

In sum, Christian churches in Pyeongan province performed key social functions in the transition to modernity. They contributed to the formation of a new elite and fostered unity among them. As the novelist Ju Yoseop (1902–1972), a native of Pyongyang, observed, "Christianity in Pyongyang was the sole possession of the middle and upper propertied classes."[82] Merchants were able both to widen and to strengthen their networks of personal relations through their church activities.[83] The older generation of Christian leaders such as Yi Seunghun and Han Seokjin was active in the presbytery of North P'yeongan province as well as in the General Assembly.[84] On the other hand, many of the younger generation of businessmen gathered at the Sanjeonghyeon Church as demonstrated by the presence of the "Three Elders"[85]—Gim Dongwon, Jo Mansik (1883-?), and O Yunseon.[86] In addition to being leaders in the business community, all three were centrally involved in the founding of the Pyongyang YMCA in 1921 and in the establishment of the Joseon Native Products Promotion Society (Joseon mulsan jangnyeohoe) in 1920–1922.[87] Membership in a church even increased the chance of serendipitous associations. For example, Gim Dongwon's family happened to live next door to a reverend at the Jinnampo Church who was married to An Changho's sister; as a result, Gim Dongwon and his siblings got to know An from an early age.[88] These personal interactions were possible within the new social spaces emerging in the northwest. Imperialism often had the effect of reinforcing traditional communities and preventing their modernization. In the early twentieth century, however, the growth of Presbyterian Christianity enabled Joseon to overcome these obstacles partially and to begin the transition to a modern civil society.

Education

During the Joseon period, the educational system focused on training in Chinese classics in order to cultivate scholar-officials. Formal education began around the age of six or seven when children entered a *seodang*. *Seodang* were village schools generally founded by local elites. After finishing *seodang* curriculum, students then entered a *seowon* at age fourteen or fifteen. Originally, government-run schools called *hyanggyo* had been in charge of secondary education, but from the mid Joseon period, privately founded *seowon* began to take over their functions. In the nineteenth century, the educational system began to decline.[89] Problems in the administration of *seowon* grew so severe that the Daewongun, the regent of the country from 1864–1873, ordered their abolition in 1871.[90] The number of *seowon* was reduced from approximately 1,700 to forty-seven government-approved schools. Another blow to the educational system was the abolition of the civil service examination in the Gabo Reforms of 1894–1895.

The growth of modern schools in Pyeongan province was as dramatic as that of Christianity, particularly after 1905. Not surprisingly, the province played a vanguard role in the spread of modern education in Joseon, being more active than the central and southern regions that had been the centre of education in the Joseon period.[91] As the *DaeHan maeil sinbo* noted, with some exaggeration, in 1908,

> Those who talk about education in Korea today say that the northwest is the leader, and they also say that within the northwest, north Pyeongan province is the most active.... According to news about the educational world in north Pyeongan province, not only are schools continuously being established, but gradually [there] will be no places that have no schools....[92]

Initially, much of the initial initiative for building schools came from churches which saw education as a way to spread Christianity. However, modernizing efforts in the northwest also created tremendous demand for Western forms of knowledge. In conjunction with churches, schools became another major centre for the production of modern individuals. Many graduates of the school worked in modern businesses while others became ministers or teachers. Outside the direct control of the state, the modern educational system became a major institution within an emergent civil society.

This section examines the rise of modern education in Pyeongan province and the role of schools in forming a new elite. Schools contributed to the development of modern industries by emphasizing practical, technical education and disseminating the knowledge and skills necessary to work in a modern economy. Schools also were disciplinary institutions that socialized students into new forms of behaviour according to the norms of Christian ethics and Western hygiene. The forms of sociality and discipline promoted unity among the students, and thus schools, together with churches, could function as sites of mobilization, even mobilizing resistance against

the colonial state. Teachers and students of the new modern schools comprised a large proportion of Sinminhoe membership; of the 123 indicted in the "Incident of the 105," fifty-one were involved in education, just barely outnumbering the number of merchants. During the 1910s, schools continued to develop the political consciousness of their students as demonstrated by the large number of students and teachers who participated in the March First Movement in 1919.

What distinguished Pyeongan province was not just the number of schools established but also the level of coordination and organization behind its educational efforts. While missionaries were the pioneers of modern education in many regions, there was also a significant degree of private initiative in the region. Regional educational societies (*hakhoe*) were established to coordinate efforts to build schools, and they also acted as informal boards of education. The first educational societies were founded in the northwest. Both the Seou Hakhoe and the Hanbuk Heunghakhoe were established in October 1906. Soon afterward, similar societies appeared in the Kiho (Gyeonggi and Chungcheong provinces) and Honam (Jeolla province) regions. Educational societies went beyond their stated purpose and became the central organizations in their provinces, but the ones in the northwest were the most active. Intellectuals hoped that regional educational societies would combine into a single nationwide organization, but the only region where a merger occurred was the northwest. In January 1908, the Seou Hakhoe and the Hanbuk Heunghakhoe combined to form the Seobuk Hakhoe.[93]

The growth of modern education in Pyeongan province was so rapid that a complete educational system was established before the Japanese occupation began in 1910. In general, missionaries played the leading role in promoting education, but the impetus came from the native Christians themselves. The educational system was built from the bottom up, beginning with primary schools and culminating in a college and theological seminary. The general pattern was that as missionaries turned their attention to a higher level of education, they turned the lower level over to Joseon converts.

Almost every church had its own primary school that taught converts the Korean language to enable them to read translations of the Bible and other Christian literature. While the missionaries' original objective was to facilitate their evangelism, such efforts also contributed to the spread of literacy in the vernacular.[94] Paralleling the growth in churches, the number of Presbyterian primary schools in the entire country increased from 62 in 1902 to 589 in 1909.[95] Observing the principles of self-support and self-management, each church provided all the funds for its primary school and hired only Christians as teachers.[96]

The first middle school in Pyeongan province was Sungsil Academy which was established in Pyongyang in 1897. It grew out of the school of the Neoldari Church, and its founder was the missionary William Baird, who like Moffett was also a graduate

of McCormick Theological Seminary.[97] It began with only thirteen students, but just three years later, in 1900, it became a five-year middle school. When the first school building was built in 1901, the school chose a site that was near the grave of one of the Christians who had died during the "*General Sherman* Incident" of 1866. The school selected students through recommendations from missionaries and church leaders, effectively weeding out most non-believers. While early primary schools were, in a sense, just extensions of Sunday school, middle schools implemented a more fully Western curriculum.[98] Because of a lack of teachers, the curriculum was initially limited to Bible study, history, mathematics, geography, music, and classical Chinese. Despite the change in the content of education, this pedagogy was similar to that of Confucian education in its focus on explication of an authoritative set of texts and on memorization. By 1909, the expanded curriculum included courses in applied science, natural science, and Japanese. Once the focus of education, classical Chinese was now reduced to a single course added to an American curriculum. Textbooks were slightly revised versions of those used in US middle schools at the time that were translated by the missionaries themselves.[99] With this expansion of the curriculum, schools were now beginning a more systematic effort to introduce Western forms of knowledge.

Building on the growth of primary education, Pyongyang quickly became the centre of both secondary and higher education in the province. Though churches promoted gender integration, there were separate secondary schools for male and female students. Two secondary schools for girls were established in Pyongyang. Founded in 1902 by an American missionary, Velma Snook, Sungui Girls' Academy was operated by the missionary board, and in 1912, it essentially became a higher normal school. Sunghyeon Girls' Academy was founded in 1900 and was run, like Sungdeok and Sungin Academies, jointly by the churches in Pyongyang. It had a six-year normal school programme and a three-year high school programme, and roughly 2000 students enrolled during the first 25 years of its existence.[100] In 1907, the Presbyterian churches in Pyongyang combined their resources to form two more secondary institutions for boys, which were both located near the Jangdaehyeon Church. Sungdeok Academy was principally a normal school that produced primary school teachers, and Sungin Academy later was turned into a higher normal school, focusing on training middle school teachers.[101] In their early years, Sungdeok and Sungin shared the same teachers, and since missionaries such as Moffett and Baird were deeply involved in these schools, their curriculums were probably similar to that of Sungsil Academy.[102] The churches paid for whatever expenses could not be covered by tuition payments and donations. These two schools tended to have higher enrollments than Sungsil Academy in this period. Up to the early 1920s, while Sungsil had enrolled about 400 students and graduated 144, 827 students enrolled in Sungin with 201 graduating, and Sungdeok had about 2,500 enrolled students with

447 graduates. The unity and coordination among the city's schools was symbolized by the presence of the character "*sung*" (to respect, worship) in all their names, as if it were a brand name guaranteeing the quality and Christian emphasis of the education.

In addition to mission schools, there were two important private secondary schools in Pyeongan province, Osan Academy in Jeongju and Daeseong Academy in Pyongyang. Although neither was a mission school, both were closely connected with both Christian and merchant communities in Pyeongan province; in fact, both were founded by central figures in the Sinminhoe. Yi Seunghun founded Osan Academy in late 1907, and An Changho, one of the founders of the Sinminhoe, founded Daeseong Academy in 1908. Part of the appeal of these schools was their freedom from the control of the missionaries. At the mission schools, there occasionally were "student strikes" whose causes were "largely centered on the school curriculum...[which was] heavily weighted with Biblical subjects."[103] In addition to a more secular curriculum, such freedom allowed these schools to take more interest in politics. Despite these differences, these two schools, like the mission schools in the northwest, primarily focused on training teachers for the growing number of schools in the country. Several hundred students reportedly responded to advertisements in newspapers and took the entrance exam for Daeseong Academy.[104] It opened on September 26, 1908 with fifty first-year students and many more in the preparatory division—significantly larger than other schools at their inauguration.[105] Osan Academy initially had only seven students and, because of lack of funds, had to use an unused building in the local *hyanggyo*, but it soon grew large enough to move to its own site.[106]

The first institution of higher education, Union Theological Seminary (in Korean, Pyeongyang Sinhakgyo), was officially established in 1905.[107] In order to train Joseon ministers to run the growing number of churches, the mission at Pyongyang began training classes in 1901. The classes began with two elders from the Jangdaehyeon Church and met yearly during the three winter months, adding more students each year. L. George Paik noted that the seminary's curriculum "was almost entirely Biblical. The seminary was, in reality, a Bible training school for Christian workers. However, courses on church history, Biblical theology, practical theology, and general academic studies were added." The first class graduated in 1907, and the seven graduates included Gil Seonju, Han Seokjin, and Seo Gyeongjo, and it went on to produce virtually all of the ministers in the Presbyterian church in the northwest. Union Christian College (Sungsil Daehakgyo) was founded in 1908. The college originated in a two-year higher education programme that Sungsil Academy added in 1905, causing a sudden rise in enrollment. It was initially run jointly by the Presbyterian and Methodist missions.[108] Graduation from the college eventually became a requirement for admission to the theological seminary.

With the exception of the primary schools and the theological seminary, the

model for all Christian schools in the northwest was Park College which had been founded in Parkville, Missouri in 1875. Under this system, "students worked half of each day and received a small wage, sufficient to cover their board." Schools had an "industrial department" with various shops where students made hats, straw ropes and sandals, worked at a printing press or at book-binding, and made maps and charts for classrooms; students also did janitorial and clerical work at the school and taught in primary and night schools.[109] In girls' schools, students also learned household skills such as embroidery.[110] This system became further entrenched with the arrival in 1905 of George S. and Helen McAfee McCune, the son-in-law and daughter of Park College founder Howard Bailey McAfee, both of whom were graduates of that institution.[111] They also implemented the Park College system when they went to Seoncheon in 1909 to join the staff of Sinseong Academy, which had been founded in 1906.[112]

Each level of the educational system produced different segments of the emerging new elite. Normal schools trained teachers for primary and middle schools, and the theological seminary produced reverends for churches. Industrial departments produced a significant number of the small-scale merchants and shopkeepers in the Pyongyang area. These departments did not just offer poorer students an opportunity to work their way through school; they also introduced and trained students in new technologies, enabling them to start their own businesses after graduation. As Charles Allen Clark noted,

> …In Pyengyang (*sic*), [in the schools,] they have had iron work of every kind, including the making of church bells, woodwork of every sort, including the making of office furniture, rattan furniture making, cement work, and more recently fruit culture and dairy work.
>
> In practically all of these towns, some of the boys have graduated and gone out into regular businesses based upon the things which they had learned in school. In the Pyengyang district, there are a dozen such men running iron shops or carpenter shops as a business. The school work does not compete with these men. It gives them the field and takes up other lines. Several companies have started making cheap bells for churches, so the work department of the academy and college is now confining itself to the more expensive kind, leaving the cheaper field to the private companies....
>
> The same school, through its chemical department, has developed a very good fountain pen ink, which is being sold on the market by a private company. Soap also, for laundry purposes, has been developed, and is being handled. Koreans have millions of cows which they use for draft animals and for carrying of loads on their backs, but they do not milk them... The Pyengyang school is making plans to start a dairy department, where all of the students will learn at least a little about the care of milch cows and of the milk itself and its companion products.[113]

Mission schools played a direct role in promoting entrepreneurship and further transforming the political economy of Pyeongan province.

Schools were also disciplinary institutions that introduced forms of bodily practice that socialized students into new norms of comportment. Since there were only a small number of secondary schools in the province, most students had to live in dormitories, sometimes with faculty as supervisors. An Changho lived at Daeseong Academy whenever he was in Pyongyang, and he would even make surprise visits to the homes of students and suggest ways to improve their households.[114] Graduates of Daeseong noted its Spartan discipline and military atmosphere. There would occasionally be emergency assemblies in the middle of the night, and students had to take turns patrolling the school grounds at night.[115] The private schools, Osan and Daeseong, even included military training in their physical education classes. In addition, mission schools introduced students to Western sports such as baseball and soccer. Along with new forms of discipline, hygiene was taught as a class in Sungsil Academy from 1900, and it was later incorporated into the science curriculum.[116] The consequence of such discipline was to transform the students into "modern" individuals in ways that were sometimes regarded as problematic. As a missionary teacher lamented in 1928,

> We, therefore, have today the undesirable situation of the Korean people striving for everything Western because it is Western, and turning away from everything Korean just because it is Korean or Oriental or "old fashioned."....
>
> The general manner of living of students in some mission schools has the tendency to put these boys and girls out of touch with the culture and customs of their own people... By becoming accustomed to foreign ways of living they lose the feeling of vital relationship, and the ability to sympathize and share life with their people, which is necessary if these students are to carry on educational activities with their own people after they finish school.[117]

Part of the reason for the growth of modern education in Pyeongan province was how quickly it was incorporated into existing communities. Schools had close ties with the merchant and business communities. In particular, private schools relied on the support of local elites, particularly many of the same financiers who were behind the Sinminhoe's business enterprises. For Daeseong Academy, An Changho raised large sums of money from local elites such as O Chieun, O Huiwon, and Gim Chinhu as well as Yi Chongho, who was the grandson of former Minister of Finance Yi Yong'ik and was also managing Poseong Academy (predecessor of today's Korea University) in Seoul at the time.[118] Yi Seunghun used much of his own wealth for Osan Academy, and later, financiers such as O Chieun also contributed funds to the school.[119] Yi Seunghun also used his merchant networks to recruit students and teachers. The journalist Seo Chun was, just as Yi Seunghun had been, an errand boy in a Japanese merchant's house in Cheongju when Yi discovered and brought him to Osan. The poet Gim Soweol was the grandson of an acquaintance of Yi Seunghun's

who had failed in the gold mining business. Yu Yeongmo, who taught physics and astronomy, came to Osan through Yi Seunghun's friendship with his father, who was a leather merchant in Seoul.[120]

The private schools were also closely connected with the Christian community. At Daeseong Academy, reverends and missionaries came by to lead Bible study classes, and students were encouraged to attend church.[121] Osan Academy became a Christian school in late 1909, and a Presbyterian missionary, Stacy L. Roberts, became principal. The original purpose was to gain some protection from the Japanese authorities, but after Yi Seunghun converted to Christianity, the school became thoroughly Christianized. A church was built on school grounds in 1910 with the reverend coming from the Union Theological Seminary.[122]

The modern educational system reinforced and helped transform communities in Pyeongan province, and it also produced a significant portion of the colonial elite. For instance, some of the more famous students of Sungsil Academy included Cho Mansik; Gim Hyeongjik, the father of former North Korean leader Gim Il Sung; and Bae Minsu, a rural activist during the Syngman Rhee administration. Among the graduates of Osan were reverends Ju Gicheol and Han Gyeongjik, the poet Gim Eok (Gim Soweol's mentor), and the modernist painter Yi Jungseop. In addition to Yi Gwangsu, early faculty members at Osan included Ham Seokheon, Jo Mansik, and the novelist Hong Myeonghui. Gim Dongwon was a teacher at Daeseong Academy when he was arrested during the "Incident of the 105," and Gil Jinhyeong was a teacher at Sinseong Academy. Pyeongan province went on to produce many of the central figures of the South Korean educational world. In addition to Baek Nakjun, such figures include deans and presidents of universities such as Seoul National University (Jang Riuk), Koryo University (Hyeon Sangyun), Ewha Women's University (Gim Okgil), Severence Medical School (Yi Yongseol), and Sungsil University (Reverend Han Gyeongjik) as well as the founders of universities such as Gyeonghui, Danguk, Sangmyeong Women's, and Hallym (Hallim).[123]

Since the mission school system was basically in place by the time the Sinminhoe was formed, the organization does not seem to have been directly involved in the system's establishment. Nonetheless, the "Incident of the 105" had an impact on mission schools since many Sinminhoe members were teachers at these schools. Three teachers from Sungsil and a student were arrested. The school hardest hit by the incident was Sinseong Academy with ten teachers, including Gil Jinhyeong, and eighteen students arrested.[124] Except for Yi Seunghun, there was no one arrested at Osan Academy.[125] However, the only school that closed down as a result of the incident was Daeseong Academy, which closed its doors in 1913. During the 1910s, schools continued to mobilize resistance against the Japanese and played a central role in the organization of the March First Movement.

Conclusion

The introduction of Christianity and modern education transformed merchant communities in a way that produced new forms of sociality different from the Neo-Confucian order. They functioned in many ways as a small-scale version of a civil society. These networks of merchant businesses, churches, and schools became centres for the production of modern individuals, some of whom became a new elite that was opposed to the rigid status hierarchy of Joseon and was not rooted in the yangban class. This "proto" civil society also enabled political resistance to be organized against a repressive state.

Its emergence was one of the reasons that the centre of political movements shifted to the northwest in the early twentieth century. The ability of the region to engage in political resistance became apparent in the so-called "Incident of the 105," the first major political incident of the colonial period. In October 1911, Japanese authorities began arresting students and teachers at Sinseong Academy, a mission school in the town of Seoncheon, north Pyeongan province. Over the next six months, a total of nearly 400 people were arrested. The pretext for the arrests was that they had been involved in a plot to assassinate the Governor-General of Joseon, Terauchi Masatake, when he visited the northwest in late 1910. The incident revealed the existence of a secret organization, the Sinminhoe (New People's Society), that had been formed in spring 1907. Of the 123 people who were brought to trial, all but seven were from Pyeongan province, and the far majority of them were members of the Sinminhoe. Though the colonial government's strong-armed tactics led to the end of the Sinminhoe, they produced the unintended result of politicizing the region even further. This was most forcefully demonstrated in the March First Movement of 1919. Churches and modern schools played central roles in the organization of the movement, and the strength of resistance in the northwest was demonstrated by the fact that on the day of March 1, virtually all protests occurred in Pyeongan province. Though the movement failed, one of its legacies was to catalyze the growth of modern political forms of action and resistance throughout the country.

Notes

1 Yi Junghwan, *Taengniji*, translated by Yi Minsu (Seoul: Pyeonghwa chulpansa, 2005), pp. 62–63.

2 Yi Gwangsu, "*Sin saenghwallon*," (Theory of a new life), *Yi Gwangsu jeonjip*, vol. 17 (Seoul: Samjungdang, 1962), p. 545.

3 For others, see Gim Sangtae, "Pyeongando Gidokgyo seryeok gwa chinmi elliteu ui hyeongseong" (Pyeongan province Christian groups and the formation of a pro-American elite), *Yeoksa bipyeong*, no. 45 (Winter 1998), pp. 172–75.

4 The state-civil society paradigm is commonly found in scholarship on early modern Korean history. Sin Yongha, *Hanguk geundaesa wa sahoe pyeondong* (Early modern Korean history and social change) (Seoul: Munhak gwa jiseongsa, 1980), chapter one; Sin Yongha, *Hanguk geundae sahoesa yeongu* (Studies on the social history of early modern Korea) (Seoul: Iljisa, 1987), p. 144. For a more recent work, see Jang Kyusik, *Iljeha Hanguk Gidokgyo minjokjuui yeongu* (Studies in Christian nationalism in Korea under Japanese rule) (Seoul: Hyean, 2001), conclusion.

5 O Suchang, *Joseon hugi Pyeongando sahoe baljeon yeongu* (Social Development in Pyeongan Province in the Late Joseon Period) (Seoul: Iljogak, 2002), p. 12.

6 Sun Joo Kim, *Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hong Kyongnae Rebellion of 1812* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2007), pp. 35–42.

7 Jo Kijun, *Hanguk jabonjuui seongnip saron* (The history of the establishment of Korean capitalism), (Seoul: Goryeo daehakgyo Asea munje yeonguseo, 1973), p. 249.

8 Hong Huiyu, *Joseon sangeopsa: godae jungse* (The history of commerce in Korea: the ancient and medieval periods) (Seoul: Baeksan jaryowon, 1989), pp. 300–01. See also Yi Junghwan, *Taengniji*, p. 54.

9 Yi Junghwan, *Taengniji*, p. 196; Hong Huiyu, p. 302.

10 O Suchang, p. 141.

11 *Hanguksa10: chungse sahoe ui haeche* (Korean history: the breakdown of Middle Age society), vol. 10, (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1994), p. 72.

12 Yun Gyeongno, p. 110.

13 Soo-chang Oh (O Suchang), "Economic Growth in Pyongan Province and the Development of Pyongyang in the Late Choson Period," *Korean Studies* 30 (2006), p. 6; Sin Yongha and Gwon Taehwan, "Joseon wangjo sidae ingu chujeong e gwanhan ilsiron" (An attempt at population estimates of the Joseon Dynasty), *Donga munhwa*, no. 14 (1977).

14 O Suchang, *Joseon hugi Pyeongando sahoe baljeon yeongu*, p. 142.

15 Kang Mangil, *Gocho sseun Hanguk geundaesa* (A revised history of early modern Korea), (Seoul: Changjak gwa bipyeongsa 1994), p. 95. See also the chart on page 96, reprinted from Son Jeongmok, *Joseon sidae tosi sahoe yeongu*, (Seoul: Iljisa, 1977). Of cities with a population greater than 2.500, Pyeongan province contained 31 out of 137 cities, exceeding both Gyeongsang (30 cities) and Jeolla (20) provinces.

16 Hong Huiyu, pp. 311–13.

17 L. George Paik (Baek Nakjun), *The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, 1832–1910* (Pyongyang: Union Christian College Press, 1929), p. 261.

18 Baek Seungjong, *Hanguk ui yeeon munhwasa* (The cultural history of prophecy in Korea) (Seoul: Pureun yeoksa, 2006), pp. 79–84, 100–04; Sun Joo Kim, pp. 89–104.

19 O Suchang, op. cit., pp. 312–17; Hong Huiyu, p. 313; Sun Joo Kim, pp. 80–88.

20 Mokpo gaehang baeknyeonsa pyeonjip wiwonhoe, *Mokpo gaehang baeknyeonsa* (The one-hundred year history of the opening of Mokpo's port) (Mokpo: Mokpo sadan beopin Mokpo baeknyeonhoe, 1997), pp. 119–28.

21 "Pyeongyang japgwan" (Various observations of Pyongyang), *Sinmin*, no. 6 (October 1925), p. 76.

22 Jo Gijun, *Hanguk gieopga sa* (History of Korean entrepreneurs), (Seoul: Bakyeongsa, 1973), Chapter 13: "Minjok ui jidoja Yi Seunghun gwa Napcheong yugi." A revised version of this chapter appears in Namgang munhwa chaedan, ed., *Namgang Yi Seunghun gwa minjok undong* (Yi Seunghun and the nationalist movement), (Seoul: Namgang munhwa jaedan chulpanbu, 1988). Jo Gijun mentions that he reviewed all the newspapers and other archival sources to revise the article but did not turn up anything significantly new. I should perhaps disclose that Yi Seunghun is my great-grandfather, my maternal grandmother being the youngest of his children.

23 O Miil, *Hanguk geundae jabonga yeongu* (Industrial capitalists in early modern Korea) (Seoul: Hanul akademi, 2002), p. 120.

24 Yun Gyeongno, p. 62.

25 For more on Bak Gijong and the Seoul-Uiju railway, see Jo Gijun, *Hanguk gieopga sa*, Chapter 5: "Hanguk cheoldoeop ui seonguja Pak Kijong."

26 Jo Gijun, *Hanguk gieopga sa*, p. 315. See also, Osan chilsip nyeonsa pyeonchan wiwonhoe, ed., *Osan chilsip nyeonsa* (The 70-year history of Osan), (Seoul: Osan chilsip nyeonsa pyeonchan wiwonhoe, 1978), 55; O Miil, p. 136.

27 Yun Gyeongno, p. 64.

28 Ibid., p. 103. See also Gim Hyeongseok, "Namgang Yi Seunghun yeongu" (A study of Yi Seunghun), *Dongbang hakji*, no. 46–47–48 (1985).

29 Yun Gyeongno, p. 98.

30 Ibid., pp. 98–109.

31 O Miil, pp. 122–23.

32 O Miil, pp. 123–24. A chart of the company's finances is given in footnote 18 on page 124.

33 O Miil, pp. 125–26, 133, 135.

34 Ju Ikjong, "Iljeha Pyeongyang ui meriyasu gongeop e gwanhan yeongu" (A study of the textile industry in Pyongyang under Japanese rule) (Ph.D. diss., Seoul National University, 1994), pp. 48–50, 66–67, 76–77, 81–87.

35 O Miil, p. 150.

36 L. George Paik, p. 199.

37 See chart in Yi Manyeol, "Namgang Yi Seunghun ui sinang" (The belief of Yi Seunghun), *Namgang Yi Seunghun gwa minjok undong* (Yi Seunghun and the nationalist movement), pp. 293–95.

38 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa*, p. 242.

39 Gim Sangtae, p. 176.

40 L. George Paik, p. 261.

41 Yi Gwangsu, "Sin saenghwallon," pp. 546–48. Originally serialized in the *Maeil sinbo*, Sept. 6-October 19, 1918. Though he was treating Christianity in general, he stated that his views here based on his "personal observations and experiences."

42 Jang Gyusik, *Iljeha Hanguk Gidokgyo minjokjuui ui yeongu*, p. 266.

43 Yi Gwangsu, "*Sin saenghwallon*," (Theory of a new life), *Yi Gwangsu jeonjip*, vol. 17 (Seoul: Samjungdang, 1962), p. 544. He does mention Cheondogyo and was planning on treating it in a later section of this article, but the serialization was discontinued before he reached that section.

44 On these early trips to the northwest, see L. George Paik (Baek Nakjun), *The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, 1832–1910* (Pyongyang: Union Christian College Press, 1929), pp. 130, 168–69. See also Hanguk gyohoe Baekjunyeon junbi wiwonhoe saryo bunkwa wiwonhoe, ed., *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa* (The 100-year history of Korean Presbyterian Christianity), (Seoul: Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe chonghoe, 1984), pp. 76–80 as well as memoirs such as Lillias H. Underwood, *Underwood of Korea* (reprint) (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1983), 62–64 (originally published in 1918). In English-language sources from this period, Gaeseong is referred to by its alternative name Songdo, and Songcheon is usually called "Sorai" (from the Korean "Sollae").

45 Charles Allen Clark, *The Korean Church and the Nevius Methods* (New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell, 1930), pp. 33–34. See also L. George Paik, p. 151.

46 L. George Paik, p. 284.

47 L. George Paik, 171. Paik quotes a report by Moffett on the establishment of the Pyongyang mission on pp. 200–01.

48 On Moffett's conception of Christianity and the theological standpoints of the early Protestant missionaries, see Albert L. Park, "Visions of the Nation: Religion and Ideology in 1920s and 1930s Rural Korea," (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2007), pp. 76–85.

49 Again, see chart in Yi Manyeol, p. 293.

50 Gil Seonju, "Pyeongyang Sanjeonghyeon gyohoe sagi" (The history of the Sanjeonghyeon Church in Pyongyang), *Yeonggye Gil Seonju moksa yugo seonjip* Vol. 1 (Seoul: Gidokgyoseohoe, 1968), p. 189.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., pp. 189–90.

53 L. George Paik, p. 261.

54 Gim Gijeon and Cha Sangchan, "Joseon munhwa gibon josa (ki pal) Pyeongnam-do ho" (Basic survey of Joseon culture (no. 8)—south Pyeongan province), *Gaebyeok*, no. 51 (Sept. 1924), p. 62.

55 Gil Seonju, "*Cheonghoe sagi*" (Record of the history of General Assembly), *Yeonggye Gil Seonju moksa yugo seonjip* Vol. 1, pp. 193–95.

56 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa*, pp. 183–86, 241–42.

57 Chung-Shin Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003), pp. 23–25.

58 Gim Sangtae, p. 178. L. George Paik noted that a brief persecution of Christians in Pyongyang in 1894 also had the effect of dispersing converts into the countryside where new churches were formed in places such as Chaeryeong in Hwanghae Province. L. George Paik, p. 245.

59 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa,* p. 222.

60 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa,* p. 213.

61 Ibid., p. 208.

62 Reverend W.N. Blair quoted in L. George Paik, 356. Paik's account of the development of the revival movement is on pp. 354–57.

63 Lord William Cecil of England quoted in L. George Paik, pp. 357–58. A missionary, William Blair, wrote that the revival was a "meeting the like of which I had never seen before, nor wish to see again unless in God's sight it is absolutely necessary." Quoted in Samuel Hugh Moffett, *The Christians of Korea*, (New York: Friendship Press, 1962). The author is the son of Samuel A. Moffett.

64 Born in Anju (South Pyeongan province), Gil Seonju (1869–1935) was another merchant who converted to Christianity, joining the Neoldari Church in 1897 and later elected as an elder. In 1907, he was one of the first graduates of the Union Theological Seminary in Pyongyang and was immediately assigned to the Jangdaehyeon Church.

65 In retrospect, it seems that what manifested itself in such a terrifying fashion during the revival meetings was none other than *han.* It could be said that Christianity provided a channel for the expression of *han* and a potential way of overcoming it—what is known as *hanpuri.* In this case, *han* served as a force both for the growth of a religion and for social reform. The connection between Christianity and *han* has been discussed most systematically within *minjung* theology. See Jae Hoon Lee, *The Exploration of the Inner Wounds—Han* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994).

66 Yi Gwangsu, "Asogyo ui Joseon e jun eunhye" (The benefits that Christianity has given Joseon), *Cheongchun* No. 9 (July 1917), p. 15.

67 Clark, p. 153.

68 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa,* p. 144.

69 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa*, pp. 232–33. See also Clark, pp. 93–4, 123 and L. George Paik, pp. 374–75.

70 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa*, pp. 238–39. See also L. George Paik, pp. 375–76.

71 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa*, pp. 240, 251–52. See also Clark, pp. 156–57, 160. For more on the democratic influence of Protestantism, see Hong Iseop, "*Hanguk e isseo Peuroteseutantijeum eul maegyero han Amerika munhwa ui yeonghyang*" (The influence of American culture through the medium of Protestantism in Korea), *Hong Iseop jeonjip*, Vol. 3, (Seoul: Yeonse Daehakgyo chulpanbu, 1994), pp. 321–22.

72 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa,* p. 192. Churches played, intentionally or not, a significant role in the conversion of agricultural and commercial capital into industrial capital. To take the example of an individual church, elderly women members of the Sanjeonghyeon Church would sometimes donate some of their farmlands to the church. In 1913, one woman donated both dry and paddy fields to the Sanjeonghyeon Church, and the following year, another woman donated a parcel of dry field. The proceeds from the fields would then be used to maintain the church and to pay for school expenditures.

73 Gil Seonju, pp. 190–91.

74 Clark, p. 137. The phrase "Leaders of Tens" comes from his book.

75 *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa*, pp. 254–55.

76 *Osan chilsip nyeonsa*, p. 92. See also Yi Manyeol, pp. 296, 306–7.

77 Yi Seunghun enrolled in the Union Theological Seminary in Pyongyang in 1915 but withdrew after a year without finishing the programme.

78 Gil Seonju, pp. 189–90.

79 Gim Sangtae, "Gim Dongwon," *Cheongsan haji mothan yeoksa* (History that has not been cleansed), (Seoul: Cheongnyeonsa, 1994), pp. 95–96.

80 Ju Ikjong, pp. 99, 108.

81 Sungsil Daehakgyo 100nyeonsa pyeonchan wiwonhoe, *Sungsil Daehakgyo 100 nyeonsa* (The 100-year history of Soongsil University), Vol. 1 (Seoul: Sungsil Daehakgyo chulpanbu, 1997), pp. 116, 124. See also, Yun Gyeongno, pp. 79, 81, 84.

82 Ju Yoseop, "Sacheonnyeonjeon godo Pyeongyang haengjingok jibang sogae (gi il), sipnyeon man e bon Pyeongyang" *Byeolgeongon*, no. 32 (Sept. 1930), p. 47.

83 This is what Yi Manyeol has argued in the case of Yi Seunghun, see Yi Manyeol, p. 319. See also, O Miil, p. 289.

84 Ibid., pp. 320–21.

85 *Osan chilsip nyeonsa*, p. 137.

86 Jo Mansik was born in Pyongyang and learned the merchant business from his father in his youth. Influenced by what he saw during the Russo-Japanese War, he enrolled in Sungsil Hakgyo in 1905, a Christian school where he converted to Christianity. After graduating from Sungsil Academy, he went to study in Japan also at Meiji University, graduating in 1913 and becoming a teacher and later principal of the Osan School. He was active in the Sanjeonghyeon Church, becoming an elder in 1922. For a rather narrative account of Jo Mansik's life, see Gim Kyosik, *Jo Mansik* (Seoul: Gyeseong chulpansa, 1984). See also Gil Seonju, p. 196.

87 O Miil, pp. 295–300 and Jang Gyusik, pp. 258–263.

88 Article by Gim Tong'in from *Samcheolli* quoted in Ju Yohan, p. 93.

89 "Seodang eseo hyanggyo, seowon ggaji" (From *seodang* to *hyanggyo* and *seowon*), *Joseon sidae saramdeul eun eoddoke sarassulgga?* (revised edition) (Seoul: Cheongnyeonsa, 2005).

90 James B. Palais, *Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), pp. 110–31.

91 See the editorial in *Daehan maeil sinbo*, Aug. 16, 1908; Oct. 24, 1908.

92 Editorial, *Daehan maeil sinbo*, Oct. 3, 1908, p. 1.

93 See Yi Songhui, "Seou hakhoe ui aeguk kyemong undong gwa sasang" (The thought and patriotic enlightenment movement of the Seou hakhoe), *1900nyeondae ui aeguk kyemong undong yeongu* (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1993).

94 Yi Gwangsu, "Asogyo ui Joseon e jun eunhye" (The benefits that Christianity has given Joseon), p. 17.

95 Missionary report quoted in L. George Paik, p. 390.

96 L. George Paik, pp. 313–14.

97 It is interesting that about half of the missionary teachers at Sungsil were graduates of the McCormick Theological Seminary. Originally located in Indiana, the theological seminary moved to Chicago in 1859 through the efforts of Cyrus McCormick, the inventor of the reaper, who sought to turn it into a bastion of conservative Old School Presbyterianism. As is well known, McCormick's company later merged with other agricultural machinery companies to form International Harvester in 1902. Although the company would seem to have little interest in a rice-cultivating country like Joseon, it did eventually develop business in both Japan and Manchuria. The agricultural resources of Manchuria, which was a strong impetus for Japanese expansion, also seems to have attracted International Harvester to northeast Asia. Considering Joseon's geographical location and importance in the regional economy, it is perhaps not so surprising that the McCormick family would be interested in Joseon. In fact, Mrs. Edith Rockefeller McCormick, daughter-in-law of Cyrus, donated the funds to construct the first building of the Union Theological Seminary in Pyongyang in 1908. William T. Hutchinson, *Cyrus Hall McCormick, vol. 2: Harvest, 1856–1884*, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968), pp. 16–23; Cyrus McCormick, *The Century of the Reaper*, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), p. 245; L. George Paik, p. 388.

98 *Sungsil daehakgyo 100nyeonsa I: Pyeongyang Sungsil pyeon* (The 100 year history of Sungsil University 1: Pyongyang Sungsil), (Seoul: Sungsil daehakgyo chulpanbu, 1997). pp. 76–77, 100, 115. See also Yi Manyeol, *Hanguk Gidokgyo munhwa undongsa* (The history of the Christian culture movement in Korea), (Seoul: Daehan Gidokgyo chulpansa, 1987), p. 190.

99 See the chart in Ibid., pp. 73, 90, 92, 94.

100 On Sungui and Sunghyeon Girls' Academies, see Gil Seonju, pp. 178–79, 181–82.

101 On Sungdeok and Sungin Academies, see Gil Seonju, "*Chonghoe sagi*" (Record of the history of General Assembly), pp. 179–81. The date that this text was written is unclear, but since there is no date mentioned in it beyond 1923, it was probably written in 1924 or 1925. All enrollment statistics are taken from this article.

102 Ibid., p. 181.

103 L. George Paik, p. 284.

104 Yi Gwangnin, p. 264.

105 Gim Hyeongsik, "*Pyeongyang Daeseong hakgyo wa An Changho*" (Daeseong Academy in Pyongyang and An Changho), *Samcholli*, January 1932, 15. Gim Hyeongsik was a member of the first graduating class of Daeseong Academy.

106 *Osan chilsip nyeonsa*, pp. 70–71, 88–89; See also Gim Dotae, *Namgang Yi Seunghun jeon* (The biography of Namgang Yi Seunghun), (Seoul: Mungyosa, 1950), pp. 170–71. Among the Christian schools in the northwest, only Sungsil and Osan managed to move to the south after liberation in 1945, and both still exist in Seoul today. Even after An Changho went into

exile in China in April 1910, Daeseong Academy was able to continue operating; however, it closed down in 1913 shortly after the "Incident of the 105," having graduated only one class in 1912. See Yi Gwangnin, p. 282.

107 On Union Theological Seminary, see L. George Paik, pp. 291–91, 388. See also Gil Seonju, pp. 173–74.

108 L. George Paik, pp. 292, 311. See also Gil Seonju, p. 176.

109 Missionary report quoted in L. George Paik, 308. See also *Daehan Yesugyo Jangnohoe Baeknyeonsa*, pp. 130–31.

110 Gil Seonju, p. 178.

111 L. George Paik, pp. 308–09.

112 Yi Manyeol, *Hanguk Gidokgyo munhwa undongsa* (The history of the Christian culture movement in Korea), p. 192.

113 Clark, pp. 209–10.

114 Ju Yohan, p. 84.

115 Gim Hyeongsik, p. 15. Jeon Yeongtaek's reminiscences in the journal *Saebyeok* reprinted in Ju Yohan, pp. 81–82, 85. See also Yi Gwangsu, Ibid., p. 30.

116 *Sungsil daehakgyo 100nyônsa I: Pyeongyang Sungsil pyôn* (The 100 year history of Sungsil University 1: Pyongyang Sungsil), pp. 81, 83, 90–92.

117 James Earnest Fisher, *Democracy and Mission Education in Korea,* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1928), pp. 126–129. Fisher was a professor of education in Chosen Christian College (Yeonhui jeonmun hakgyo), a Presbyterian school that was the predecessor to today's Yonsei University.

118 Yi Gwangnin, "*GuHanmal Pyeongyang ui Daeseong hakgyo*" (Daeseong Academy of Pyongyang at the end of the Joseon period), *Gaehwapa wa gaehwa sasang yeongu,* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1989), p. 262. See also Ju Yohan, Ibid., and Yi Gwangsu, Ibid. Both Yi Gwangsu and Ju Yohan give Gim Jinhu as the main financial contributor while Yi Gwangnin states that it was Yi Chongho. Some of the references to the *Daehan maeil sinbo* are actually in the *Hwangseong sinmun*.

119 *Osan chilsip nyeonsa*, pp. 125–26.

120 Ibid., pp. 97, 141, 148.

121 Ju Yohan, 86.

122 *Osan chilsip nyeonsa*, pp. 92–5.

123 Gim Sangtae, p. 173. Many professors at these and other schools were also originally from Pyeongan province.

124 Yun Gyeongno, 81. See the two charts on the breakdown by school of those arrested in the "Incident of the 105."

125 Yun Gyeongno, p. 81.

GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION

HEONIK KWON

The Korean War (1950–1953) was not a single war, but rather a combination of several different kinds of war. It was a civil war, of course, waged between two mutually negating post-colonial political forces, each of which, through the negation, aspired to build a common, larger, singular, and united modern nation-state. It was an international war fought between, among others, two of the most powerful states of the contemporary world: the United States and China. It was a global war—waged between two bifurcating international political, moral, and economic forces, each having a different vision of modernity—which we, for want of a better term, commonly call the Cold War.

However, hidden beneath these well-known characteristics of the Korean War, there was another kind of war going on in the Korean peninsula from 1950 to 1953, or even earlier. The Canadian historian Steven Hugh Lee calls this war the Korean War's war against the civilian population.[1] The South Korean sociologist Kim Dong-Choon calls it "the other Korean War," emphasizing the fact that the reality of this war is not well known in existing history or to the outside world or even, for that matter, to Koreans themselves.[2] The historian Park Chan-Sung calls it "the war that went into the village," highlighting the disparity between Korean War history as national narrative and as local historical experience.[3]

What these scholars commonly try to draw to our attention is the fact that the Korean War was not primarily a violent struggle between contending armed forces. Instead, they show that the war's main struggle was the struggle for survival by unarmed civilians against the generalized, indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the armed political forces of all sides. The South Korean state committed pre-emptive violence in the early days of the war against hypothetical collaborators with the enemy. This set in motion a vicious cycle of violence against civilians in the ensuing chaos of war: it radicalized the punitive actions perpetrated under the North Korean occupation against the individuals and families who were classified as supporters of the southern regime, which in turn escalated the intensity of retaliatory violence directed against the so-called collaborators with the communist occupiers when the tide of war changed. When the North Korean forces left their briefly-occupied territory in the South, they acted as the South had done before, committing

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numerous atrocities of pre-emptive violence against people whom they considered to be potential collaborators with the southern regime.

These tragic events arose out of the specific conditions of the Korean War, which was, being part of the broader, turbulent state-building process in post-colonial Korea, based on the negation of the other's existence between the two state systems that emerged in the era, revolutionary North Korea and anti-communist South Korea. The radicalization of this mutual negation in the form of civil war drove the civilian population caught in the middle into an extremely precarious situation.

In the South, the war generated not only a host of outlawed individuals but also politically non-normative consanguine relations and ideologically impure and undesirable families. For the individuals that had fallen victim to the state's anti-communist terror, their historical traces became an ominous threat to their surviving families during and after the war, that of being deemed enemies of the state on account of their relation to the victim. For those who had gone missing in the chaos of the war, their absence ran the risk of being construed as a result of defection to the communist-controlled territory. Their remaining families became "families whose members crossed to the north", a highly stigmatizing status in post-war times. After the war, many of these families had to endure intimidating surveillance by the state security apparatus and systematic discrimination in public life.

Life was hard for many of the post-war Korean families who failed to demonstrate that they had maintained a clear, untainted identity throughout the chaotic war and that they stayed within the circle of political and ideological purity that the state enforced on the national society. For numerous families, it was practically impossible to meet this demand amidst the war's changing tides and chaotic frontiers of violence. The lived reality of the Korean War, for many families and communities, was principally about confronting the radical simplicity of the war's zero sum rule imposed on them amidst the complexity of actual communal experience of the conflict, in which people were forced to accommodate both sides of the mutually negating forces of war. In popular discourse, the historical situation is often expressed with the poignant traditional idiom that depicts an extreme state of confusion: "Move to the right and then to the left [and then again to the opposite direction without knowing where to go and what to do]."

Korea was not the only place where family and other intimate communal relations became the object of political control and punitive actions during the era of the global Cold War. Speaking of the impact of the anti-communist terror unleashed in Java and Bali in 1965–1966, the historian Geoffrey Robinson describes how the terror campaign distorted the moral fabric of Balinese communities. He observes that the widespread practice of punishing the chosen victims together with their families and close relatives left deep scars in the affected communities. In a broadly similar light, Greg Grandin investigates the alleged "susceptibility of Mayans to communism" during

the 1981–1983 terror campaigns in Guatemala against indigenous communities.[4] The anthropologist Stephan Feuchtwang investigates the incidents of state terror in Taiwan in the early 1950s (which were, in fact, closely related to the outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula), focusing on how the experience of state violence is transmitted across generations.

During the Greek civil war (1946–1949), according to Polymeris Voglis, "the line between legality and illegality was drawn along the lines of nationalism versus communism. Ideas, intentions, and even family relations during the Civil War were labelled as "anti-national" and thus became new forms of illegality and new objects of punitive practices".[5] Voglis describes how family relations became "new objects of punitive practices" and how the terrifying label "anti-national" exerted enormous pressure on the prisoners and their families. He reconstructs the intimate experiences of these people, drawing upon their diaries and memoirs and situating their experience in the broad historical context of the post-World War II Europe. In doing so, he raises objections to Michel Foucault's seminal thesis on the birth of the modern prison.[6]

Voglis's objections to Foucault are broadly based on two grounds. One of them concerns Foucault's differentiation of the modern from the pre-modern penal practices in the context of European history. Under this distinction, pre-modern practices consist primarily of introducing physical pains to the prisoner's body in a spectacular way, while modern penal technology is focused on disciplining the body within a system of surveillance, as Foucault illustrates with Bentham's panoptical structure.[7] According to Foucault: "In a society in which the principal elements are no longer the community and public life, but, on the one hand, private individuals and, on the other, the state, relations can be regulated only in a form that is the exact reverse of the spectacle … Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance".[8] Voglis argues that this sharp contrast between the pre-modern spectacle of physical punishment and the modern disciplinary surveillance regime does not fit with the actual history of penal practice in modern Europe, especially in the persecution of political crimes, in which torture and surveillance were both liberally used. Voglis highlights measures such as the forced removal of children from female inmates who refused to make a confession, widely practised against the Greek political prisoners during and after the civil war. He questions whether such measures should be considered a corporeal or non-corporeal punishment, considering that the inmates who underwent the harrowing experience regarded the coerced separation from their children as something akin to an experience of torture. Voglis questions whether Foucault's idea of the modern prison system and modern individual human subject can apply to the condition and subjectivity of Greek political prisoners, which were, according to him, fundamentally social and political.

The disciplinary power of the Greek penal camps was concentrated on punishing the anti-national ideas and ideals believed to be held by the inmates, which was

crystallized in the extraction of confessions from the inmates in the form of them renouncing these ideals. The pains that these inmates experienced with the system of confession were not merely corporeal (bodily pains inflicted for refusing to make confessions) but were ultimately social and relational. The form of punishment was inseparable from the contradictions existing between the inmates' obligations to their families outside the prison on the one hand and, on the other, their loyalties to other inmates and comrades—contradictions that the politics of conversion and confession systematically exploited.

This essay supports Voglis's observation that the body as the object of punitive actions can be a social body located in a web of social and moral ties, rather than the docile body of an isolated individual located within a "minute web of panoptic techniques", as appears in Foucault's work.[9] In an ideologically charged conflict such as the Greek civil war or the Korean War, the weight of political punishment often falls on people who are suspected of harbouring subversive ideas rather than those who actually commit a political crime. If the object of disciplinary penal actions is a body of ideas and ideals that the state hopes to eradicate from the space under its rule, where would it find the targets to discipline and punish in the first place? What are the ways to materialize the condemned body of ideas so that political and administrative resources can be invested against the condemned? The history of punishment can take a radically different route from that described by Foucault in places where the technology of power had to first invent the materiality of the condemned body before it could set out to punish and discipline it.

Collective culpability

One of the most distinctive penal systems in post-war Korea was a set of rules and practices classed as the *yŏnjwaje*. The broad purpose of this system is, according to the definition provided in the 1980 Basic Laws of the Republic of Korea that banned the practices, that a person experiences disadvantages due to the actions committed not by him or her but by someone else related to the person. In a narrower definition, which is how the term has been used in post-war Korea, the rule of *yŏnjwaje* refers to the specific domain of civic life in which the culpability for an individual's criminal actions, if these are judged to threaten national security, may be shared by the culpable individual's close relations. In the literature of law and ethics, similar institutional or customary practices appear under the rubric of collective responsibility, contrasting with the principle of individual rights and responsibility sanctified in modern society and law.[10] They also appear in the idiom of being "guilty by association"; "a deplorable ethical concept, a carry-over from our barbaric, tribal past," according to legal historian, Larry May.[11]

Yŏnjwaje has been a familiar term for Koreans—in particular, to people of the

war generation—until recently. It is associated most prominently with the prevailing wartime and post-war conditions in which the punishment against an individual whom the state defined as an enemy of the political community might fall onto the individual's family and kindred. The presence of this individual within the family could be a post-mortem condition, or it could take on other forms of physical absence, such as someone who went missing during the war or one who is believed to have joined the opposite side of the war.

The criminalization of the family was nominally against the law: the practice of collective responsibility was unconstitutional, and was banned as early as 1894 when the first modern constitutional rule was established in Korea. Nevertheless, it was an integral element of the state's penal practice throughout much of the twentieth century and until very recently. Although there have been several attempts to eradicate the practice of collective culpability, which include the 1980 Basic Law mentioned above, the draconian practice actually lasted until the end of 1980s.[12]

The existence of *yŏnjwaje* goes a long way back in the history of Korea. In pre-modern times, collective culpability was an explicit, legitimate element of the penal institution of the feudal dynastic rule, in which those who are judged to have challenged the authority of the sovereign were punished not only with their death but also with the death (or enslavement or banishment to remote areas) of their entire families. The name *yŏnjwa*, meaning literally, "relations seated together", refers to the structure of the feudal court where the judgment against the accused was pronounced in the presence of his dependents and descendants gathered in his back.

Although the *yŏnjwa* system has a long history in Korea, its modern ramifications in the forms briefly described above, however, are not to be considered merely in terms of historical continuity or deplorable cultural survival as the legal historian cited earlier argues. The "barbaric" institution of collective punishment existed in twentieth century Korea not merely as a remnant of the backward past but, as I will argue shortly, primarily because the institution was a highly effective instrument of social control in a particular condition of political modernity and crisis. Moreover, the institutional practice of collective culpability proliferated in Cold War-era Korean politics and society despite the clear public awareness that the practice was unwarranted in modern life.

The persistence of this practice is evident in the continual attempts made by the South Korean lawmakers to annihilate the *yŏnjwa* system. The leader of the 1961 military coup made the promise to abolish the system during his presidential campaign in 1963, and this was followed by the announcement from the South Korean interior ministry in 1966 that the system no longer existed. However, when a new group of military-political elite took over the political power in the subsequent era, a new promise was made to abolish the *yŏnjwa* system. This happened in 1980 and again in 1987, and each time, the decision was supposed to be a real and final abolition.

The *yŏnjwa* system was, therefore, in Korea's post-war Cold War modernity, both a conceptually defunct penal institution in modern society and, in practice, a useful and indispensable instrument in modern politics.

The important point about the *yŏnjwa* system is that this punitive system existed both outside the rule of law and inside the legal order in practice. It was in part a feudal legacy outlawed in Korea's modern constitutional history; nevertheless, the system has had a powerful shadowy presence in the country's modern political and legal history. Its existence in modern life became a source of suffering and bitterness for numerous families and individuals, and it continued to exist until the geopolitical structures of the cold war began to crumble in the late 1980s. Therefore, it is possible to imagine that the system of collective culpability has both pre-modern and modern origins. The fact that the institution was in practice in modern Korea in spite of the general public awareness of its unlawful status within modern politics shows the limits and distortion of political modernity at the outposts of the global Cold War.

The "survival" of the feudal penal system in modern political life can be thus seen as an invention of tradition, relating to the critical questions of sovereignty and citizenship arising from the particularly volatile condition of the global Cold War that Korea faced in the second half of the twentieth century. The system of collective responsibility bespeaks the predicament of state sovereignty and the limit of citizenship in radical bipolar politics. What was this institution that shaped modern politics outside modern law? Why did kinship become the principal site of contradiction between law and politics in Korea's Cold War?

Two-coloured family genealogy

In November 1978, the eldest descendant of the Anh lineage group, in a village north of Andong, northern Kyungsang Province, had an unforgettable encounter with the history of his lineage. Arrested at home the previous evening, Anh was brought to the basement interrogation room of what he later found out was the office of the province's state security agency. In the room, the then forty-five-year-old rice farmer was brought to face a large wall-mounted drawing. Trembling in extreme fear, Anh recognized that the drawing depicted a family genealogical chart.

The drawing listed a number of names branching out from left to right, connected by a gradually expanding set of horizontal and vertical lines. Being the eldest descendant of his lineage group, Anh kept at his home a collection of records that had similar genealogical drawings. It took time, however, before Ahn came to discover that the two dozen names written on the wall-mounted paper were those of his family. It was much later that he noticed also that the names were written in two different colours; most in black and a few in scarlet red. Eventually, Anh recognized the red-coloured names introduced at the centre of the genealogical chart as those of his two

paternal uncles, who had been leading members of Korea's communist movement during the colonial era.

During the next five days, Anh was supposed to assist his interrogators in putting his family's genealogical history in order. What the investigators wanted from him was not clear to Anh at the outset. Anh was repeatedly told that he had to say, truthfully and without concealing anything, everything he knew about his family's past and present in all details. However, he was confused as to what he could do to meet this request since the interrogators did not tell him what they were looking for in his family history. He received beatings, sometimes severe ones, each time he failed to relate "everything". After each beating, he was commanded to look again and examine the drawing on the wall.

This went on, and as the hours passed in that dreadful basement room, Anh said that things started to become clearer to him. He slowly began to understand what his interrogators expected from him, what the drawing on the wall meant to him, and why he had been brought to the room in the first place: his job was to explain the relationship between the two coloured names and the genealogical lines presented on the drawing.

The objective of the interrogation was to superimpose a structure of political and ideological ties onto the structure of blood relations depicted on the wall-mounted drawing. It aimed to establish a web of collaborative political relations between the red-coloured names on the chart, on the one hand, and, on the other, the rest of the names, which were connected to the red-coloured names in lines that indicated descent and collateral ties. Ahn's duty was to provide detailed information about the extent to which his descent group harboured the "red ideology" (i.e., communism) beyond the two red-coloured individuals, his two paternal uncles. The interrogators also wanted from him detailed biographical and historical information on the way in which the commitment to red ideology was allegedly diffused from his paternal uncles to those in other collateral lines within his lineage.

Each time an interrogation session was over and Anh was given some moments to gather his thoughts, he noticed that more red lines had been added to the genealogical diagram. And each time Anh protested the spread of the red-coloured lines to his close and distant relatives, he experienced another round of physical abuse. By the time the interrogation was over, the genealogical chart had changed in colour. The red-coloured elements on the chart had grown from a small to a large proportion, and many new red lines had been added on to the black-coloured lines. Looking at it, Anh said that he felt that nearly the entirety of his lineage group was drenched in the scarlet-red colour of communism.

Ahn's experience speaks of the broadly-held understanding in post-war South Korean society that the family genealogical record, being an important symbol of

communal integrity and continuity, could turn into a weapon against the community's welfare and survival.

The cultural and moral importance of the genealogical record is well illustrated in an episode featured in a biographical account of the Korean War: a family's grandfather, when the family's home was set on fire in the midst of a counterinsurgency action, tried to rescue family treasures from the burning thatched-roofed house. When the old man narrowly escaped a collapsing beam and was carried out to safety by his neighbours, people were surprised to see that the treasure for which the family's grandfather had risked his life was an old faded book—the family's *jŏkbo* or book of genealogy.

The significance of the book of genealogy has another dimension, however. In the above story, the counterinsurgency group set the family's home on fire as a punishment in relation to the old man's eldest son, whom they suspected to be a left-wing intellectual. After the son was later arrested and executed, the book, which the grandfather treated as the family's most treasured object, became the source of a nightmare for the family, especially the grandfather's eldest and only grandson, who was the narrator of this story. The grandson, in his childhood, endured the stigmatizing experience of hearing the villagers' whispers about him and his family as "a family that has red lines in the genealogical record."

"Red lines in the genealogical record" (*hojŏke pp'alganjul*) was a powerful idiom in post-war South Korea. The lines indicated, in popular understanding, that there was a person in the family whose loyalty to the current political society was in doubt. Having these lines in the family record meant that the family as a whole had a politically dubious background. The family record in this context does not refer to the privately possessed documents of genealogical history, such as that which appears in the above story, but the family genealogical registers (*hojŏk*) kept in the public office.

The latter was invented in the 1920s by the Japanese colonial administration, and has since been a primary public source of personal and collective identification in Korea. Recorded information included the person's name and place and date of birth in the context of his or her family relations, as well as the identity of the family group as a whole in terms of its place of origin. "Place of origin" typically refers to the family's "root"; the place where the family's original patrilineal group is believed to be based. In this system, a person may be considered to be rooted in a place that is other than the person's place of birth and where he or she never lived. In today's Korean context, therefore, someone's "root" identity signifies more a place of the dead rather than that of the living: it is where the graves of family and ancestors are located and where individual families, while living separately from each other and mostly in urban areas, gather periodically to visit these ancestral graves and thereby to renew a sense of being together among them through ancestor worship. The public

genealogical documents are associated with this "root" identity and usually kept in the registry office of the district where the place of root identity belongs. It is then intelligible why the thought of a "red line" introduced to this document provokes such strong fear and indignation in the popular imagination. The red line is not merely an element of personal identification, but an indicator of collective identity—such that the family as a whole may have a questionable public and political identity.

In actuality, lines of this kind were not often applied to the public family records in physical terms and, although the fear of them was real for many post-war families, they mostly referred to more implicit indicators of politically non-normative identity. These traces could take the form of a simple handwritten comment on the record—for instance, a note saying "The aforementioned has been missing since July 1950," as was the case with one of my interviewees. This apparently innocent information turned into a powerful threat to my interviewee's personal safety when the information was relegated, through a chain of command, to the security department of the army unit in which he was serving. One of his superior officers later told him that on his family record that the officer had seen, someone had written, next to the above note and in red-coloured pen, that the "aforementioned person", the soldier's father, who disappeared from home during the Korean War, was a "security suspect demanding attention".

The "red lines" in the public genealogical record have may have been less materially real than popular imagination had it, but this does not mean that the fear of them was unwarranted. With reference to the post-war experience of separated families who had relatives in North Korea, it is observed:

> The surveillance against these families, apart from occasions of direct control by the police's security personnel, was on an everyday basis. Most other people encounter the state power when they have broken the law, whereas these families encountered the state's power of exclusion in their everyday life and in a diffused way, on occasions as diverse as when applying for jobs or schools, choosing a spouse, or obtaining a permit to travel overseas. Since their experience of exclusion and discrimination took place in the space of everyday life, such as at school, rather than necessarily in the appropriate designated public space, such as in the police station or in the court, these families tend to speak of these experiences as private affairs [rather than a public, systemic phenomenon].[13]

Indeed, the recent testimonial histories of the Korean War compiled by South Korean historians and anthropologists amply show that the *yŏnjwaje* was a widely applied punitive and disciplinary technique. It applied to diverse aspects of post-war civic life, but was nevertheless without clearly specified rules. One broadly held view understood the rule of collective responsibility in terms of a concentric circle. In this view, illustrated by many stories told by people who claim to have been victimized by the rule, the *yŏnjwaje* draws a circle around the vital public institutions that constitute

the state power, excluding the social groups, whose political loyalty the state doubts, the right to join the space within the concentric circle. The many episodes of failing to enter the civil service, legal profession, national police, or the military officer corps for children from families with "red lines" illustrate the existence of the *yŏnjwaje* rule in this political concentric form.

A number of instances have been also reported in which these children were forced to choose alternative careers in the so-called outer circle of public service, such as in the teaching profession within the national educational system, where the imposition of security rules was relatively less severe. Some of these episodes also feature differences between public schools (state-directed schools) and private schools (i.e., run by Christian or Buddhist religious groups or by other private sectors) for the career prospect of people who have politically non-normative family backgrounds. It is suggested that this aspect of the *yŏnjwaje* rule explains the relatively high proportion of such people in South Korea's literary world, who in turn played a pivotal role, in the late 1980s and 1990s, in exposing the hitherto unseen history of the Korean War in fictional and semi-fictional forms, departing radically from the existing dominant national narrative.

The predicament of Anh was mainly related to the historical fact that his paternal uncles had been active in the region's communist movement during the colonial time in the 1930s. His father was the eldest son and, after the death of their father, supported his younger brothers while the latter were in hiding, and later in the colonial prison. Following the death of his father, the responsibility to keep the ancestral farmland, family tombs, and the genealogical record of the lineage fell onto Anh's shoulders. As the eldest descendant of his lineage, he is nominally in charge of the lineage affairs and regarded as such by his kin. The gruesome experience he endured at the security office was mainly because of his status as the eldest descendant, who is supposed to have a broad knowledge of the lineage's genealogical history and family affairs.

However, after he was released, Ahn discovered that he was not the only one from the family who had been arrested. While he was held in a room at the basement of the security agency, his cousin, who was the descendant of one of Anh's paternal uncles, was undergoing a similar experience in another room. Although Anh still does not understand what the interrogators wanted from him and why they were interested in his family's genealogical order and history, he said that he understood at least why he had been brought to them: "For my cousin, it is obvious. He is a man with a communist father. That makes him a red. For me, it is equally obvious. I am the eldest descendant of what they see as a red [Communist] bloodline. That makes me a red who carries on his back the heritage of a red family."

The docile collective body

Foucault's account of the origin of modern prison draws upon Bentham's panoptic techniques. These techniques are emblematic of Bentham's general utilitarian approach to modern society and governance, which is focused on the economic efficacy of institutional forms. Foucault allocates to the techniques another dimension of efficacy—namely, that in the system of surveillance, the object of the disciplinary action (the isolated docile body) participates in the system quasi-willingly (rather than necessarily being forced into it) on the basis of its adaptation to the system's "mechanics of power" (thereby becoming what Foucault calls "the practised body").[14] The panoptic techniques are portable to other institutional contexts, such as schools, army, and hospitals, according to Foucault, and therefore generate a higher efficacy (the body trained in one specific institutional disciplinary context is already made ready for adjusting to another, thus becoming "useful individuals" for society).[15] The portability (or what Foucault calls "the art of distributions"), in turn, generates the benefit of an economy of knowledge, in that the knowledge of control obtained and cumulated in one institutional setting can apply to controlling activities in another setting since, according to Foucault, "each provides a model for the other."[16]

The above depiction of the origin of modern penal practice is so widely known and cited that I will not get into more details here. Instead, I will limit the discussion to two specific issues concerning the relational human body mentioned at the start of this essay.

Firstly, the premise of the docile body is predicated on the modality of the individual subject and the related assumption that in modern societies the relationship between the person and the community is replaced by that between the individual and the state. Before being docile within the structure of power, the human subjects need to be isolated from one another, and, for this, it is required that the subject becomes a modern self, freed from traditional communal bonds. Only this radically autonomous self, such as that which appears in French existentialist thought, may join the modern disciplinary regime as a meaningful participant in the way described by Foucault.[17] In other words, the docile body is the body of a fully autonomous individual in action, and not that of a human actor who is yet unacquainted with the modern ontology of individualism.

Secondly, the human body that inhabits a modern disciplinary regime is primarily a physical body. Thomas Flynn argues: "Although a history of the modern 'soul', *Discipline and Punish* is primarily about the *body*. First of all, it is about that physical body which can be trained, whipped into shape, rendered a docile, productive tool of society. But it is about the 'body politic' as well, a term which gains new meaning at Foucault's hands, namely, 'a set of material elements and techniques which serve as weapons, relays, communication routes and supports for the *power and knowledge*

relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge."[18] If the regime controls the body, it can control the individual (and therefore the society) through it, for, by controlling the body, the regime can control the person's soul.

In this way, Foucault shares one of the central tenets in the early French sociological school: that "the soul is the prison of the body."[19] This idiom represents the break of modern knowledge practices from the previous theology-dominated era. In the pre-modern era, the focus of knowledge was on the question of soul because the idea that a soul brings man to existence prevailed in this era; modern knowledge turns away from this tradition, shifting its focus to observable facts and phenomena, such as the body. Thus, the human subject as the object of knowledge is not what it thinks and feels but rather what it does and how it does it. Likewise, according to Foucault, it is this "very materiality as an instrument and vector of power" on which the political investments of modern times focus.[20]

Foucault's erudition is, therefore, based on the idea that a radical rupture took place in European penal practices in the transition to modernity. In his work on the history of prison, Foucault associates the rupture with the rise of the panoptical surveillance system as the dominant technology of control in place of the spectacle of punishment. The change in penal system is closely related, in his understanding, to the rise of the autonomous, isolated individual in place of the community-bound moral person as the new object of social control. Thus, in his account, the invention of the modern prison corresponds closely to the invention of modern society and modern individuality—that is, the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft.* Foucault illustrates this historical rupture in a plague-stricken French town in the late seventeenth century, from which he derives the idea that the origin of modern disciplinary society is a mechanism of disease control—the invention of "the seeing machine," as he calls it:[21]

> The town was a quarantined space against the spread of the plague that it was suffering from. The residents were locked up inside their houses, allowed to communicate with the outside world only through the syndic who keeps the street under surveillance, and they were forbidden from leaving the street, the violation of which constituted a condemnation to death. The syndic kept an eye on the houses of the street he was in charge of and was to report to the intendant responsible for quarantining the wider residential area. At the end of each street was a sentinel where guards stood on alert, and all the gates to the town were also guarded by the militia and at each of them stood a tall observation tower. Each household was compelled to report everything about its activity to the chain of the quarantine authority—"to speak the truth under pain of death"; the authority was to observe all actions and events taking place within the regimented city's space through its agents of surveillance entrenched in the regimented spatial order.

Foucault presents the structure of the quarantined city as a "political dream" of the

modern disciplinary society—"the utopia of the perfectly governed city"—an ideal exemplar of Bentham's panoptical technology of control, in which "each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible," and "he is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication" (p. 200). As such, he contrasts the city's spatial structure to what he sees as the quintessential modality of disease control in pre-modern times: the exile community of the leper. He writes (p.198):

> The leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure; he was left to his doom in a mass among which it was useless to differentiate; those sick with the plague were caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were the constricting effects of a power that multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself; the great confinement on the one hand; the correct training on the other. The leper and his separation; the plague and its segmentations. The first is marked; the second analyzed and distributed. The exile of the leper and the arrest of the plague do not bring with them the same political dream. The first is that of a pure community, the second that of a disciplined society. Two ways of exercising power over men, of controlling their relations, of separating out their dangerous mixtures."

An epidemiological model of society as a vulnerable organism was familiar to the anti-communist politics of the early Cold War.[22] Edgar Hoover saw communism as "a condition akin to disease that spreads like an epidemic, and like an epidemic, a quarantine is necessary to keep it from infecting the nation."[23] In 1950, an important report, known as *NSC-68*, from the U.S. National Security Council, describes the Soviet Union as aimed to "contaminate" the Western world with their preferred technique of infiltrating "labor unions, civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for influencing opinion." In parallel with the urgency to stop domestic contagion, the document argues that, internationally, there is a need "to quarantine a growing number of infected [by the disease of communism] states".[24] *NSC-68* asserts that the enemies of the liberal world are shadowy and entrenched within society as well as embodied by radical political movements and states out there on the distant geographical horizons. These assertions became materialized in the public policy initiatives of the mid-century United States, as seen in Harry S. Truman's 1947 speech, "Disloyal and Subversive Elements Must Be Removed from the Employ of the Government," concerning the establishment of the Disloyalty Review Board—measures, as is well known, that were to take on a more radical tone and form with the outbreak of the Korean War.[25] Considering this development, Ron Robin writes: "American society of the 1950s was increasingly fascinated by the threat of a foreign presence within the American body politic. The political, social, and intellectual atmosphere of the period reflected concern for, and fascination with, the enemy within".[26]

The anti-communist politics of post-war South Korea was at the frontline of the global "quarantining," and it also advanced an epidemiological view to social and political relations.[27] It aimed to build an ideologically pure, morally disciplined society that stood meaningfully on the global frontline, and it sought to deal with "the threat of a foreign presence" within the body politic accordingly. The enemy within and the carrier of infectious foreign ideology that was given concrete forms in this political process was not an individual but a person in relationship. The object of discipline and punishment was not necessarily the individual's isolated body, but the rich web of relationship that makes the individual a moral person. Because the focus of punishment was on relation and body in relation, the body of the accused was never isolated in the first place and the accused was not able to prove his or her innocence unless able to pull his or herself out of the condemned relational body or make the relational body as a whole innocent.

The disciplinary society invented in the age of the Cold War and at the frontline of the global ideological struggle was neither merely in the image of the pure community of lepers nor solely according to the segmentary structure of the plague control. Rather, the political dream of this society was close to a creative combination of these two modalities of control, thereby making a polity of docile subjects based on the isolation from society of contaminated relations. The structure of this disciplinary society is unintelligible if we take for granted what Foucault says about these docile subjects as being "alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible." On the contrary, the ideal subjects, in the political dream of the frontline anti-communist society, were those who are never alone and never free from the liabilities of communal relations and who are constantly vigilant against the contamination of these relations by alien thoughts and beliefs.

Notes

1 Steven Hugh Lee, *The Korean War* (New York: Longman, 2001).

2 Kim, Dong-Choon, *The Unending Korean War: A Social History,* trans. Sung-Ok Kim (Larkspur, CA: Tamal Vista Publications, 2009), pp. 3–38.

3 Park, Chan-Sung, *The Korean War That Went into the Village: The Korean War's Small Village Wars* (Paju, Kyunggi-do: Dolbege, 2010, in Korean).

4 Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 14.

5 Polymeris Voglis, *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners during the Greek Civil War* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2002), pp. 7–8.

6 Ibid., pp. 6–10.

7 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Penguin, 1991), p. 224.

8 Ibid., pp. 216–7.

9 Ibid., p. 224.

10 Elazar Barkan, "Individual versus Group Rights in Western Philosophy and the Law," in Nyla R Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.) *Collective Guilt: International Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 309.

11 Quoted from Larry May, *The Morality of Groups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), p. 8. See also Elazar Barkan, "Individual versus Group Rights," p. 311.

12 *Yŏnjwaje* ended in South Korea in 1988. The outlawing of this institutional practice was one of the first legal reforms undertaken by the democratically elected legislative body after the fall of the military rule in 1987. Commentators in Korea hailed the reform as a historic progress in the country's legal history. However the reform was a profoundly paradoxical initiative. Formally *yŏnjwaje* had always been an unconstitutional practice in post-colonial Korea. The 1948 constitution of the Republic of Korea includes an article that specifically declares the abolition of the system. In subsequent decades, various political leaders promised again the abolition of *jŏnjwaje*.

13 Cho, Sung-Mi Cho and Kim, Gui-Ok, "Wŏlbukin yugajokŭi bangongjŏk ŏkapgwa 'wŏlbuk'ŭi ŭimich'egye" (Anti-communist repressions against the families of individuals who moved to North Korea and the meanings of 'moving to North'), in Gui-Ok Kim (ed.) *Isangajok, 'bangongjŏnsa'do 'ppalgaeni'do anin: isangajok munjerŭl bonŭn saeroun sigak* (Divided families, neither anti-communist warriors nor 'red' individuals: new perspectives to the problems of divided families), (Seoul: Historical Criticism Press, 2004), p. 178.

14 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 138.

15 Ibid., p. 141.

16 Ibid, p. 221

17 This choice to highlight the autonomous, displaced "modern" self in historical inquiry is also methodological choice. That "what Foucault calls his "[historical] nominalism" is per force of a kind of methodological individualism. It treats collectives such as the State of abstractions like "man" or "power" as reducible, for purposes of explanation, to the individuals that comprise them." Thomas R. Flynn, "Foucault and Historical Nominalism," Harold A. Durfee and David F. T. Rodier (eds.), *Phenomenology and Beyond: The Self and Its Language* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 134.

18 Ibid., p. 138

19 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 30.

20 Ibid., p. 31.

21 Ibid., p. 207.

22 Ibid., p. 7.

23 Quoted from Cynthia Hendershot, *Anti-Communism and Popular Culture in Mid-Century America* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), p. 13.

24 Douglas Field, "Introduction," in D. Field (ed.) *American Cold War Culture* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), pp. 3–4.

25 Walter LaFeber, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents* (New York: John Wiley, 1971, pp. 165–167.

26 Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 168.

27 Syngman Rhee said, "Communism is like cholera. Once cannot make compromise with cholera [virus]." Quoted from Yu Young-il, "Unam Rhee Syngman's Thoughts about Reform and State-building," *Aseahakbo* (Asian Studies Journal) 20 (1997), p. 40.

THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR ON THE ARTS

YOUNGNA KIM

I

In many ways, the people of Korea are still waiting for the Korean War to end. The standoff between North and South Korea across the demilitarized zone located on the 38th Parallel continues to wield invisible influence over both countries, not only in politics, but also in economy, society, and culture. Although the war has been directly represented in several landmark works of Korean literature, such as Choi Inhun's *Gwangjang* (The Square) and Yi Byeongju's *Jirisan* (Mt. Jiri), there have been very few works of visual art which have explicitly addressed this national trauma. It seems that the distress of witnessing the ideologically motivated massacres, retaliations, and other atrocities of the Korean War effectively deterred Korean artists from responding with works of a distinctly political nature. Although the war and its aftermath clearly had a lingering effect on these artists, most of them were only able to artistically rectify their horrific memories and experiences through metaphor.

This paper is a survey of the impact of the Korean War on art and artists in Korea. First, it will present the activities and works of the official troop of war photographers and war artists, respectively. Then, it will examine how the Korean War was remembered by artists in government-commissioned war monuments and works based on personal wartime experience. Finally, it will analyze more recent works by artists who did not experience the war, to see how the Korean War has been viewed by later generations.

II

The Korean War is remembered through photography more than any other medium.[1] The United States National Archives and Records Administration holds hundreds of thousands of photographs related to the Korean War. Journalists from all over the world came to Korea when the war broke out, and approximately 270 reporters and photographers contributed to the prodigious photographic history of the conflict. One of the most iconic images of the Korean War is Max Desfor (1914–)'s Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph of refugees scaling a bombed bridge over the Daedong River. This image of North Korean civilians risking their lives to seek freedom and

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democracy in the South justified the mission of the United Nations, which deployed large numbers of troops to the war.

The South Korean government was not prepared to deal with the war in any systematic way. It was only in August 1950, two months after the war began, that the government managed to mobilize an official war photographers' troop under the Army Information Agency of the Department of Defense. According to a number of testimonies, many of these men became official war photographers based on the promise of an identity card and an exemption from the draft.[2]

During wartime, the Army Information Agency was charged with disseminating war photographs through the press and other outlets and securing the understanding and trust of the public. The official war photographers' troop was responsible for recording and reporting vivid images of the war. Although they were not financially compensated, the photographers were provided with necessary materials, including Kodak film and Leica IIIB cameras. They were also allowed to eat at the Department of Defense canteen and to ride in military vehicles. All of their photographs were subject to control and censorship, and those pictures that were approved would often be displayed on the news board at the army headquarters, as well as for civilians in the rear.[3] Unfortunately, the film negatives which were kept at the Army Information Agency have disappeared due to poor management. Most of the surviving pictures were taken using personal cameras and remain in private collections. Therefore, the specifics of the situation at the time are difficult to verify.

Figure 1. Im Insik, *Destroyed T34 Tank*, 1950

Lieutenant Im In-sik (1920–98), who led the Information Agency of Army official war photographers' troop, captured many images of the war before he was discharged in June 1952.[4] Some of his pictures, such as *American Soldier Captured and Murdered*, were picked up by the Associated Press and sent across the world, receiving widespread coverage in the U.S. press. Interestingly, since pre-war photography in Korea had been dominated by pictorialism, very few photographers were experienced in "straight photography." Thus, the war images captured by Korean photographers tend to be highly artistic, as exhibited by Im's *Destroyed T34 Tank* (fig. 1) photo. The slant of light in the frame robs the destroyed, abandoned tank of its menacing materiality, giving the photo the aura of a Romantic image of ruins.

Of the Korean photographers, Lee Gyeongmo (1926–2001) had the most experience with documentary photography. As a staff photographer for the Honam Newspaper, he had previously captured vivid images of the Yeosu Rebellion of October 1948, which arose from a conflict between the right and left wings, foreshadowing the Korean War. One of Lee's most harrowing pictures of the aftermath of the rebellion shows a row of victims dead on the ground, with straw ropes bound around their necks and ankles, while a woman with a baby on her back looks for the body of her dead husband. Without expressing any ideological position, the photo presents a powerful image of the plight of ordinary people. Lee was one of the most active of the Korean War photographers, capturing images of refugees, the South Korean army's advances, and North Korean prisoners of war. These photographers' experiences covering the war instilled a strong sense of duty in them, and became the foundation for the rise in popularity of documentary photography after the war.

The Korean Department of Defense did not form the official war painters' troop until June 1951, a year after the outbreak of the war.[5] The Department of Defense ostensibly expected to get depictions of battle scenes, representations of the lives of refugees, and yearnings for peace, but in reality the artists received few specific directives. In fact, there were some who believed that certain cultural figures persuaded leaders in the Department of Defense to establish the troop in order to protect artists and provide them with accommodation and ID cards.[6] Thus, it seems that the official war painters' troop may have been formed for reasons other than the systematic production of painted representations of the war. Few of the artists from the troop regularly witnessed heavy combat, though most made occasional trips to the frontlines to make sketches. They relied on returning soldiers to tell them about the handling of prisoners of war, the disposal of dead Chinese soldiers, and the extent of damage sustained by the South Korean army.[7]

The approximately 40 members of the official war painters' troop held a total of six exhibitions of war documentary paintings. The first of these, "War Painters' Exhibition Commemorating March 1," was held in Busan in March 1952, and featured the work of 25 artists. Most of the works were small drawings which depicted life

Figure 2. Yoo Byeonghui, *Battle on Mount Dosol*, 1951

in the rear, unrelated to the war. Even nude paintings were included. At the sixth and final "Official War Painters' Troop Art Exhibition," held in March 1953, the Minister of Defense Prize for best painting went to Moon Hakjin (1924–)'s *Trench*, a vivid portrait of soldiers crawling in the trenches and throwing grenades. Sadly, the painting itself became a casualty of the war, surviving only in the form of a black-and-white photograph.

In 1951, traditional-ink painter Yoo Byeonghui (1919–) painted *Battle on Mount Dosol* (fig. 2), which depicts an intense skirmish between the North and South Korean armies. The flag of South Korea soars high in the air, while the North Korean flag has fallen to the ground, suggesting the former's triumph.

A number of war-related works by Lee Sooeok (1918–90) have also survived. A graduate of the Tokyo Imperial Art College, Lee was active in North Korea before the war. Based on his record of service as the chair of an artists' alliance in North Korea, it can be safely presumed that Lee was familiar with the Socialist Realist style. When the Chinese army entered the war, he took refuge in the South with his family, and eventually became an official war painter who served in the Central Front. His *Night Battle* (1952), which depicts soldiers digging out a trench, was exhibited in the same year as the first "Official War Painters' Troop Exhibition" and received the Army Chief of Staff Prize. This accomplished painting is noted for its outstanding composition and its realistic rendering of soldiers engaged in a battle, firing stun grenades.

Of the paintings produced by the official war painters' troop during the Korean War, only a minimal number depict fierce battles. Most of these focus on the South Korean army while showing little of their enemies. The reason for this is that the painters did not share a collective feeling of patriotism that might be expressed as a wish to destroy the enemy and conquer its territory. In an internecine conflict like the Korean War, it is not always easy to distinguish one's own forces from the enemy,

or to separate the victims from the perpetrators. Painter Lee Joon (1919–) explained some of the wartime problems faced by the official war painters' troop:

> "The war painters made several works, but most of them were just small sketches, so it's difficult to call them serious war documentary paintings. But you have to remember that there was a lack of materials, and that we were all focusing on how to live day-to-day and survive the war. There wasn't a lot of desire to make our work anti-communist or to encourage people's morale… I also believe that we wanted to avoid using our paintings to document the tragedy of our people fighting one another."[8]

Since it was the official war painters' troop's duty to document the war, most of the works discussed above focus on realism. However, the South Korean war painters understood that Socialist Realism, which was born in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, represented the artistic mainstream in North Korea. Notably, when these painters worked as individual artists, rather than as members of the troop, they actively tried to distance themselves from the Realist style. At that time, the main alternative to Realism was European Modernism.

Lee Sooeok experimented with Cubism in his 1954 work *The Korean War* (fig. 3), which he painted after the war had ended. The figures portrayed in this painting—a father pushing his child and his belongings on a cart, a young girl carrying her younger sibling on her back, a mother holding a bundle of blankets with a young boy walking by her side—represented the actual experiences that most Koreans

Figure 3. Lee Sooeok, *The Korean War,* 1954, oil on canvas

Figure 4. Byeon Yeongwon, *Anti-Communist Wandering Spirit,* 1952, oil on canvas

had during the war. But the agony of becoming a refugee dissipates because of the balanced composition, in which geometric shapes are fitted together like a puzzle.

The work from this period that is most strongly influenced by Pablo Picasso (1881–1973)'s *Guernica*, 1937, is Byeon Yeongwon (1921–88)'s *Anti-Communist Wandering Spirit* (fig. 4), 1952, which memorably delineates the inhumane and indiscriminate carnage of war. The painting shows human and machine hybrid figures holding bombs and dashing across a battlefield. These fragmented forms, with their bulging eyes and bodily dimensions, are reminiscent of Picasso's distorted figures of women from the 1930s, and also suggest a sort of madness often associated with Surrealism.

Many Korean artists continued to address these issues well into the 1950s and 60s. But instead of providing more portraits of battles or refugees, the war-related works which appeared after the end of the war more often dealt with abstract topics such as an individual's attachment to life and a loss of faith in humanity.

Nam Kwan (1911–90), who left for Paris in 1955, continued to focus on his memory of the war in his works of the 1960s. Kwan remarked that the fallen soldiers, broken limbs, and refugees he witnessed during his flight from Seoul became motifs for his abstract paintings. The dark colours and mood of his painting *The Movement in the Shadow* (1961), which seems to represent the transformation of a human form into an abstract form, reflects the lingering pain of the war.

Kim Youngjoo (1920–95), who worked as an official war painter, tried to express humanity's despair in his work *Age of Darkness,* which he worked on from 1958 until 1961. Kim places a scene of a crucifixion against a black background, in a work that is

reminiscent of the *Isenheim Altarpiece*, 1515, by German Renaissance artist Matthias Grünewald (c.1470–1528). The theme of despair also haunts a related drawing by Kim entitled *Black Sun, Crucifixion, 6.25*, which shows the Madonna and Child, the crucifixion, an image of a bird, and a screaming human being.

III

Since the end of the Korean War, many of the most notable war-related artworks have been the national monuments initiated by the government. These monuments serve to remember those who died during the war, and to represent the beliefs and ideals that they died for. Even before the Korean War came to an end, sculptor Park Chilseong (1929–) erected his *Mother and Child Commemorating the Recovery of the Lost Territory* in Sokcho, a city near the 38th parallel where many North Korean refugees lived. Park's sculpture emphasized the importance of family because one of the most traumatizing aspects of the Korean War was the dispersions and deaths of family members. The theme of a mother and child was frequently used in monuments and postwar art.

War monuments only began to be constructed in large numbers in the late 1950s, once the governmental system had recovered from the shock of war and regained some degree of normality. Anti-communism was the foremost policy of South Korea, and it was the duty of all male youths to serve in the military. This militant social climate is well reflected in the war memorials which began to appear all across the country, the majority of which were highly formulaic. For example, Kim Gyeongseung (1915–92)'s *A Monument to the Dead Soldiers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force*, which was erected in 1957 in Mt. Yongdoo Park, Busan, features three figures (symbolizing the three branches of the military) holding rifles, bayonets, and grenades, while the central figure is holding a dove. The figures' muscular physiques and the overall heroism of the monument are reminiscent of the Socialist Realist style. Nevertheless, there was no criticism of this similarity at the time of its unveiling, and its idealized image of heroes served as a model for later monuments.

Perhaps the most nationally celebrated war monument was *Monument to General MacArthur* (fig. 5), also by Kim. This sculpture, which was an initiative of the Department of Domestic Affairs, was erected in the Incheon Freedom Park in 1957 to commemorate the seventh anniversary of the Incheon Landing Operation. The operation, successfully manoeuvered by General Douglas MacArthur, led to the reclamation of Seoul and the retreat of the North Korean army, and marked a critical early turning point for the South Korean forces. The monument was largely financed through donations collected from citizens at the behest of President Rhee Seung-man. In addition to the statue of the general, which was based on photographs supplied by

Figure 5. Kim Gyeongseung, *General Douglas MacArthur,* 1957, bronze

Figure 6. Yun Seoungjin, *Statue of Brothers,* 1994, War Memorial

the military, Kim also created a pedestal decorated with reliefs depicting the Incheon Landing Operation.

More than 40 years after the Korean War ended, the national effort to remember the war continued. In June 1994, the National War Memorial opened in Yongsan, Seoul, commemorating all of the wars in Korean history. However, almost half of the exhibition space is dedicated to objects related to the Korean War, which illustrates the persistence of the bitter memories of that conflict. Outside of the massive memorial hall, there stands *Statue of Brothers* (fig. 6), 1994, a huge sculpture of two brothers sharing a dramatic embrace. Based on the true story, the older brother is a South Korean soldier, and the younger brother is a North Korean soldier. This motif of two brothers who are forced to become enemies has now appeared in so many Korean dramas and movies that it has almost become cliché, yet it remains the best symbol for the tragedy of the Korean War.

IV

At the end of the 1950s, a group of young artists in their early 30s led a collective outburst of artistic expression related to the war experience. These artists, many of whom graduated from either the recently established College of Fine Arts at Hongik University or Seoul National University, were members of the post-liberation generation. They had strong, distinct memories of the war, since all of them either fought in combat or grew up amidst the turmoil of the post-war years. These young artists, who were filled with sorrow, doubt and disbelief, were searching for a spiritual anchor, and they were extremely disillusioned with the conservative nature of Korean art. They had greater affinity for movements such as *Informel* and Abstract Expressionism, which emerged from the rubble of Western Europe after World War II and eventually reached the United States. Korean artists found much to identify with in the works of these movements: the post-war spiritual dislocation, the lack of faith in former methods, the disdain for established power structures, and the passion for artistic innovation. Although the Koreans often did not have access to detailed information about *Art Informel* or Abstract Expressionism, they remained extremely enthusiastic about the dynamic intensity of the brushwork and the overall autonomy of paint they saw in contemporary European and American works. Many Korean *Informel* artists created works reminiscent of European and American gesture art by using aggressive brush strokes to slather thick layers of paint onto huge canvases (fig. 7).

In the realm of sculpture, young Korean artists began experimenting with welding metal, a technique that had only recently emerged as an artistic possibility. Although Korean society was impoverished and deprived of many vital materials, there was no shortage of scrap metal. Many sculptors procured metal pieces and barrels from

Figure 7. Kim Tchangyeul, *Ritual no. 1*, 1968, oil on canvas

the numerous scrap metal dealers and iron foundries, which they then cut with a straw cutter and welded into sculptures. The fiery process of torch-welding made these war-tested young artists feel like warriors. One particularly important source of material was the metal barrels which the American army used for distributing or selling oil, which were cut open, flattened, and fabricated into other metal products, including buses. Park Jongbae (1935–) recalls that he often used the remnants of military vehicles which he found on Mt. Wawoo, near Hongik University. "Whenever I used those metal plates to make a work, I remembered the scars of war and realized the meaning of the power called destruction."[9] One work which Park made from scrapped military vehicles was *Circle of History* (1965), which he described by saying, "The work held traces of a glaring rage, sharp pangs and tender pains, cold criticisms as well as a heaving anger that was on the verge of bursting, as well as an unapproachable volcanic heat… "[10] The rough, craterous surface of the work is indeed reminiscent of destructive anger and explosive passion.

Park Seokwon (1941–)'s *Scorched Earth* (fig. 8), 1968, is a similar work, which the artist described as expressing the "human feeling of emptiness after the wretchedness and misery of war."[11] As the title suggests, the contrast between the smooth surface and rough interior of metal symbolizes ruined soil, or a society ruined by war.

As the South Korean economy grew by leaps and bounds in the 1970s, art

Figure 8.
Park Seokwon,
Scorched Earth,
1968, iron

Figure 9. Im Oksang, *Kim Family after the Korean War*, 1990, mineral colour on paper relief

works which addressed the war became scarce. It was not until the emergence of *Minjung Misool* (People's Art) in the 1980s that topics related to the Korean War resurfaced. Led by a generation that did not experience the war, *Minjung Misool* was not interested in producing works which directly depicted scenes of war. Instead, they took on the problem of dispersed families and protested against the influence of the U.S. military, which remained a fixture in South Korea after the war. Im Oksang (1952–)'s painting *Kim Family after the Korean War* (fig. 9) takes the form of a family picture taken at the birthday party of an old parent, but six figures in the group are whitened out. The picture contains no clues as to the fate of these vanished figures, leaving the viewer to imagine where they are or whether they are still alive or not. *Minjung* artists viewed the culture of the West as trash, stained by the influence of capitalism and materialism. They identified with the *minjung*, or "common people's" culture, which was firmly rooted in the earth. Thus, many of the foremost works of the movement treated farming as their subject. Shin Hakcheol (1943–)'s *Modern Korean History—Rice Planting* shows the southern half of the peninsula filled with the garbage of capitalist and materialist culture, while the northern half contains an idealized depiction of farming communities. In 1989, the authorities reacted to this work, which they felt was pro-North Korean, by confiscating the painting and imprisoning the artist for violation of the National Security Law.

Beginning around 2000, a new generation emerged with its own unique perspective on the Korean War and its impact. Kim Hongsok (1964–)'s video work *Wild Korea* (2005) presents itself as a documentary featuring interviews with "real" Koreans, but it is actually a fictional film with a script and professional actors. The story starts from the premise that, in 1997, the Korean government legalized the private possession of firearms in an attempt to become an advanced democratic country. With access to guns, people react to even the most trivial issues by shooting and killing one another. One interviewee states that he was kidnapped by his ex-girlfriend and then killed in front of a crowd of onlookers. He claims that he was shot because his face was red, and that his face turned blue from shock just before his death. With this ending, the viewers come to realize that they have been watching an interview with a person who is already dead. The video ends with a scene declaring that, after three months, the Korean government again prohibited the possession of firearms.

There are many ways to interpret this work. It reflects the society where people have been endlessly conditioned to report any suspicious people as spies. Also, the killing scene evokes an execution by a people's court during the Korean War. Most of all, the reference to colour in Korean society is a subtle critique of the nation's ideology. Since the ending of the Korean War and the division of the country, Koreans have consistently been subjected to anti-Communist ideology, which identifies the colour red with the most dangerous form of dissidence. Although the frozen relations between the North and South have shown sporadic signs of thawing, ideological

colour remains a political problem that is strategically deployed every time there is a transition in government, and which contributes to the strained relationship between the two Koreas. Kim's video work functions as a comedy which forces us to confront difficult facts and reflects the culture and ideology of Korean society.

In response to the several decades of Korean military culture, Lee Yongbaek (1966–) created his work *Angel-Soldier* (fig. 10), which combines diverse art forms such as performance art, video art, and installation art. Against a fabric flamboyantly decorated with digitally printed flowers, soldiers, whose uniforms and rifles are "camouflaged" with more flowers, participate in a military drill called "the silent walk." At first, the viewer finds it difficult to discern any movement, but prolonged attention reveals that the soldiers are slowly and repetitively moving forward and stopping. In the entire 30-minute video, the soldiers only cover about 16 meters of ground. Their forward movements are executed in deadly silence, but when they stop, the soundtrack fills with the sound of birds singing. In this simulated battlefield, the soldiers are in constant danger of being vanquished by the flowers. The title of *Angel-Soldier* takes on added meaning when one realizes that "angel" is also a slang word for a computer hacker who attacks the large corporate networks.

Jeon Joonho (1969–), another artist in his early forties, has demonstrated a similar interest in both the military culture which has become a mainstay of Korean life and the demoralizing situation in North Korea. One of Jeon's preferred media is currency. For his work *Welcome*, Jeon scanned the 50 won North Korean bill, which features a picture of Mt. Baekdoo. He then made a digital animation which documents the efforts of several North Korean helicopters to install a giant WELCOME sign on the side of

Figure 10. Lee Yongbaek, *Angel-Soldier*, 2005, HD Video

Figure 11a. Jeon Joonho, *Statue of Brothers,* digital simulation of installation



Figure 11b. Jeon Joonho, *Statue of Brothers*

Mt. Baekdoo in order to woo foreign tourists, similar to the famous Hollywood sign on Mt. Lee in Los Angeles. In Jeon's work, the helicopter pilot mistakenly switches the letters "E" and "M," forcing him to make a return trip. In the final scene of the video, two of the helicopters collide with each other, causing an explosive sheet of fire. The video plays on the humour of seeing North Korea emulate the "Hollywood" style of its capitalist arch enemy, the United States, while providing a reminder as to the potential calamity which may result from any mistakes in the tenuous relations between the South and the North.

In his *Statue of Brother* (figs. 11a, 11b), Jeon appropriates the famous sculpture of the embracing brothers from the War Memorial in Yongsan, as described in section III. Jeon separated the older and younger brother, shrunk them down into plastic toy-like figures, and then replicated them numerous times. Next, he motorized the cavalcade of tiny statues so that they spin and move around each other to the tune of a waltz. However, whenever two of the statues get close enough to one another, a sensor is triggered which sends them in opposite directions, such that they can never embrace each other as in the original statue. Jeon's work asserts that the division of

Figure 12. Kim Atta, On Air Project 023–2, *The DMZ Series, The Central Front*, 2004

Korea is actually the result of a power play between larger, stronger nations, in which Korea can only act as a puppet.

Recently there has been a lot of ecological interest in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) which divides Korea, stretching for 155 miles across the 38th parallel. The DMZ has been preserved for sixty years without any human presence. For the series *On Air Project*, photographer Kim Atta (1956–) used his 8x10 camera to capture almost 10,000 long exposure photos of the DMZ, which he then digitally superimposed to create a time-lapse sequence (fig. 12). Because of the camera's stillness and the duration of the exposure, any signs of movement were inscribed as a ghostly wisp. Kim said that whenever he set up his cameras, the North Korean soldiers were on high alert, creating a very tense atmosphere. The primary subject of the finished series is time itself, which has allowed nature to reclaim the area and vanquish all traces of the war after a mere 60 years.

The Korean War was unlike any other war, in that it was not caused by a territorial incursion or a conflict of interest between two countries. Rather, it was a war between proxies of two ideologies — democracy and communism — which was fought between people who had previously shared a history. Korean War art did not consist of systematic propaganda which enacted clear distinctions between allies and enemies. Even though there was an official troop of war artists, its members assert that they witnessed and depicted the war through their own eyes, rather than as members of an "official" institution. Even after the war, instead of showing pure contempt for the enemy and support for the homeland, artists focused more on universal human ideals, such as freedom, dignity, and unity. Another remarkable trait in these individual bodies of work from the post-war period is the fact that they all tend to reflect the influence of abstract art or Modernism. Because of the colonial period and the war, Korean artists felt somewhat antiquated in terms of international trends, and they resolved to catch up during the postwar period. The works of later generations, such as the *Minjung* artists and the 21st-century generation, show that there remain significant differences in perspectives on the Korean War and the country's division. They regard the division of Korea as the collateral result of a power struggle between stronger nations which cannot be solved by two Koreas alone.

Notes

1 Kim Hyeonggon, *Hanguk jeonjeng ui gieok gwa sajin* (The memories and photographs of the Korean War), Hanguk haksul jeongbo, Seoul, 2007, 27.

2 It was abolished later.

3 Kim Yunjeong, *Documentary roseo ui Hanguk jeonjeng sajin* (The photographs of the Korean War as documentary), Master's thesis, Seoul National University, 2009, 22.

4 Im Insik, *Uriga bon Hanguk jeonjeng* (The Korean War we have witnessed), Nunbit, Seoul, 2008.

5 The memories of artists on the official war painters' troop were slightly different from each other. Read *6.25 jeonjeng misuljosa yeongu bogoseo* (Report on research into Korean War art), Jeonjengginyeom saeophoe (War Memorial Committee), Seoul, 2008, 9–12; "Jonggun hwagadan ui silsang (The reality of the war painters' troop), *Wolgan Misul*, June, 1990, 65–68; Jung-eon jonggun jakgadul ui itcheojin jeonjeng (Testimony, the forgotten war of the war painters' troop), *Wolgan Misul*, February, 2002, 120–129; "Sok imsi sudo cheonil (A sequel, a thousand days of temporary capital)," *Busan Ilbo*, 3–24 September, 1985.

6 *Busan Ilbo*, 10 September, 1985

7 Yu Gyeongchae, "1.4 hutae ihu ui pinan saenghwal (Life as a refugee after the 1.4 retreat)" *Gyegan Misul*, Autumn, 1985, 60.

8 Lee Jun, "Busan e unjiphan misulin (Artists gathered in Busan)," *Gyegan Misul*, Autumn, 1985, 63.

9 Kim Yisoon, *Hyeondae jogak ui saeroun jipyeong* (A new horizon for modern sculpture), Haean, Seoul, 2008, 224.

10 Ibid, 251.

11 Ibid, 261.

THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP AND THE FUTURE OF NORTH KOREA

NICOLAS LEVI

Introduction

The following paper will deal with the political system of North Korea. I will present the successor to the actual leader of North Korea and the elites that are conducting North Korea. These elites are all connected to Kim Jong Il's family. According to Jae Cheon Lim, a South Korean analyst, Kim Jong Il's family can be divided into branches.[1] The main branch controls the power and symbolizes legitimate descendants who could accede to the throne. They are directly connected to Kim Jong Il and to his biological sister Kim Kyung Hee and to their natural mother Kim Jong Suk. The "lateral branches" are completely isolated from power and are generally living abroad. Members of this branch are connected to the last wife of Kim Jong Il, Kim Sung Ae, and to Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Il's son who indirectly criticizes his father by disapproving the hereditary succession process in North Korea.[2]

1. The main branch of the Kim Jong Il family

1.1 Kim Jong Il's children

1.1.1 KIM JONG CHOL (1981–): THE UNCHOSEN SUCCESSOR

Kim Jong Chol, Kim Jong Il's 29-year-old second son, was considered for a time to be the leader's chosen successor. Kim Jong Chol reportedly began work at the Propaganda and Agitation division of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) after studying at an international school in the Swiss city of Berne. In 2003, efforts had begun to propagate a cult around North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's last known legal wife and mother of Kim Jong Chol, Ko Yong Hee. A similar campaign had been created for Kim Jong Il's deceased mother, Kim Jong Suk, ahead of his succession. However Ko Yong Hee died in 2003 from a breast cancer. For a time he was supported by the First Vice Directors of the Guidance Department Ri Je Kang and Ri Yong Chol. However both of them died in 2010. For a number of years Kim Jong Chol was the rumoured successor. However, he does not have any interest in politics, and may have removed himself from consideration. Kenji Fujimoto, Kim Jong Il's personal *sushi* chef, wrote

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in his memoir *I Was Kim Jong Il's Cook* that Kim Jong Il disliked Kim Jong Chol because his son was too effeminate and had a passive personality. Kim Jong Chol works now in the Propaganda and Agitation Department, CC KWP.[3]

1.1.2 Kim Jong Un (1984–): the next leader

More than 20 directives have been signed by the Korean Workers' Party about the succession to Kim Jong Il. The next leader of North Korea is supposed to be Kim Jong Un. Like Kim Jong Il, he was educated at the International School of Berne and is a fan of NBA basketball. In 2009, Kim Jong Un took up a junior level post at the National Defence Commission (NDC)[4] a few days before the Parliament reappointed Kim Jong Il as the NDC chairman on 9 April 2009. He was expected to assume higher level NDC posts in preparation to succeed his father, but will just be a puppet of the North Korean leadership.

It seems improbable that the most powerful organizations in North Korea would accept a leader without military background. That's why Kim Jong Un was given 4-Star general status at age 28 and then was elected Vice Chairman of the NDC, the most powerful organization in North Korea. In spite of having these positions, Kim Jong Un is in a very different situation in comparison with his father and grandfather. Kim Jong Il was nominated, but he had begun his ascension working first in the party's elite Organization Department before being named a member of the Party Politburo in 1968 and promoted to deputy director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Party Headquarters in 1969. Until 1980 he added positions to his leadership background and was finally confirmed as Kim Il Sung's successor during the Sixth WPK Congress in 1980 at the age of 38. It means that Kim Jong Il worked for at least twelve years in order to get the approval of other North Korean elites. In comparison, Kim Jong Un, who is just 28 years, has no long military and significant political experience. His tutors Ri Je Kang and Ri Yong Chol also died in 2010 in mysterious conditions,[5] which seems to indicate that the position of Kim Jong Un is not fully secured. Kim Jong Un lacks close associates who can help him. Kim Jong Il had some close assistants, Kim Il and Choi Hyun, during his succession process who truly advised him, considering him even as a nephew. In comparison Kim Jong Un has got everything and is the second most powerful person in North Korea. He doesn't avail himself of real advisors and he's in a way alone. Without any power base, Kim Jong Un must obey the North Korean elites, especially in the event of his father's sudden death.

1.1.3 Kim Jong Nam (1971–): the exiled son

Kim Jong Nam was born on 10 May 1971 to Song Hye Rim, Kim Jong Il's second wife. The eldest son of Kim Jong Il, he moved to study at an international school in Geneva at the age of ten. Kim Jong Nam was at one time believed to be the

successor to his father and expected to take the helm of the communist North. He had been appointed to a senior post in the domestic intelligence agency, and was also a computer enthusiast. As of 2001 he led North Korea's committee on computing in cooperation with South Koreans, and was believed to be responsible for information technology policy. However, a big event occurred in 2001. On Tuesday 1 May 2001 Japanese authorities detained Kim Jong Nam at Narita airport for attempting to enter the country illegally. Kim Jong Nam's weakened position became apparent in 2002, when he spent much of the year in Russia, tending his mother. Although he had previously been touted as Kim Jong Il's heir, after the Tokyo airport incident and the death of his mother, he appeared to be out of the leadership race. As of early 2003 he was believed to be residing in China. Kim Jong Nam's travel habits almost certainly demonstrate that he is not in line to succeed his father to the leadership of North Korea. He travels by commercial scheduled passenger aircraft. There is however a precedent for the regime reinstating disgraced figures after a period of atonement, and in this case, his rehabilitation cannot be excluded. Oldest sons are generally favoured in North Korea, where Confucian traditions that honour seniority still hold sway. Kim Jong Nam was supported by Kim Kyung Hee and her husband Jang Song Thaek, because this couple participated in his education.

1.1.4 Other potential children of Kim Jong Il

Kim Jong Il is supposed to have other unofficial sons and daughters,[6] who may not be at the head of the country, but may play key roles in its future. Pak Se Bong, a supposed son of Kim Jong Il, is a member of the NDC. Another son, Kim Hyun, was supposed to have been killed a few years ago. Kim Sul Song, a daughter of Kim Jong Il, is often with her father during public inspections. She was born in 1974 and is fluent in French and English due to her education in Switzerland. She works in Room 99 (the IT department) of the CC KWP[7] and is a favourite of Kim Jong Il.[8]

1.2 Kim Jong Il's closest family members

1.2.1 Kim Kyung Hee: the younger sister

Kim Kyung Hee is the daughter of Kim Il Sung and his first wife Kim Jong Suk, and the sister of Kim Jong Il. She's a key member of Kim Jong Il's inner circle and a director of the Light Industry Department of the Workers' Party of Korea. On 27 September 2010 she was made a general in the Korean People's Army (the North Korean Army) and emerged as a member of the Political Bureau of the CC KWP. In the 70s she worked in the CC of the Korean Women's Association. After 1993 she was at the head of the Planning and Heavy Industry Department of the CC KWP.[9] This department now also includes the Light Industry section.[10] In 2004, she lost her position but remained a CC KWP member.[11] In March 2009 she was nominated

to the Supreme People's Assembly.[12] She and her husband have two children. Their son Jang Kim Song studied in Sweden and currently works in the Organization and Leadership Department of the CC KWP,[13] of which he is a member.[14] Their daughter Jang Kum Sung, who used to work with her father in the planning and construction of Pyongyang, committed suicide in 2006.[15]

Table 1. Kim Kyung Hee's partners[16]

Identity	Key responsibilities
Kim Jong Un	Kim Jong Il's successor
Kim Ki Nam	Vice Chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
Choe Thae Bok	SPA Chairman
Kim Yang Gon	Director of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
Kang Sok Ju	Vice Premier of the North Korean Government
Choe Ryong Hae	KPA 4-star general
Kim Chang Son	Deputy Director of Kim Jong Il's personal secretariat
Kim Jong Nam	Kim Jong Il's son

Table 2. Main political partners of Jang Song Thaek

Identity	Key responsibilities
Jo Jun Hwang	Deputy Director of Propaganda and Agitation Department, CC KWP
Ri Kwang Gon	Responsible for economic cooperation with South Korea
Hyon Chol Hae	Deputy Director of the Political Department of the KPA
Kim Yong Il	Secretary of Foreign Affairs, CC KWP
Kim Jong Jun	KPA Minister
Ri Ha Il	Director of the KPA Military Department
Kim Myong Guk	Director of the KPA Operational Department
Choe Ik Kyu	Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department CC KWP
U Dong Juk	Deputy Director of the National Security Department
Ri Yong Bok	Party Secretary of the city of Nampo
Ri Ul Sol	KPA Marshal. He was a tutor for Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Nam
Jang Song Hwon	Jang Song Thaek's uncle—KPA general
Jang Song Sop	Jang Song Thaek's brother—Deputy Director of Kim Il Sung University
Jang Song Yol	Jang Song Thaek's brother—Director of the Kim Il Sung Party School
Jang Song Ho	Jang Song Thaek's brother—Deputy Director of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Party

1.2.2 Jang Song Thaek: the unloved half-brother

Jang Song Thaek, born in 1946, is often cited as a possible "regent" if Kim Jong Un rises to a top post after Kim Jong Il passes on. Jang owes his power in certain measure to the influence of his wife, Kim Kyung Hee but also to his skills.[17] However, Jang Song Thaek was not in favour with Kim Il Sung (Kim Il Sung didn't accept the relationship between him and his daughter). Kim Jong Il has had to look after him. Mr. Jang rose through the ranks of the Workers' Party but disappeared from view between 2004 and 2006. Then he came back to the political scene of North Korea. He was nominated to the NDC in 2009 and accompanied Kim Jong Il during his trip to China. Jang Song Thaek is also the Chairman of the Chinese-North Korean investment bank Taepung.

1.3 The lateral branch of Kim Jong Il's family

Kim Jong Un is seemingly the next leader of North Korea, having been displayed to North Korea's cadres in September 2010. He has also apparently launched a purge of senior party and military officials in an attempt to cement his grip on power. In comparison, when his father Kim Jong Il was nominated to succeed Kim Il Sung, he had also to realize some purges and to compete with his half brother Kim Pyong Il, who has been the ambassador of North Korea to Poland since 1998. We will present here the relations between Kim Jong Il and the members of the "lateral branch".

Very early on Kim Jong Il disliked Kim Pyong Il (b. 1954) due to his mother Kim Sung Ae. Kim Jong Il hated his stepmother because she was indirectly involved in the death of his natural mother, Kim Jong Suk, who died in 1949 from a haemorrhage during childbirth. Kim Jong Suk was jealous of Kim Sung Ae. She preferred to die than watch the betrayal of her husband. Twenty years later, when the succession topic emerged in the mind of Kim Il Sung, Kim Sung Ae proposed to her husband that Kim Jong Il should be at the head of North Korea, Kim Pyong Il at the head of the army and Kim Yong Il at the head of the economy. Kim Jong Il, who was already a growing star of the Korean Workers' Party, was against this idea. He feared that Kim Pyong Il would be too powerful. Kim Jong Il then defined Kim Sung Ae and her family (including her brothers) and children as the "lateral branch" of the Kim Il Sung family. He wanted to legitimize himself as the only one who could carry the fate of North Korea. According to defectors, Kim Pyong Il was dissatisfied at this treatment—being considered as a member of a family side branch. Kim Pyong Il wanted to be at the head of the KPA. Kim Jong Il refused and tried to find a reason for expelling Kim Pyong Il from North Korea. Differences between Kim Jong Il and Kim Pyong Il really started when the latter entered the Security Guard Bureau following the Panmunjon axe incident on 18 July 1976. According to Bradley J. Martin, author of *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader,* at this time Kim Pyong Il started

to lead a dissolute life with his friends, Kim Pyong Ha and Kim Chang Ha, in his residence in the Taesong district or at his father's house in Amisan. He used to have some entertainment with female members of the People's Army ensembles, offering gifts including watches engraved with his name. His supporters started to scream "long live Kim Pyong Il" all over the country. These acts were of course totally prohibited in the North Korean monolithic system. Kim Jong Il was informed about these events by 15 members of the older generation of the political department, and told Kim Chang Ha to be careful. Kim Jong Il also gave an order to Chon Mun Sop, a director of the Security Department, to launch an investigation of Kim Pyong Il. All material collected was then shown to Kim Il Sung who was angered by the reports. His reaction was immediate. Kim Pyong Il's removal was ordered, and he was for a time discharged from the army. After these events, Kim Pyong Il was no longer able to maintain his dignity and authority in the army and probably from this moment the army's support for him was at least partially reduced. He was then sent to Moscow and to East Germany on the pretext of pursuing academic studies.[18] Next step was Yugoslavia where he was sent as a military *attaché* in 1980. He was then an ambassador of North Korea to Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland and now Poland. In this case and being far away, he was not able to coordinate actions against Kim Jong Il.

However, in the 90s, some of Kim Pyong Il's supporters conducted demonstrations on his behalf. In December 1994, fire was exchanged between the followers of Kim Jong Il and the followers of Kim Pyong Il in which eight major figures died and Kim Pyong Il's followers were suppressed. In April 1995 a rumour emanated from Seoul that Kim Pyong Il had been summoned to North Korea, because more than 50 of his followers were confined to their houses.

Kim Pyong Il may be under the protection of the Polish government, like the eldest son of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Nam, who is actually living in China and rumoured to be under Chinese protection. Other sources even suggest that Kim Pyong Il is regularly flying to Vienna and Zurich, where he's running some of Kim Jong Il's accounts. He was not present during the last Korean Workers' Party Conference, which took place in September 2010. During this time, Kim Pyong Il was present during a diplomatic party in Warsaw, and said in perfect English that "the longer I am in Poland, the better it will be". It shows us, how Kim Pyong Il is far away from the North Korean political drama.

Other members of the "lateral branch" were expelled from Pyongyang in the 70s and in the 90s. Kim Jong Ju, Kim Il Sung's brother, is now living with his family out of Pyongyang. In the 70s he was living in the northern part of North Korea. He returned to politics in 1993, being nominated as honorary Vice Chairman of the SPA. In 2010 he lost his political position. Kim Sung Ae and her brothers, Kim Sung Gap and Kim Sung Ho, lost their political power (in the 90s Kim Sung Ae had been Vice Chairwoman of the CC of the Korean Womens' Association). They were even forced

to pay tribute to the biological mother of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Suk. Now nobody knows if they're alive. Kim Pyong Il's sister is living in Vienna and was expelled from North Korea in 1979. Her second brother Kim Yong Il died of liver cirrhosis in 2000. He used to spend his time in nightclubs and casinos all over Europe. Kim Yong Ja, another of Kim Sung Ae's daughters, is married to a KPA general.[19]

2 North Korean Elites

2.1 Definition

The elite at the top of the social strata almost invariably puts it in a position of leadership. In North Korea, people who belong to the elites have at least one major position in leading party, government, and military organs. This group includes all political leaders who are directly involved in the preparation of major policy decisions and who participate in the inner circle of policy making. The ruling elite include Political Bureau members and secretaries of the KWP and members of the NDC. It's estimated that they represent a group of twenty thousand people.[20]

2.2 Actual Elites

Kim Jong Un may be North Korea's heir apparent, but as I explained before, he will be just a puppet of the system. The balance of power might be in a collective leadership — which either the Workers' Party or the army would dominate. Power is actually in the hands of Kim Jong Il and members of the NDC. The North Korean military is directly controlled by the NDC which has been elevated to an independent organization next only to the President of North Korea. This organization is composed of politicians and generals. Its members are the most powerful people in North Korea including Jang Song Thaek, Ju Kyu Jang and Kim Jong Jun. These leaders concurrently hold multiple positions within the party, the government, and the army.

There also some new elites who are connected to the business world, including Jon Sung Hun or Kim Yang Gon, who are at the head of business organizations such as the investment bank of North Korea. Members of the CC are senior managers and also belong to north Korean elites. They include technocrats, economists, managers, and technicians. Elites are directly connected to Kim Jong Il, Jang Song Thaek and Choe Ryong Hae. These people are in their 50s or 60s. These key persons are Kim Kwang Gon, Pak Saeh Bong, Pak Myong Chol and Kim Kyung Hee. They have known Kim Jong Il for at least 20–30 years and they are connected to the main political organizations in North Korea.

Top leaders share a number of common social characteristics. They belong to the same generation. According to my calculations, the average age of the party's top fifty leaders was about 68 years in 1990, 64 years in 2000 and 64 in 2010. By the end

Table 3. Kim Jong Il's family lateral branch

Identity	Kinships	Key responsibilities
Kim Pyong Il	Kim Jong Il's half-brother	North Korean ambassador to Poland
Kim Kyung Jin	Kim Jong Il's half-sister	Wife of the North Korean ambassador to Austria
Kim Sung Ae	Kim Jong Il's step mother	Retired
Kim Jong Ju	Kim Il Sung's brother	Retired
Kim Jong Nam	Kim Jong Il's son	No responsibilities

Table 4. North Korea Elites connected to Kim Jong Il and Jang Song Thaek

Identity	Main position	Connections with Kim Jong Il	Connections with Jang Song Thaek	Other information
Kim Kyung Hee	Director of the Light Industry Department KWP, KPA 4-star general	Kim Jong Il's sister	Jang Song Thaek's wife	No information
Kim Yong Nam	Former North Korean Chairman of the Presidium of SPA	Kim Jong Il's cousin	Jang Song Thaek's cousin	No information
Kim Il Chol	KPA minister	Kim Jong Il's cousin	No information	Former counterpart of Jo Myong Rok
Kim Jong Jun	KPA Vice Marshal	Close advisor to Kim Jong Il	No information	Former counterpart of Jo Myong Rok
Ri Myong Su	KPA Vice Marshal	Close advisor to Kim Jong Il	Close advisor to Jang Song Thaek's brother	Jang Song U's mentor
Kang Sok Ju	Deputy prime minister	Close advisor to Kim Jong Il	No information	No information
Kim Kye Kwan	Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister	Translator's husband to Kim Sung Ae.	No information	Kim Kye Kwan is under the protection of Kim Yong Nam
Pak Kil Yon	Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister	Advisor to Kim Jong Il	No information	Counterpart of Ko Yong Hee and Kang Sok Ju
Ri Yong Mu	NDC Deputy director	Advisor to Kim Jong Il. His wife is a cousin of Kim Jong Il	No information	No information

of 1989, ageing members of the anti-Japanese partisan group accounted for 24 per cent of the Political Bureau's full members and in 2000 for 20 per cent, and in 2010 for 15 per cent. There is no clear evidence of regional under-representation. However, many Hamgyung natives are included in the inner circle, for example the former KPA Leader O Jin U, Pak Song Chol, Kim Yong Nam and Kye Ung Tae.

2.3 Future Elites

Future elites can be split into two categories. In the first category, we've got North Korea politicians who are in their 50s or 60s and belong to the second and third generation. They represent a group of senior North Korean elites' children, who are travelling abroad and more open-minded than the first generation. The second group of elites consist of young people who are in their 30s and 40s. They are illegally importing alcohol and other items from various locations. Their activities include the production and the distribution of counterfeit 100 dollars bills and drug trafficking. This group is led by Oh Se Wan, the son of O Kuk Ryol, a North Korean general. Kang Tae Seung, Kang Jok Su's son (Deputy Prime Minister of North Korea) is also

Table 5. The political leadership in North Korea

Identity	Key responsibilities	Date of birth
Kim Jong Il	Chairman of the NDC KPA Marshal General Secretary of the KWP Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP	1942
Ju Kyu Jang	NDC member Deputy Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP Deputy Director of the 2nd Economic Committee	?
Ri Myong Je	Deputy Director of the Personal Secretariat of Kim Jong Il Deputy Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP	1929
Yom Ki Sun	Deputy Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP	1935
Choe Ik Kyu	Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, CC KWP	1934
Ri Jae Il	Deputy Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, CC KWP	?
Choe Yong Rim	North Korean Prime Minister	1930
Jon Pyong Ho	Secretary of the Military Industry Department, CC KWP NDC member	1926
Kang Kwan Ju	Deputy Director of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland Expert on South Korean and Japan issues	1930
Ri Kwang Gon	Responsible for economic exchanges with South Korea Central National Bank Chairman	?
Jon Il Chon	Director of Room 39 (a bureau that manages Kim Jong Il's finances) and an operator of North Korean companies	?
Jon Sung Hun	North Korean businessman (one of the wealthiest persons in North Korea)	1960s

Table 6. The military leadership in North Korea

Identity	Key responsibilities	Date of birth
Ri Yong Mu	Deputy Director NDC KPA vice marshal	1925
U Dong Juk	NDC member Deputy Director of the National Security Bureau KPA general	1942
Kim Jong Jun	KPA minister NDC Deputy Director	1936
Ri Yong Ho	KPA vice marshal Chairman of the Pyongyang KPA division	1942
Kim Jong Gak	KPA General NDC member KPA Political Department Deputy Director KPA spokesman	1945
Ju Sang Song	KPA general Public Security minister	?
Ri Ha Il	KPA vice marshal Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs, CC KWP	?
Ri Myong Su	KPA general NDC Administrative Director Advisor to the NDC	1938
Kim Kyuk Sik	Close advisor to Kim Jong Il (Kim Kyuk Sik is often travelling abroad)	1940
	Central Army Commission member	
O Kum Chol	Air Force commander	?
Ri Thae Il	KPA general Member of the National Security Bureau KPA Deputy Director	?

involved in these issues.[21] This North Korean group could be compared to China's "princelings", sons and daughters of Chinese Communist Party and military leaders who amassed fortunes through businesses and their family connections within the ruling Communist Party system.

3. The future of North Korea

The future of North Korea is uncertain. The system is in constant evolution, insofar as new elites are ruling the country. The future of North Korea is dependent on China's behaviour. China is North Korea's most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, and fuel. China is helping sustain Kim Jong Il's regime and is against international economic sanctions in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and an uncontrolled move of refugees. The number of refugees coming from North Korea is increasing but is still relatively limited. Most of those who leave do

so for economic rather than political reasons. The reunification of the two Koreas is still impossible, insofar as South Korean organizations face problems with North Korean settlers.

The regime has survived many things such as war, famine, international isolation and many other problems. It should not be written off yet, even though there are more imponderables now than before. China, South Korea, and other countries such as Japan do not wish to face a political crisis in the peninsula, for fear of the consequences in terms of refugee outflows and consequences of a potential conflict. The future of North Korea is then dependent on Kim Jong Il's successor and North Korean elites, who will lead the North Korean system, and of course on China and to a lesser degree on Russia. The actual transition of power in North Korea is also a vulnerable time for North Korean elites. Authorities are increasing their grip on society to prevent potential riots. Meanwhile, the nomination of Kim Jong Un as next North Korean leader and the presentation of the new elites may give a new impulse to relations between both Koreas and China. Expectations and stakes are high. Recently, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak has urged the North Korean elites to adopt China's economic reforms, arguing that this can lead to eventual Korean reunification. Lee Myung Bak and his administration probably waited for the nomination of Kim Jong Un in order to pronounce these spectacular words. There are hopes everywhere, not only in South Korea, that the new leaders will make the perspective of unification more plausible.

Appendix

Table 7. Kinships in the actual North Korean leadership (as of November 2010)

Identity	Kinships with the Kim Jong Il family	Main position
Kim Jong Il	Kim Il Sung oldest son	Supreme leader of North Korea
Kim Jong Un	Kim Jong Il's son	Kim Jong Il's successor
Kim Kyung Hee	Kim Jong Il's sister	Head of the Light Industry Department, CC KWP
Kang Sok Ju	Kim Jong Il's cousin	Deputy Prime Minister
Ri Yong Mu	Kim Jong Il's cousin-in-law	KPA general
Kang Kwan Ju	Kim Jong il's cousin, on his father's (Kim il Sung) side	Deputy Director of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
Kim Ki Nam	Kim Yong Nam's brother	Vice Chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
Yang Hyong Sop	Husband of Kim Il Sung's cousin	Chairman of the Presidium of the SPA
Kang Dok Su	Son of Kang Bo-sok, Kim Il sung's uncle on his mother's side.	Chairman, Choson Broadcasting Corp.
Kang Yong Sop	Kim Il Sung mother's cousin	Chairman of the Korea Christian Federation of North Korea
Kim Jong Su	Kim Il Sung's cousin	Deputy director of the Mangyongdae school
Kim Jong Suk	Kim Yong Nam's wife	Director at the Social Sciences University
Kim Tu Nam	Kim Ki Nam's brother	Director of the Kumumsan mausoleum, where Kim Il Sung is placed
Kim Il San	Kim Il's cousin	Kaesong Mayor
Kim Myung Hee	Kim Il Sung's cousin	Responsible for foreign affairs in the Cultural Department, CC KWP
Kim Myung Woo	Kim Il Sung's cousin	Deputy Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP
Kim Sung Hwan	Kim Il Sung's cousin	Deputy Director of Chongjin University
Kim Jong Nam	Kim Jong Il's son	Director of the IT department of the KWP (the so-called Room 99)
Kim Sul Song	Kim Jong Il's daughter	Director of the IT department of the KWP (the so-called Room 99)
Son Song Pil	Kim Jong Il's cousin	Former North Korean ambassador to Russia
Kang Tong Yun	Kim Jong Il's cousin	KPA general
Ko Yong Ho	Cousin of the last wife of Kim Jong Il	KPA general
Kim Pyong Il	Kim Jong Il's half-brother	North Korean ambassador to Poland

Notes

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3 CC KWP: The Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party (CC KWP) is the KWP's political body. It advises on government policies. *A Handbook of North Korea*, Naewoe Press, Seoul 1996.

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5 "Close Aide to Kim Jong-il Dies", *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 April 2010.

6 Kim Jun Song is another potential daughter of Kim Jong Il (b. in 1975). Kim Jong Il may have other children from unofficial relationships.

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